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Abstract 
 
The thesis focuses on the firms’ business performance in China, along with the growth of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows and the reforms of the institutions. This research 
employs New Institutional Economics (NIEs) as a theoretical basis, seeking to identify the 
mechanism of interaction between FDI, ownership change, and the institutions in China. The 
economic reforms, which started in the 1980s and continued thereafter, not only led to an 
unprecedented level of FDI inflow into China and increased the role of the private sector and 
ownership in the country, but also had more serious implications in that the formal and informal 
institutions of the Chinese economy remains largely under the control of the Chinese 
Communist Party. This study considers ownership change as an appropriate connection between 
FDI inflows, the improvement of business performance, and the institutions in the context of 
both formal and informal institutions in China. This paper aims to provide supporting evidence 
for the institutional approaches to the study of business performance in a transition environment. 
The author chooses the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) as the data source to 
explore the relations between the institutions and the business performances of enterprises in 
China, measured by sales and investment. In this thesis, the author uses a number of statistical 
tools, including descriptive analysis, Levene’s test, Error Bar, Logistic regression, and 
categorical regression. The results show that the influences of the institutional constraints 
reported by the hypotheses vary in different occasions according to the firms studied, and these 
significant relations between the institutions and the business performance cannot be kept 
consistent and continuous. The influences of institutions on the business performance are 
complicated in China, measured by sales and investment. The complexity consists of the 
relation and interaction among the formal and informal institutional factors, of the relations 
between the institutional factors and the firms’ inherent nature, and of the relations between the 
institutional factors and the firms’ business performance in China.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background-----FDI, Institutions, and  Economic growth in China 
From the beginning of 1980s, China began reforming its economy, including application for 
membership in the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) followed on January 1, 1995) (Norlan and Wang, 1999). In defiance of its 
previous objectives, the Chinese Communist Party that controls the government has allowed the 
appearance of some elements of a capitalist market, which has brought inevitable changes to the 
Chinese economy. China’s WTO negotiation and membership played a key role in increasing 
the openness of its economy, including bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, and financial 
cooperation. Moreover, WTO membership “also means China’s sensitive and infant sectors, and 
small and medium-sized enterprises …… are exposed to global competition and to conformity 
with WTO rules and disciplines” (Yue, 2004: 2).  
 
In the 1980s, a number of developing countries initiated economic reforms in order to reform 
their economies and achieve high and sustainable economic growth. In the 1990s, the former 
Eastern European Communist countries, often referred to as transition economies, also joined 
this group of developing countries in reforming their economies. Although they all adopted 
similar development strategies and reform policies, some are still lacking behind, either in terms 
of the pace or quality of reforms. Some were even involved in serious economic and social 
crisis, such as the 1997 Southeast Asian crisis. The Chinese economic growth, on the other 
hand, is regarded as a miracle among them, and the firms’ business performance is an important 
part contributing to Chinese economic growth. More importantly, the rapid business growth of 
firms’ in China shows no signs of abating, despite apparent lack of what seems to be essentials 
for business growth in the western world, such as the rule of law and secure property rights 
(North, 1999). The obvious questions here are what China has done to improve its business 
performance? And how can China improve the performance of the firms? 
 
Since the 1980s, China has absorbed a large amount of FDI, and the FDI inflows to China 
increased from $ 19.56 million in 1985 to $ 1160.11 million in 2011 (table 1.1). From 1985 to 
1991, the overall growth of the FDI inflows is more than doubled. In 1992 and 1993, the FDI 
inflows keep increasing at speed of about 150% per year. From 1994 to now, the growth of FDI 
inflows is stable except for the negative influences caused by Southeast Asian financial crisis in 
1990s and the recent global economic crisis.  
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Table 1.1 The economic performance in China------FDI and GDP 
 FDI Annual growth GDP Annual growth 
Unit US$ 100M (current price) % US$ Billion (current price) % 
1985 19.56  305.26  
1986 22.44 14.72 295.48 -3.20 
1987 23.14 3.12 321.39 8.77 
1988 31.94 38.03 401.07 24.79 
1989 33.93 6.23 449.10 11.98 
1990 34.87 2.77 387.77 -13.66 
1991 43.66 25.21 406.09 4.72 
1992 110.08 152.13 483.05 18.95 
1993 275.15 149.95 613.23 26.95 
1994 337.67 22.72 559.23 -8.81 
1995 375.21 11.12 727.95 30.17 
1996 417.26 11.21 856.01 17.59 
1997 452.57 8.46 952.65 11.29 
1998 454.63 0.46 1019.48 7.02 
1999 403.19 -11.31 1083.28 6.26 
2000 407.15 0.98 1198.48 10.63 
2001 468.78 15.14 1324.81 10.54 
2002 527.43 12.51 1453.84 9.74 
2003 535.05 1.44 1640.96 12.87 
2004 606.30 13.31 1931.65 17.71 
2005 603.25 -0.50 2256.92 16.84 
2006 630.21 4.47 2712.92 20.20 
2007 747.68 18.64 3494.24 28.80 
2008 923.95 23.58 4519.95 29.35 
2009 900.33 -2.56 4990.53 10.41 
2010 1057.35 17.44 5930.39 18.83 
2011 1160.11 9.72 7321.99 23.47 
Source: FDI---Chinese statistical year book; GDP and GDP per capita---World Economic Outlook. 
Graph 1.1 China’s OFDI stock (US$ millions) 
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Grahp 1.2 China’s OFDI flow and FDI inflow (US$ millions) 
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Since the 1980s, China has absorbed a large amount of FDI, and the FDI inflows to China 
increased from $1956 million in 1985 to $121080 million in 2012 (table 1.1). From 1985 to 
1991, the overall growth of the FDI inflows is more than doubled. In 1992 and 1993, the FDI 
inflows keep increasing at speed of about 150% per year. From 1994 to now, the growth of FDI 
inflows is stable except for the negative influences caused by Southeast Asian financial crisis in 
the later 1990s and the recent global economic crisis.  
 
One the other side, many Chinese enterprises already engaged in international business have 
started significant investment abroad while China remains a favourite destination of foreign 
capital at the same time (OECD, 2008). Shown in Graph 1.1 and Graph 1.2, at the end of 2012, 
China’s cumulative stock of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) reached USD 509 
billion, more than 18 times the level in 2000. Although the amount of OFDI stock owned by 
China is still only about one quarter of the FDI stock in China, the OFDI flows from China 
during 2000-06 with an average flow of USD 7 billion per annum and an average annual growth 
rate of 116%, while at the same time, the FDI inflow to China only increased 54.8%. 
 
Several studies suggest that the OFDI of China is to take advantage of beneficial host country 
conditions, and then re-invested in China to benefit from advantageous terms for foreign 
investors (Morck et al., 2008; Yeung and Lie, 2008; Cheng and Ma, 2008; Cheng and Stough, 
2007). The OFDI of China are often also expected to make profits as the OFDI provides the 
investment incentives, such as the access to raw materials and energy, the acquisition of 
technology, brands and know-how, the search of new market, and the desire to avoid 
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international trade barriers (Salidjanova, 2011). In addition to profitable objectives, Chinese 
OFDI may also reflect different opportunities or incentives than FDI from other countries. In 
particular, China has a quite different institutional environment than the major source countries 
of FDI from the developed world, and the institutional setting in China may thus be an 
important determinant (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009). Alternatively, the China’s OFDI may 
represent the establishment of holding companies for investment elsewhere, or attempts to hide 
wealth from tax authorities or other parties (Morck et al., 2008). 
 
The Chinese companies that invest abroad were predominantly state-owned so far, for instance, 
82% of China’s non-financial outward FDI was conducted by state-owned enterprises in 2006 
(Yeung and Liu, 2008). However, the 2011 Private Wealth Report, published by China 
Merchants Bank and business consulting firm Bain & Company, showed the number individuals 
in China, who have at least 10 million yuan ($1.53 million) worth of individual assets (financial 
assets, not including their primary residence) available for investment exceeded 500,000 in 
2010, 19 percent more than in 2009. Moreover, among them, nearly 60 percent are either 
considering emigration through investment overseas or are already finalizing the process 
(Global Times, 2011). In fact, “Obtaining a US EB-5 visa (for immigrant investors) requires at 
least $500,000, or over 3.4 million yuan, the United States approved the settlement of 1,971 
investment immigrants from the Chinese mainland in 2009, surpassing the entire number of 
1,360 foreign immigrants who came to the US in the previous year” (Global Times, 2012).  
 
Table 1.2 PERSONS OBTAINING LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS of the 
US BY REGION AND COUNTRY OF BIRTH 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total 653206 644787 841002 1058902 1,059,356 703,542 957,883 
China 36854 32159 45585 56267     61,082      40,568      55,494  
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 1,122,257 1,266,129 1,052,415 1,107,126 1,130,818 1,042,625 1,062,040 
China     69,933      87,307      76,655      80,271      64,238      70,863      87,016  
Source: United States Census Bureau. 
 
In addition, based on the statistical data released by the US government (table 1.2), in 2011, the 
US government granted green cards to more than 1.06 million immigrants. Among them, 87,000 
were from China, 16,000 more than in 2010 (Chinadaily, 2010). An interesting question is what 
drives the Chinese domestic private capital to invest abroad, instead of staying in this rapid 
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growth economy, or what business obstacles they have to face in China. Moreover, why more 
and more FDI inflows to China while the Chinese private capital is moving away? In other 
words, what are the business constraints for the foreign capital and the domestic private capital 
in the business environment in China respectively, which results in their opposing reactions? 
 
To study the business environment in China, some NIE researchers believe that FDI inflow 
influences the direction of China’s growth and the kind of institutions support the business 
growth of firms in the country. Among them, North (2005) regards the effective performance as 
the essential requirement for the dynamic market as this performance entails the creation of 
open-access society. For them, the key is to create the appropriate institutions to provide the 
proper incentives under a particular business environment. Based on the NIEs, the institutional 
evolutions, such as the openness reforms in the 1980s, have encouraged FDI inflows in China. 
The change made by government to attract and absorb FDI brought some initial changes in this 
economy. Those in turn led to the construction of a set of beliefs, resulting in the evolutions of 
both formal including laws, regulations, contracts, constitutions, and networks, and informal 
institutions, such as social norms and values, privatization, corruption, cronyism, tax evasion, 
trust, social capital, new business ethics and informal cooperation (Leftwich, 2009; Chavance, 
2008). The institutions in China have developed into an inter-dependent and multi-level system 
whose operation depends on organisational connections and personal relationships (Child and 
Tse, 2001). Finally, both formal and informal institutions worked together resulting in the 
creation of a new institutional framework. Thus, the institutional change for openness can be an 
issue to improve the business performance of the firms in China.  
 
In this research, FDI inflows are used as a key factor behind initiating economic changes and 
institutions are examined as the vital element to sustain the changing policies and to improve the 
business performance of firms in general. However, these two issues do not guarantee a 
continuous business growth. In this respect, it is more important to study what else determines 
the success or failure of the changes in a developing or transition economy. The author seeks to 
study the connection between FDI and institutions, which results in the growth of business. This 
is to be achieved through investigating FDI inflows, the firms’ business performance, and the 
application of institutional changes with the changes of the business environment in China. 
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1.2 The theoretical basis and research objective  
The openness or liberalisation change in China means “that multi-layered approach should be 
appropriate for trading …… given its diversity and different levels of development…… to 
enhance the region’s welfare if these arrangements create more trade” (Avila, 2002: 6-19). The 
other developing countries have pursued the export-oriented development strategies to increase 
potential competitive advantage and gain the benefits of their labour-intensive manufacturing 
processes. However, not all of them succeed in achieving their targets. Even worse, some have 
been involved in the economic crisis, such as the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s 
and the Southeast Asian financial crisis in 1997. As a result, these developing countries faced a 
number of problems, including sharp reductions in values of currencies, stock markets and other 
asset prices, and a reduction in incomes, stagnant economic growth, high unemployment and 
inflation (Weisbrot, 2007; Felix, 1990). Given the essential factors for economic growth, such as 
labour and capital (Solow, 1956), it can be questioned why those countries failed to achieve 
their growth targets. Therefore, it is important to clarify what results in these economic failures 
and what determine successful economic growth in a developing country. 
 
Table 1.3 the institutional changes in the European post-Soviet countries 
Source: Chavance (2008) 
 
Moreover, the post-socialist transformation in approximately 30 countries during the 1990s and 
2000s has also led to a number of new topics for social researchers. Among these studies, two 
typical aspects of transformation are the striking diversity of national paths of change and the 
general importance of informal relations and rules in a process of rationalization and 
formalization. Chavance (2008) summarised these changes in Europe and in Asia respectively 
(table 1.3 and table 1.4), and concluded that the specific and evolving relations between formal 
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and informal institutional change have been a key element in the transformation of these post-
Soviet countries. Although a number of scholars examined these changes at a national level 
(Chavance and Magnin 1997; Magnin, 1999; Van de Mortel 2002; Lane and Myant, 2007), the 
investigation of the formal and informal institutional changes that directly influenced the 
business operation of firms should be also emphasised. Concentrating on such causes and the 
processes of institutional changes that affect business performance may help to understand the 
application of the NIE theories. In this thesis, the author intends to apply the NIE theories to 
investigate the relations between the firms’ business performance and the institutions at an 
organisational level in a Soviet country, in order to better understand the efforts and the changes 
related in this transitional process. 
 
Table 1.4 the institutional changes in the Asian post-Soviet countries 
Source: Chavance (2008) 
 
Accordingly, there are several reasons as to why the author chooses China as the research target 
country. China is the biggest developing country and the biggest transition economy in the 
world. Moreover, since the beginning of the 1980s, China has overcome the same difficulties 
faced by other developing and transitioning countries while achieving and maintaining a relative 
rapid economic growth. In this regard, as a country that has achieved high economic growth 
over the past thirty years, it is useful to examine how and why China has succeeded while others 
have failed. Among the factors that support economic growth, the improvement of the firms’ 
business performance should be one of the fundamental issues contributing to China’s economic 
success. “China’s success is built on the gradual liberalization of product and labour markets, 
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increasing openness to foreign trade, investment in infrastructure and institutional changes such 
as property reforms and privatization which provide individual actors with sufficient security for 
planning, investing and economic risk taking. The beneficial effect of the state results from its 
capacity to construct and maintain institutional environments that provide positive incentives to 
entrepreneurs and managers at the firm level to invest in economic growth” (Nee et al., 2007: 
43-44). Therefore, the issues that comprises the institutions, the economic changes, and the 
governance systems work together to constitute the Chinese business environment. It is 
consequently necessary to study these issues in order to enhance our understandings of the 
impact on business performance or the practical outcomes of the economic changes in China. To 
examine the firms’ business performance during the changing process in China, this thesis 
focuses on the following research questions:   
 Can a relationship between institutional frameworks and the business performance of 
firms be conceptually defined? 
 Can this relationship be tested in the case of the business performance of firms in China 
in the context of FDI inflows and the policies related?  
 Can any relationship between the institutional constraints and the different firm 
categories be found, including the firms with / without foreign ownership, as well as the 
private firms and the non-private firms? 
 
The NIE will be employed as a theoretical basis for this research. According to new institutional 
economists, institutions consisting of formal rules, informal constraints, and their enforcement 
characteristics, constrain the behaviour of individuals to maximise the wealth or utility of 
principals (North, 1981; Harberger, 1978; Scully, 1988). Both formal and informal institutions 
determine the transaction cost and productivity and quality of transactions, with the institutions, 
as a result, shaping the direction of economic change (North, 1991). This research concentrates 
on the factors that directly influence the firms’ business performance in the context of sales and 
investment, as the effects of a changing business environment under the economic and social 
changes to achieve the economic growth in China.  
 
A number of factors such as the SOEs and the socialist business environment in China, and 
governmental intervention in the business operation in particular, have been widely criticised 
because of their inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. They are also considered as obstacles to the 
improvement of business performance, which may prevent sustainable economic growth in the 
future (Child, 1994; Li et al., 2006; Ma et al., 2006; Pan et al., 2008; Peng, 2004; Shenkar and 
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Von Glinow, 1994; Wei, 2007). The objective of this paper is thus to identify the mechanism 
between the firms’ business performance and institutions in China. In the proposed study, the 
author will investigate how institutional changes affect FDI inflows and improve business 
performance in China, including the relevant changes in the formal institutions and the informal 
institutions. In particular, this research proposes to find a key to enhance business performance 
in China, and then to use this key factor to understand the relations between the institutional 
changes caused by FDI inflows and the domestic business impacts related to the FDI favourite 
changes in addition to the proposed aims and the practical influences of the changing efforts in 
China. To sum up, the author aims to provide a strategic implication of improving the firms’ 
business performance in developing and transition economies.    
1.3 Research approach 
In order to answer the question about how institutions may affect the business performance of 
firms along with the FDI inflows in China, the author focuses on studying the causal 
relationships between the institutional variables and the firms’ business performance. The 
author conducts this study through the following steps. In the beginning, the author introduces 
the conceptual framework to investigate the business performance of the firms, along with the 
economic changes and the related social changes in China. This framework focuses on domestic 
changes, including those which have led to institutional changes. Consequently, the influences 
on the firms’ business behaviours should be measured in the context of the institutional changes. 
The study will then focus on formulating and testing the research hypothesis about the 
relationship between the firms’ business performance and the business constraints, which may 
consist of both formal and informal institutions in China.  
 
This thesis consists of two main parts. The first part --- from chapter 1 to 5 --- provides an 
overview of the theory of institutional economics, highlighting its most important three aspects. 
It also reviews the relations between FDI inflows, the institutions, and the emergence of private 
ownership in China. The first part highlights the importance of the appearance of private 
ownership in China during the economic growth path, and looks at the value of private 
ownership to achieve sustainable growth and development along with the changing policies. 
Based on the reviews of the existing literature, the author draws attention to the conceptual 
framework to answer the research questions and to accomplish the research objectives. 
Furthermore, the author examines the methodology and research that will be used to test the 
research hypotheses from the conceptual framework. 
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The second part ---from chapter 6 to chapter 9--- covers the empirical analysis and discussions 
of the research. Chapter 6 studies the research hypothesis in general. Chapter 7 investigates the 
research hypotheses about whether the intensity of institutional constraints differs across the 
different categories constituting the ownership structure of the firms in China, i.e. between firms 
with and without foreign ownership; between private firms and non-private firms; and between 
small, medium and large size firms. Chapter 8 empirically examines the relationship between 
the institutions and the firms’ business performance. Using the regression model, this chapter 
examines the nature of the interaction between institutions and the effect of institutions on the 
business performance in China. In chapter 9, the author summarises the research findings of 
chapter 6, chapter 7 and chapter 8 to further discuss the reasons behind the mathematical results 
regarding business performance and institutions in China, including the practical influences of 
the changes on business operation. The final chapter of research is the conclusion which 
highlights the main points and findings of this research. This involves the implications of the 
findings as well as the limitations of this study and recommendations for further research.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
Chapter 2 Institutional Economics 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the theoretical foundation of this dissertation, which is based on the 
New Institutional Economic theory.  There are six sections in this chapter. The first section 
reviews the definition of institutions and the origins of the New Institutional Economics (NIE). 
The second section presents three categories of institutions and explains why this research uses 
the NIE to investigate the firms’ business performance in China. The third section displays the 
important elements of the NIE, while the fourth section discusses the importance of the link 
between institutions and the process of economic change. In the fifth and sixth sections, I will 
be discussing the business performance and the economic exchanges of informal and formal 
institutions. 
2.2 Definition of institutions and the new institutional economics 
The term “institutional economics” can be traced back to Walton Hamilton in 1918. Commons 
(1931), one of the founders of the NIE theory, states that an institution is a collective action that 
is used in the control, liberation and expansion of individual action. Veblen (1898), Commons 
(1931) and Coase (1937), characterised the beliefs of Original Institutional Economics (OIE) in 
that this view of institutions was typical of their viewpoint on institutions. Commons (1931, 
cited by Rutherford, 1983), saw this as,  
“(1) the nature and function of property rights and other rules and their effect on 
economic transactions, (2) the behaviour of private collectives and judicial and 
political processes of decision making, (3) institutional change, and (4) proposals for 
institutional reform.” (Rutherford, 1983:739) 
However, Rutherford (1983) noted that the issues of transaction costs, public goods, 
externalities, free ridership, and bureaucratic behaviour are omitted from Commons’ view, 
which is something that could have been used to strengthen his definition on institutions. 
 
Hodgson (2000: 318) described and summarised the core of the OIE, in terms of five 
propositions: 
 Although institutional economists are keen to give their theories practical relevance, 
institutionalism itself is not defined in terms of any policy proposals. 
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 Institutionalism makes extensive use of ideas and data from other disciplines such as 
psychology, sociology and anthropology in order to develop a richer analysis of 
institutions and of human behaviour. 
 Institutions are the key elements of any economy, and thus a major task for economists 
is to study institutions and the process of institutional conservation, innovation and 
change. 
 The economy is an open and evolving system, situated in a natural environment, affected 
by technological changes, and embedded in a broader set of social, cultural, political, 
and power relationships. 
 The notion of individual agents as utility-maximising is regarded as inadequate or 
erroneous. Institutionalism does not take the individual as given. Individuals are affected 
by their institutional and cultural situations. Hence individuals do not simply 
(intentionally or unintentionally) create institutions. Through reconstitutive downward 
causation institutions affect individuals in fundamental ways”. 
Hodgson also considered the fifth proposition as the single most important characteristics of the 
old institutionalism, and that is also the difference between the OIE and the NIE. Mayhew 
(2000) agreed with Hodgson about the identification of “five propositions” as the main defining 
features of the OIE. For them, the difference between the OIE and the NIE is that the NIE aims 
to explain institutions “with the tools of neoclassical theory, so that institutions are chosen by 
individuals and not allowed to condition individual choice” (Dequech, 2002: 566). In other 
words, given an environment, the individuals are constrained by the institutions providing 
incentives for individuals.  
 
Williamson (1981) and North (1990) lead the NIE. North (1995: 8) has defined institutions as 
“the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction--the ‘rules of the game.’ The 
definition is designed to be complementary to the choice-theoretic framework of economic 
theory and to incorporate the overall function of institutions--which is to provide the underlying 
structure to exchange and human organization”. Both schools of traditional institutional 
economics and the NIE reject the assumption pioneered by the neo-classical economics, that the 
full economic rationality postulate or perfect foresight (Richter, 1996). North (1994), in 
particular, criticises neoclassical theory for not being an appropriate tool to analyze and 
prescribe policies that will induce development as it is concerned with the operation of markets, 
instead of how markets develop. Both the OIE and NIE theories use institutions as the basis of 
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their analysis, linking institutions and economic performance together. They also believe 
institutions determine economic activity and hence contribute to economic growth.  
 
North (1990 and 1991) explains the economic phenomenon in terms of mainstream economic 
orientations, by including the institutions in the analysis of economic issues and abandons the 
neoclassical assumption of economic rationality and zero transaction costs. In other words, NIE 
places more emphasis on choices to be made and explain individual’s behaviour in complex, 
dynamic circumstances that involve a great deal of uncertainty, in contrast to the concept of 
rationality in the neoclassical economics. NIE retains the economic assumptions of scarcity and 
competition. The scholars of NIE believe that transactions are not costless (Coase, 1937), and 
due to the incompleteness of information, this outlines the importance of the institutions in 
reducing uncertainty in human exchange, and therefore as a determinant of the efficiency of 
markets. As a result, the NIE researchers implement transaction cost to their analysis.  
 
It is important to note that rules not only differ between various societies, but that they might 
also differ from one individual to another, from one group to another and from one society to 
another. These differences are the result of societal changes, including different natural 
endowment and different subjective backgrounds. The evolutionary path is determined by past 
and initial conditions (North, 1990). Moreover, these rules do not have to be under the control of 
certain characteristics of an institution. Rules differ in their degree and extent of change. Indeed, 
as an example, formally written rules could be changed at any moment of time provided that the 
incentive (such as technology and prices) for that change exists. However, rules, based on 
cultural endowments, change very slowly and incrementally throughout time. This may hinder 
any process or changes that a given society or a nation wants to undertake (North, 1990, 1991 
and 2003).    
 
This research is based on the results of the NIE in investigating the links between institutions 
and firm performance in China. The NIE focuses on the importance of institutional frameworks 
in determining the business performance in terms of the efficiency of market based interactions. 
This performance is strongly affected by transactions and coordination costs, and is determined 
by the characteristics of informal and formal institutions and the way they interact (Welter, 
2002). Consequently, the NIE provides an analytical framework that is useful for investigating 
the central issues in this research. These issues are the relationship between institutional 
frameworks and the performance of firms in the context of marketing programmes in a 
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developing country. Moreover, the application of the NIE focuses on the interaction between 
different institutional constraints and examines how this may affect business transactions. 
Therefore, the NIE provides a useful instrument for studying the interaction between the 
institutions and the performance of firms in China. 
2.3 The NIE and institutional categories 
The NIE defines institutions as socially constructed constraints that structure human interaction. 
Institutions consist of formal rules (new property rights laws, judicial system, privatisation and 
deregulation), informal constraints (values, norms, beliefs and culture), and their enforcement 
characteristics (North, 1991). Together they define the incentive structure of societies and 
specifically economic transactions (North, 1994). Clague (1997: 2) has defined institutions as 
the “rules of the game”. He also adds, “The emergence and evolution of these rules is 
understood in terms of the motivations and decisions of the individual actors in the collectivity”.  
 
Institutions help create order and reduce uncertainties in human interaction and human 
exchange, as they are the devised constraints that structure the human environment. When 
transaction cost is considered as a determinant of economic performance, institutions and the 
technology employed determine the cost of transacting and producing. As an on-going process, 
economic growth could be a consequence of the choices made by individuals and organisations 
(North, 1992). Among economists, Knack (2002) considers technical change as an important 
mediating channel through which institutions affect economic growth, while many scholars 
argue that political institutions are the key precondition of development (Easterly, 2001). North 
and Thomas (1973), Jones (1982) and North (1981) believe that the protection of property rights 
inhibits investment, which is the proximate determinant of economic growth. Apart from these 
arguments, institutions are considered as a fundamental determinant of economic growth. 
According to the NIE, institutions can be defined as a set of rules, both formal and informal, 
which govern the behaviour of society or of individuals in the conduct of human interactions 
and serve to enforce decisions. The ways in which these rules interact determines how 
incentives are given in an economy and has consequences for its performance. This definition is 
maintained in this research as it emphasises the importance of both informal and formal 
institutions, and how the interaction of formal and informal rules determine the nature of 
incentive and enforcement mechanisms. 
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Institutions can also be considered as social structures that have attained a high degree of 
resilience as individual and organisational activities are strongly shaped by a given institutional 
environment which influences their actions (Scott, 1995). Institutions are composed of cultural-
cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that provide stability and meaning to social life, 
activities and resources. The three elements collectively comprise the institutional mechanisms 
within an economy (Bruton et al., 2002). Moreover, it is possible for one class of institutions to 
replace the failed institutions of another class (Aoki, 2001). The relative influence and 
importance of these institutions are dependent on the nature and development of the economy.  
 
Regulatory institutions represent laws and sanctions that guide and regulate the behaviour of 
firms and individuals (North, 1990). Regulatory processes involve the setting of rules and their 
subsequent enforcement to regulate individual and organizational action through formal or 
informal methods (Scott, 1995). Normative institutions define the roles and actions expected of 
individuals and firms. These norms can hold very significant guides and values, such as 
understandings of the role of a Capitalist, what values he or she should hold, and how behaviour 
is conducted. Cognitive institutions are most closely associated with culture in that they are 
created and carried out in a specific country, including informal constraints in traditions, such as 
conventions that are taken for granted and subconsciously accepted rules or customs (Jepperson, 
1991; Scott, 2002). Cognitive institutions develop over time and shape the views as to what 
actions are appropriate. As a result, certain actions can affect investment in a region (Bruton et 
al., 2001), including expectations of trust and reliability, the importance of non-contractual 
relationships and connections, regard for government and public sector priorities, and 
expectations of government support.  
2.4 Three core elements of New Institutional Economics 
2.4.1 Transactions Cost  
As Williamson (1981: 555) stated, “The critical dimensions for describing transactions are 
uncertainty, the frequency with which transactions recur, and the degree to which durable, 
transaction-specific investments are required to realize least cost supply”. NIE emphasises the 
fact that transactions are not costless and their costs are increasing with the frequency of 
transactions, the specificity of the assets involved, and the uncertainty connected to human 
interaction (Williamson, 1985). One of the main reasons why transaction costs create market 
imperfections which ultimately lead to market failure is due to the cost of acquiring and 
processing information. Transaction costs actually make markets differ greatly from a perfect 
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model (North, 1993a). Consequently, the importance of the demand for institutions appears to 
correct these imperfections.  
 
The transaction cost approach regards the transaction as the foundation of the NIE research. The 
theory of transaction costs implies that transaction costs tend to be minimised, and such reforms 
have to be considered in order to implement transaction cost-minimising methods in response to 
a changing, competitive environment (Buckley and Chapman, 1997). Accordingly, the 
investigation of transaction costs is at the centre of the NIE analysis of the efficiencies and 
inefficiencies of market based transactions in different institutional contexts. Therefore, the NIE 
emphasise that institutions and transaction costs influence transformation costs. Furthermore, 
the study of transaction costs provides a useful approach of analysing advertising, marketing 
and policy making (Samuels, 1995). In addition to efforts to reducing transaction costs, 
contracts between firms have the advantage that the two parties can be risk-neutral in order to 
deal with each other fairly. For many transactions however, either market procurement or own-
production is technologically feasible and the choice is predominantly decided by comparative 
transaction cost considerations, subject to comparisons between the cost and competencies of 
alternative modes of governance (Williamson, 1998). 
 
The scholars’ consideration on the transaction costs result in the theoretical arguments at 
different levels. Coase and Williamson explore the conditions under which firms or 
organisations in the private and public sector could reduce transaction costs. As Coase (1995: 
245) noted, “The costs of coordination within a firm and the level of transaction costs that it 
faces are affected by its ability to purchase inputs from other firms, and their ability to supply 
these inputs depends in part on their costs of coordination and the level of transaction costs that 
they face which are similarly affected by what these are in still other firms. What we are dealing 
with is a complex interrelated structure”.  Additionally, he states, “Add to this the influence of 
the laws, of the social system, and of the culture, as well as the effects of technological changes 
such as the digital revolution with its dramatic fall in information costs (a major component of 
transaction costs), and you have a complicated set of interrelationships the nature of which will 
take much dedicated work over a long period to discover. But when this is done, all of 
economics will have become what we now call the NIE” (Coase, 1998:73). 
 
North and others consider institutions generally at the macro level, and their effect in 
minimising or increasing transactions costs, such as the strength of property rights, laws and 
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customs (North, 1990, 1991, 1999). North (1993: 160) also points out, “Transaction costs are 
those costs involved in measuring what is being exchanged and in enforcing agreements. In 
economic markets what are measured are the valuable attributes of goods and services or of the 
performance of agents; enforcement consists of costs associated with measuring and enforcing 
the terms of exchange. Measurement consists of the physical and property right dimensions to 
goods and services or the performance of agents. The physical dimensions have objective 
characteristics and the property rights dimensions are defined in legal terms. Competition plays 
a critical role in reducing enforcement costs. Yet economic markets throughout history and in 
the present world are frequently very imperfect, beset by high transaction costs and defined by 
institutions that thwart economic efficiency. In fact the fundamental issue in developing 
productive economies is the creation of institutions that provide low costs of transacting”.  
2.4.2 Principal-Agent theory  
Principal-Agent (PA) theory is an important subject for many business researchers because it 
allows the analysis of the management performance of an entity (in either business or political 
and public area) at a macro or micro level, assessing the relationship between the principal (e.g. 
shareholders, legislatures) and the agent (e.g. managers, bureaucrats). The theory offers unique 
insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This characteristic has made the theory very popular amongst different scholars from many 
fields of business researches, including accounting economics finance, and organisational 
behaviour.   
 
PA relations are the relations between actors in which one actor named the principal, transfers 
resources to other actors called the agents, “which they should use to realize the objectives of 
the principal which the principal himself cannot realize” (Meulen, 1998:399). As the principal 
retains the right to monitor the transfer of resources (Coleman, 1990), PA theory has been used 
to explain and conceptualize the translation of policy in the relations between the government 
and its dedicated agencies (Moe, 1984). PA relations are characterized by four important 
features (Meulen, 1998:399). First, agents have their own objectives and interests that might be 
in favour or against those of the principal. That is often a main reason for an agent to enter into 
the PA relation as the resources of the principal can be used to satisfy the objectives and 
interests of the agent. Second, the principal is short of the relevant capability to make a proper 
judgement about how to realize its objectives and often depends on the information provided by 
the agents. Thus, the information asymmetry between the principal and agent is a main problem 
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for the principal. Third, although the principal has the right to monitor when the resources are 
transferred to the agent, monitoring behaviours themselves bring additional costs and self-
reporting by the agents, which are unreliable without further incentives. In other words, as he 
lacks appropriate information on the activities of the agents, the principal has to introduce more 
evaluations and other evaluative criteria that will lead to increasing costs to monitor the agents, 
including user-judgments, productivity and network relations (Meulen, 1995). Finally, the 
principal should also trust the agent to create stability and continuity, especially in long-standing 
principal-agent relations (Shapiro, 1987). Based on the four characteristics of PA relations, an 
incentive structure is used to attract agents which match the interests and objectives of the 
principal. 
 
North (1992: 1-2) notes that, “In fact, we have incomplete information and limited mental 
capacity by which to process information. Human beings, in consequence, impose constraints on 
human interaction in order to structure exchange. There is no implication that the consequent 
institutions are efficient. … Individuals possess mental models to interpret the world around 
them. These are in part culturally derived--that is produced by the intergenerational transfer of 
knowledge, values, and norms which vary radically among different ethnic groups and societies. 
In part they are acquired through experience which is ‘local’ to the particular environment and 
therefore also varies widely with different environments. … Individuals make choices on the 
basis of their mental models. Individuals do learn, and changes in mental models stem from 
outcomes inconsistent with expectations …… The incomplete information and limited mental 
capacity by which to process information determines the cost of transacting which underlies the 
formation of institutions. At issue is not only the rationality postulate but the specific 
characteristics of transacting that prevent the actors from achieving the joint maximization result 
of the zero transaction cost model. The costs of transacting arise because information is costly 
held by the parties. The costs of measuring the multiple valuable dimensions of the goods or 
services exchanged or of the performance of agents, and the costs of enforcing agreements 
determine transaction costs.” 
 
Dean and Andreyeva (2001) mention two approaches to protect the principals against 
expropriation by the agents. These are the legal protection of the investor and the concentration 
of ownership. With the investors’ legal protection, the principals have legal power to be able to 
enforce their returns. In the second approach, large shareholders can match their control rights 
connected with their investment (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The application of PA theory 
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usually depends on the format of contract, whose impacts are connected with the distribution of 
income and the benefits from participation. The participants’ benefits depend on the terms of the 
contract and their own characteristics, through the procedure of pursuing their respective 
strategies. Basically, a contract scheme is able to strengthen income stratification to influence 
the involvement of participation, and the transactions costs and information costs in the market 
environment work together to affect the process of business operation (Warning and Soo Hoo, 
2000). In other word, PA theory is used in NIE to focus on information imperfections and 
information asymmetries, especially how opportunistic agents can confound their principals 
because of unequal access to information (Stiglitz, 2001; Williamson, 1985).  PA analysis, thus, 
contributes to an understanding of the “deficiencies” of the organisational set-up in a particular 
institutional setting and provides guidance on corrective strategies. For example, PA approach is 
relevant to the study of corruption in the bureaucracy, to the extent that principals do not 
endorse or encourage this behaviour. Consequently, measures such as organic reorganisation of 
a given structure could be taken by the regulator so that the interests of the multiple parties do 
not diverge at the expense of other parties. Hence, more accountability, more transparency and 
more equity are established.      
 
The separation of ownership and management means that the agency problem exists as long as 
investors and managers are not the same people. It refers to the behaviours of the managers to 
use the firm’s resources for personal gains at the expense of investors’ interest, by taking the 
advantage of their expertise and access to inside information of the enterprises (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In sum, PA is a useful instrument that highlights 
how well a given institutional system is functioning. It helps to understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of institutional systems through the relationship built between principals (such as 
shareholders) and agents (such as managers).   
2.4.3 Property right 
Economists agree that good economic institutions must secure property rights, enabling people 
to keep the returns on their investment, make contracts, and resolve disputes. By encouraging 
the investment in human capital and in physical capital, the security of property rights boosts 
economic growth. The system related to property rights, including contract enforcement, is 
principally important in reducing the transaction costs of doing business and thus enabling 
markets to achieve economic efficiency. In market-based transactions fundamental problems 
arise where there is ability to hold, benefit from, and transfer resources, and no ability to enforce 
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agreements. In these conditions economic actors risk substantial losses if they engage in market 
transactions. According to Demstez (1967) property rights derive their significance from the fact 
that they help form those expectations which can reasonably be held in dealings with others. 
These expectations find expression in the laws, customs and mores of a society. In the view of 
Demstez, it is the value of the bundle of rights attached to the property that determines the value 
of what is exchanged not the commodity itself. North (1990: 54) asserts that “the inability of 
societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of contracts is the most important source of 
both historical stagnation and contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World…” because 
the absence of secure property rights discourages investment and specialization. 
 
Property rights constitute an important element for countries experiencing economic change that 
involves transformation modes of transactions among economic agents. Coase (1937 and 1960) 
made the fundamental connection between institutions, transaction costs and neo-classical 
theory. Because a large part of our national income is devoted to transactions, institutions and 
specifically property rights are crucial determinants of the efficiency of markets. Clear 
definition, attribution and protection of property rights during the phase of transformation 
directly affect the way investment is undertaken and its performance (Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
North 1990, 1994; Clague, 1997). One person's ownership can be categorised with the absence 
of ownership and control by another. Property rights identify relations among people, which 
means that they characterize “the institutional basis of the power relations in the processes of 
production, exchange, and accumulation” (Campbell and Lindberg, 1990: 642). It is of great 
importance to comprehend the importance of the structure of property rights, as any 
modification in the property right bundles (e.g. private or public possession and exchange) leads 
to a reallocation of resources and hence may result in an increase in the transaction cost of 
engaging in market-based transactions (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Therefore, the heart of 
efficient business operation must be linked to the creation of policies in order to create and 
enforce efficient property rights (North et al., 2000). That is to say, in the case of economic 
institutions--property rights, the fair enforcement through a judiciary and other governmental 
agencies can create credible commitment for institutions. 
 
Two central dangers in society are disorder and dictatorship. As Djankov et al. (2003: 598) 
noted, “Disorder refers to the risk to individuals and their property of private expropriation in 
such forms as banditry, murder, theft, violation of agreements, torts, or monopoly pricing. 
Disorder is also reflected in the private subversion of public institutions, such as courts, through 
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bribes and threats, which allows private violators to escape penalties. Dictatorship refers to the 
risk to individuals and their property of expropriation by the state and its agents in such forms as 
murder, taxation, or violation of property. Dictatorship is also reflected in expropriation 
through, rather than just by, the state, such as occurs when state regulators help firms to restrict 
competitive entry”.  
 
Property rights are centrally important for the allocation and use of resources, as they settle 
legally or institutionally possibilities in the form of contracts. In order to enhance efficiency of 
market operation, institutions function to support private contracting and ensure the enforcement 
of property rights, to reduce asymmetrical information and other otherwise external effects 
(Rametsteiner, 2002). There are two sides to securing property rights. On the demand side, 
investment must be secured by the government. On the supply side, a government is capable of 
protecting property against expropriation. These demands reflect a trade-off of institutions. That 
is, the goal of controlling disorder that is toward greater dictatorship on the one hand, and the 
objective of controlling state intervention that is against dictatorship on the other hand. 
Accordingly, a fundamental problem of institutions is the conflict between the goals of 
controlling disorder and dictatorship (Djankov et al., 2003). 
 
The state can have an effect on property rights in several ways, “as an actor who assists or leads 
the selection process, as a political-institutional structure that constrains and establishes the 
range of available governance options, and as an actor who ratifies (or not) emergent 
governance regimes” (Campbell and Lindberg, 1990: 642). It is also important to understand the 
mechanism by which some economies have a strong enforcement capacity while others do not. 
Although contract compliance is a function of clear laws and courts, many transactions are 
carried out without explicit compulsions by outside enforcement agencies (Clague, et al, 1997). 
Businesses routinely go to considerable lengths to keep disagreement out of the courts, which 
are seen as a relatively cumbersome instrument for resolving complex disputes (Macaulay, 
1963; Williamson, 1985; Clague, et al, 1997). An institutional analysis provides a good 
momentum to examine thoroughly the conditions under which such compliances thrive, thereby 
delivering low transaction costs and efficient market based exchange.  
2.5 Institutions and economic change process 
Institutional economics uses an evolutionary analysis of economic phenomenon in order to 
understand the environment in which individuals, organisations and nations perform. Making 
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economic changes should fit in an understanding of institutions and the incentives facing 
individual actors. The intended and actual outcomes may differ in response to creating the right 
social and political environment. Under a new institutional equilibrium, individual actors 
understand the incentives set, to undertake and respect a given change (Clague, 1997). North 
(1994: 359) notes, “A theory of economic dynamics is also crucial for the field of economic 
development …although he cannot guarantee that the beliefs and institutions that evolve 
through time will definitely produce economic growth”.  The complexity of environment 
increases as human beings become increasingly interdependent. This means that it becomes 
necessary to introduce some complex institutional structures to capture the potential gains from 
trade.  Originally, institutions allowed anonymous, impersonal exchange across time and space 
(North, 1993). For the NIE scholars, culture provides the key to path dependence. In this regard, 
the past is a powerful influence on the present and future. Throughout time, collective learning 
is “the transmission in time of our accumulated stock of knowledge” (Hayek, 1960: 27), which 
consists of the experiences that are embodied in our language, institutions, technology, and 
ways of doing things. More importantly, the belief systems and institutions of the experience of 
a society might fail to meet and solve new problems arising along with societal complexity.  
 
There are four basic institutional strategies for the enforcement of good conduct in a society 
(Djankov et al., 2003: 601): “ 
 The market discipline solution relies on the incentives of issuers themselves, or of their 
underwriters, to disclose the truth about the securities because they need to establish a 
reputation for credibility to raise funds in the future.  
 The society can rely on private suits by buyers of securities who feel that they have been 
cheated by the issuers, under the general doctrines of contract or tort. For this, the society 
needs a court and a judge. The question for the court is whether the issuer disclosed 
inaccurate information or failed to disclose material information.  
 The society can designate a public regulatory agency, which mandates what should be 
disclosed by security issuers, inspects their books and disclosures, and penalizes issuers and 
underwriters who break its rules. Between private litigation and full-scale regulation, the 
regulator can establish the rules for security issuance, but leave the enforcement of these 
rules to private litigation by the wronged investors.  
 The society can nationalize security issuance. A company wishing to raise capital must 
relinquish the inspection, disclosure, and sale of securities to the state”.  
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“These four basic strategies differ in the degree of public control. No public involvement is 
required with competition and private orderings. Courts employ impartial judges enforcing the 
rules of good behaviour. These rules do not even need to come from legislation; rather, they 
may derive from custom or from judge-made common law. Even in this case, the judge is a 
public agent with decision-making authority. With regulators, the state writes the rules, inspects 
the product before it is sold, and penalizes sellers for delivering a bad product. Both the scope of 
government activity and its centralization are increased relative to independent courts. Finally, 
with state ownership, the government takes complete control over an activity” (Djankov et al., 
2003: 601). 
 
Agents acquire certain behavioural patterns and attitudes arising from their interaction with each 
other within an economic setting. These informal institutions play a significant role in the 
manner by which formal institutional constraints operate and influence the transaction costs in 
market transactions. The nature of informal institutional factors means that informal institutions 
affect market based transactions which change very slowly with uncertainty. This makes the 
process of economic change very complex, resulting in unexpected and uncertain outcomes. 
Differing from formal rules, informal institutions have possibly developed before the economic 
change process starts. This would lead to incompatibility between the formal and informal 
institutions. Moreover, the enforcement of the rules could not be effective in such environment 
as there is a gap between what formal rules state and what informal rules accept, and the 
resulted outcome would be consequently inefficient. North (1990: 45) illustrated this fact, 
“….equally important is the fact that the informal constraints that are culturally derived will not 
change immediately in reaction to changes in the formal rules. As a result the tension between 
altered formal rules and the persisting informal constraints produces outcomes that have 
important implications for the way economies change”.  
 
Overall, with a critical review of the economic development, we have to incorporate past 
experiences into the analysis, with full awareness of the current interests of the participants in 
the economic changing process. North (1990: 7) argued that inefficient institutions could keep 
unchanged if they have the necessary support, as “rulers devised property rights in their own 
interests and transaction costs resulted in typically inefficient property rights prevailing”. In the 
context of incorporating past experiences into the analysis of change, it is important to realise 
the powerful influence of the past on the present and future, which is known as path 
dependence. In its most general meaning, path dependence is the condition where outcomes are 
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sensitive to the variations in events that lead to that outcome (Liebowitz, and Margolis, 1995). 
Path dependence exists when the present state of a system is constrained and directed by its 
history.  The basic advantage of path dependence is that it gives systems stability and structure 
as it plays a role of stability in case of undesirable shocks. However its basic disadvantage is 
that it may get in the way of necessary or desirable change.  
 
Meanwhile, the NIE researchers choose an institutional/cognitive approach for the better 
understanding of developments (North, 1994). Creation of institutions which allow low-cost 
transacting in favour of cooperation in impersonal exchange is complex, because it not only 
entails the creation of economic institutions, but also requires the connection with appropriate 
political institutions. The NIE scholars use institutional/cognitive analysis to explain path 
dependence, and address the difficulty of understanding economic change process as a function 
of political markets. This places the belief systems of the agents at the centre (Arthur, 1989; 
Paul David, 1985). Moreover, this integrated institutional/cognitive approach explains the 
complex interplay between institutions, technology, and demography in the overall process of 
economic change (Rosenberg, 1976; Mokyr, 1990; North, 1994).  
 
As a result, by using the institutional/cognitive approach, analysts and policy makers must 
recognise the constraints that contribute to the path-dependence situation, to understand their 
nature and try to proceed. However, this depends mainly on how soon society (or an individual 
actor) is able to adapt to new formal and informal institutions. North (1999) names this ability as 
the adaptive efficiency of institutional environment, which is determined partly by how the 
informal and formal institutions interact within a given social environment. 
2.6 Interaction between informal and formal institutions 
The study of institutions requires a deep understanding of the complexity of the elements in the 
institutional framework and the interaction between the informal and formal institutions. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to realise the functioning of the institutions and their key roles in 
determining the policy outcomes. Hare (2001:5-6) summarises a number of special features 
related to the institutions of economic development: “(a) they regulate economic behaviour in 
ways which, in the short run, often conflict with individual preferences; (b) they are based on 
shared expectations, derived from custom, trust, legal provisions, etc.; (c) they make most sense 
if the economy is thought of as a “repeated game” in which most types of transaction occur 
many times; and (d) anonymity, in the sense that the functioning of a given institution should 
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not be dependent upon the identity of the economic agents seeking to conduct the types of 
transaction to which this institution relates”. 
 
Policies normally belong to formal institutions, but outcomes are a result of changes in both 
formal and informal institutions, as well as enforcement characteristics. Therefore, assessing the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions becomes essential to improve economic 
performance (Mantzavinos, et al, 2004). The emphasis on the interaction between formal and 
informal constraints is based upon the fact that the exchanges governed by a set of formal 
institutions (contracts, incentives, authority) and informal institutions (norms, routines, political 
processes) are deeply intertwined. Hence, the failure to integrate these concepts into a common 
theory has led to faulty reasoning and incomplete theories of economic organizations (Zenger, et 
al, 2002).  
 
Li (2004) studies the institutional framework for the protection of the property rights in China, 
and shows the imbalance between formal rules and informal constraints. He concluded that 
foreign firms have to understand the important relations in the institutional matrix in order to 
achieve long term protection of property rights. In addition, he noted that informal institutions 
cannot lead to any improvement of businesses protection in the long term and leads to delays in 
the establishment of formal institutions for property protection. Nee (1998: 85) similarly states, 
“Unless the nature of the relationship between informal and formal constraints is better 
specified, the inclusion of informal constraints by new institutionalists contributes to a problem 
of indeterminacy”. He discusses formal institutions including laws, constitutions and 
governance systems, and informal institutions consisting of habits, customs, and norms. On one 
hand norms and customs are the basis from which laws and constitutions derive their legitimacy. 
On the other hand new laws would help shape future potential norms and customs that society is 
governed by.  In other words, informal institutions are either embodied in formal institutions, or 
emerge as a result of adopting formal institutions for long periods of time. In this respect the 
process of learning through economic actors is a crucial component in the relationship between 
formal and informal institutions (Mantzavinos, et al, 2004). These generate confusion to identify 
the distinction between the different institutions, especially in a developing country (Lal, 1999; 
Voigt and Engerer, 2002).  
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In practice, the differences of identifying the nature of the link between the two sorts of 
institutions and their characteristics are connected with the agents’ abilities of the evaluation 
about the costs and benefits along with an institutional change. For example, high sunk costs 
will limit the ability of institutional system to change. As the information about this change and 
this interaction is limited, the learning process about the nature of the interaction is critical in 
reducing the problem of identification of the costs and benefit of institutional changes. This is 
particularly the case where the sunk costs of institutional change are bigger than the benefit of 
this change. The problem of change related to this interaction is also related to the distribution 
of the sunk costs and benefits across power groups and the public. In other words, any reforms 
of institutions might lead to diverse reactions among social groups. Thus, the formal and 
informal institutions can manifest themselves in a way that may affect the transaction costs. We 
have to focus on the importance of learning about the interaction between the institutional 
constraints in order to receive the most accurate information about the sunk costs and benefits 
associated with a given institutional matrix (North, 1990). Given an institutional environment, 
on one hand, informal institutions manifest themselves to help reducing or increasing 
transaction costs (Lal, 1999). On the other hand, the implementation of inappropriate formal 
rules create a whole set of informal institutions for a given period (Feige, 1997). Feige (1997: 
22) also mentions that, “Many of the transition economies have yet to establish the rule of law, 
and suffer instead from the legacy of regimes of arbitrary discretion that encouraged 
noncompliant behaviour as the informal norm. … Many of the centrally planned economies 
suffered from fundamental inconsistencies between formal and informal institutions. 
Consequently, the transition process had to deal with a legacy of noncompliant behaviours 
involving protective and predatory activities”.      
 
The World Bank 2002 World Report emphasises the point that formal institutions are ineffective 
if they are not compatible with the norms and behaviours (informal institutional constraints) of 
the recipient of new formal institutions. “For policy makers, building new formal institutions 
that complement existing informal institutions is a challenge. When inadequate attention has 
been paid to norms and culture, formal institutions have not delivered desired outcomes. But 
many successful institutional arrangements have flourished precisely because of their ability to 
harness, or adapt to, prevailing norms” (World Bank, 2002: 172). The World Bank Report 
(2002), also states that informal institutions are crucial to make formal institutions work 
properly and effectively and that formal institutions get more effective when the presence and 
effect of norms are recognised. “Policies that allow parallel operation of informal and formal 
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institutions increase options for market participants. Examples are courts that operate in parallel 
with informal enforcement mechanisms, formal rural credit schemes that explicitly use elements 
of local norms of solidarity, and institutions such as affirmative action that try to reduce 
discrimination” (World Bank, 2002: 172). However, where there is a vacuum of formal 
institutions, significant negative externalities might arise, ranging from worsening of the 
business climate (and thus the discouragement of legitimate and honest businesses) to the 
simultaneous operation of unrelated criminal activity. Correspondingly, there is a clear demand 
for good formal institutions (North, 1990). 
 
Thus, informal institutions can play a substitute role when economic agents in the society 
perceive an inadequate regulatory system to “build up supplementary insurance” for economic 
agents (Voigt and Engerer, 2002:162). This additional insurance can be economic exchange 
within the family, or the business relationships relying on personal contacts. Another type of 
insurance is the enterprise network (relations), many of which have been created in transition 
countries. Voigt and Engerer (2002) also find that the internal (informal) institutions are very 
important because the process of changing the external institutions in a transitional environment 
is more time consuming than that was assumed by the policy makers initially. Johnson et al 
(1999) likewise conclude that relational contracting (which is informal agreements and 
unwritten codes of conduct that have a strong effect upon the behaviours of individuals within 
and between firms) and courts that can substitute each other in developing countries towards 
marketisation. They highlight that the role of courts is becoming more important than that of the 
relationship contracting over time and the larger the role of the courts, the larger the increase in 
efficiency. 
 
Controlling the agents’ behaviour can be set down in agreed rules usually in the form of written 
contracts. However, it is impossible to complete a long term contract without any problems as 
the effort of the appropriate adaptation to new circumstances is a challenge (Williamson, 1986). 
Consequently, contracts based upon trust and networks between long-term relationships would 
be important to avoid the deficiencies of written contracts. The relationship based on trust has 
an economic relevance in that reduces the specification and monitoring of contracts, provides 
material incentives for cooperation, and reduces uncertainty; transactions are thus cheaper, more 
agreeable, and more flexible (Nooteboom et al., 1997).  The kind of contracting that contributes 
to the stability within which the exchanges occur could be beneficial for parties who are 
uncertain of the effectiveness of the third party mechanism. In this context, the dominance of 
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relational contracting in many developing countries (characterised by weak third party 
enforcement mechanism) would lead to inefficient outcomes due to restricting access to other 
actors who do not belong to a specific network.  On the contrary, the effectiveness of the third 
party mechanism generally depends on the level and quality of social and moral norms, and 
particularly on the level of cooperative and institutional performance between different regions 
(Putnam, 1993). 
2.7 Institutional Matrix and Types of Exchange 
An institutional matrix influences the way that formal and informal institutions interact and 
enables individuals and organisations to undertake economic exchanges. Institutional 
frameworks vary among one another, from solving individual exchange problems to covering 
complex exchanges between actors. Hare (2001: 6) mentions some key “economic functions 
provide by institutions or institutional arrangements in a market-type economy:  
 Private property rights and contracts; 
 Banks and other financial markets: existence, functioning and regulation; i.e. reliable access 
to credit on reasonable terms and Bankruptcy/liquidation policy in place to facilitate orderly 
exit; 
 Labour market institutions: social policy and the social safety net; 
 Clear fiscal environment for firms, perceived as fair, predictable and enforced (this means, 
for instance, that in a multi-level country such as Russia it should not be possible for the 
regions to set taxes that conflict with national policies, and taxes should not be changed 
frequently); 
 Institutions dealing with competition policy, industrial policy and trade policy; 
 Trust between economic agents, trust and honesty in public institutions (lack of corruption, 
reliable law enforcement, incl. as regards business taxation)”. 
 
North (1990) highlights three situations where a variety of economic exchanges in the 
institutional matrix structures that are consistent with the transactions cost arising from the 
matrix, among informal and formal institutions and their enforcement characteristics. The first 
form concerns personalised exchange involving small-scale production and local trade, 
characterised by a lack of a third-party enforcement and low transactions costs for exchange. In 
this situation, social norms play a prominent role in the economic activities in a small 
community, where information flows (about business opportunities) may only be available to 
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members of a group, with outsiders excluded because of linguistic or cultural barriers (World 
Bank, 2002), where actors normally cannot obtain the scale of economies.   
 
The second form concerns impersonalised exchange in which greater variety and number of 
exchanges with some economies of scale and scope. Parties involved are constrained by kinship 
ties, bonding, exchanging hostages, or merchant codes of conduct. The exchange is set within a 
context of regional and religious precepts rather than formal third party enforcement. In this 
context, a specific religion and a certain language might be regarded as a signal of 
trustworthiness and members of peripheral ethnic groups would be forced to join the persuasion 
of host society. The demand for reputation building in intercommunity exchange has promoted 
the development of specialised ethnic or religious groups as intermediaries that traditionally 
controlled a large proportion of long-distance trade in many parts of the world (Platteau, 1994). 
However, this type of society has high transaction and uncertainty costs for outsiders, as the 
institutional system is mainly supported by informal networks. 
 
The third form of exchange is impersonal exchange with third-party enforcement, where a third 
party is essentially centred to complete the self-enforcement role played by the informal 
constraints. Effective third-party enforcement is best realised by creating a set of rules that make 
a variety of informal constraints effective. The formal rules are able to lower information, 
monitoring, and enforcement costs and hence make informal constraints possible solutions to 
the more complex exchange (North 1990). High adaptive efficiency is necessary to allow the 
interaction of the formal and informal constraints in these exchanges in order to create the 
potential wealth-maximising opportunities of individuals. These societies can thereafter obtain 
large economies of scale and scope and have a large number of actors available to undertake and 
develop transactions.  
2.8 The role of institutions in shaping business performance 
NIE studies institutions and how combinations of institutions interact with organizational 
arrangements, such as markets and firms (North, 1990). Particularly, NIE views the principal 
agent relationship between the owners of the firm, its management and other economic agents as 
a contractual arrangement of delegation of decision rights over the use of property (Hart, 1995; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1995). The ability of owners to create and appropriate value from 
resources depends on a clear delineation of the property rights to the resource, the ability to 
contract over their use for value creation, and the degree to which contract enforcement 
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institutions safeguard the right to appropriate value from their resource allocation decisions 
(Eggertsson, 1990; Hart, 1995). The fact that a firm has well defined control rights to its 
resources is certainly linked to the returns and the costs of its investments. 
 
To ensure efficient resource allocation, firms incur “agency” costs of monitoring, bonding or 
incentivizing agents responsible for making resource allocation decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Mechanisms operating in the capital, product and labour markets mitigate problems of 
information asymmetry and align shareholder and managerial/agent self-interest impact the 
agency costs incurred by the firm. In less than perfect markets, due to information asymmetry 
and chances of opportunism, these costs are shifted to the firm which in turn increases the 
agency costs of monitoring, incentivizing or bonding agents. By providing information and 
reducing transaction costs, institutions can fill in the gap created by the failure of market 
mechanisms (Coase, 1988), thereby facilitating governance mechanisms which promote 
appropriate investments. Therefore, institutional contexts, through their definition of property 
rights and enforcement of contracts in an economy, not only provide the ex-ante incentives to 
managers to invest appropriately but also facilitate the ex-post governance mechanisms 
designed to curtail inappropriate investment behaviour (Williamson, 2005). 
 
Investments are an important component and a critical determinant of the business performance 
and competitive advantage of firms (Greve, 2003; Jensen, 1993; Porter, 1992). However, 
investments are only desirable when firms have the potential to benefit from these investments. 
Thus, such investments only occur when potential benefits exceed the potential costs in pursuit 
of economic opportunities. Shahzad and David (2010) mentioned two important propositions 
regarding the appropriate investments. First, when the extent of problems of information 
asymmetry and opportunism can be overcome by market mechanisms, firms are more likely to 
invest when they have growth opportunities. Second, when the extent of problems of 
information asymmetry and moral hazard cannot overcome by market mechanisms, firms are 
more likely to invest when they have internally generated cash flow. 
 
Given the capital for investment, in order to improve the business performance, Burczak (2006) 
claimed that free markets are the most favourable to freedom and interference will negatively 
influence the freedom. However, the self regulation of markets is similar to regulation of 
production by those whose motivations are toward their own economic gain (Veblen, 1921). 
Eventually, an important conflict is unavoidable in the context of self-regulation as there will be 
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a conflict between the individual micro-goal of capitalists, and larger welfare-enhancing macro-
goals. The conflicting nature between the micro-goals of capitalists and the larger macro-goals 
of society once realized, leads to an investigation of the appropriate balance between freedom 
and control (Murray, 2010). 
 
There are two broad dimensions of economic governance in existing measures of institutional 
quality or “rule of law” (Fernandes and Kraay, 2007). Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) used 
“property rights institutions” to measure the extent to which private business is secure from 
predation by the state and “contracting institutions” to measure how institutions such as the 
courts allow private parties to contract with each other. In business studies, firms’ perceptions 
about the quality of the courts capture “contracting institutions” and their views on corruption 
capture “property rights institutions”. It captures perceptions of the likelihood that property will 
be expropriated by the state, the likelihood that contracts will be enforced, and the likelihood 
that property is secure from crime, and so on. The former can also include the measures of 
expropriation risk connected with governmental behaviours, such as the measure of corruption 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005). Contracting Institutions can refer to the institutions 
securing the contracting relationship making it more manageable. This consists of business 
regulation, court, financing, and other issues being able to affect business operation and 
business competition, even the length of time required resolving a dispute over an unpaid 
commercial debt (Fernandes and Kraay, 2007). For instance, labour institutions are able to 
influence both firms and labour markets. Accordingly, firms are more likely to seek investment 
opportunities in nations that allow for more flexibility in dealing with the workforce that may 
attract foreign investment as strict regulations obstruct efficient labour contract (Kleiner, 2009). 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) further developed a framework to measure the rule of law into 
two dimensions. The first is “property rights institutions” that capture the extent to which 
private property is secure from predation by the state, for example through outright 
expropriation, or less dramatically, from corrupt officials demanding bribes in exchange for 
favours to the firm or individual. The second is “contracting institutions”, capturing how the 
effectiveness of institutions that are used to mediate disputes between private parties, such as the 
courts and the judicial system. According to Fernandes and Kraay (2007), there is a very strong 
negative correlation between this measure of institutional quality and levels of development: 
countries with worse institutional quality are on average poorer than countries with good 
institutional quality. 
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2.9 Summary 
For the NIE scholars, if third-party enforcement is weak, i.e. in most developing and transitional 
countries, transaction and uncertainty costs are high because of the dominance of personal and 
impersonal exchange with poor third party enforcement. This is especially true where the formal 
rules as third-party enforcement mechanisms are not compatible with the informal institutions. 
In these societies, such as China, the adaptive efficiency is usually low and likely to result in the 
problems in covering the missing connections between the formal and informal institutions. 
Weak third-party enforcement eventually leads to more emphasis on informal institutions to 
govern the exchange. The resulting outcome thus appears with high transaction and uncertainty 
costs for business operations.  
 
The NIE scholars have theoretically discussed the importance of the institutions in economy 
growth and development. In practice, a more important matter appears to be how important is 
the role of the institutions in affecting the business performance of the different firms. The next 
chapter focuses on the relations between the institutions and business performance in China, and 
the author attempts to build a conceptual framework about the relations between the institutions 
and business performance.   
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Chapter 3: Institutions in China and Conceptual 
Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Graph 3.0 China Official Unemployment Rate 
 
Table 3.0 Estimates of China’s Unemployment Rate (per cent) 
Source 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
XZ 3.2 3.6 4.3 4.8 5.5 4.5 6.3 8.1   
KX 3.2 3.6 4.4 4.9 5.7 6.9 7.1 7.1 6.6 6.2 
GPZa 7.1 8.6 7.7 7.3 9.2 10.8 12.5 11.5   
GPZb 5.9 6.8 7.7 8.5 9.5 10.1 10.8 11.5 12.6 13.1 
Note: XZ=Xue and Zhong (2003); KX=Knight and Xue (2004); GPZa= Giles, J., Park, A. and Zhang, J. (2005) 
based on the research of Xue and Zhong (2003); GPZb= Giles, J., Park, A. and Zhang, J. (2005) based on the 
research of Knight and Xue (2004) 
 
A large amount of FDI inflows to China and China has achieved a rapid economic growth, but 
China also has to face several serious social and economic challenges. Some basic infrastructure 
and services essential remain weak for private sector growth (Eggenberg-Argote, 2005). When 
regarding a population that is more than 1.3 billion, the unemployment problem is always the 
primary concern of the Chinese government and is becoming more and more of a serious 
problem. As the Chinese official figures regarding unemployment are not convincing (Graph 
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3.0), a number of scholars have estimated the unemployment rate in China (Table 3.0). Mr Li, 
the prime minister of China, has stated that China would need only 7.2% growth to ensure its 
employment targets. China needs that economic growth rate to create 10 million jobs and to 
ceiling the urban unemployment rate at around 4%. He also added “The reason why we need to 
stabilize growth is that we need to guarantee employment” (The Wall Street Journal, 2013). 
China can still be summarised by large public sectors, with centralised governments, overstaffed 
civil services, and weak systems of accountability (Green, 2005). Its business environment can 
hence be characterised by a weak institutional framework as the institutions that are often 
unclear or inconsistent with international norms (Lynch, 2002).  
Table 3.1 Instruments Measuring the Effects of the Government  
Dimension 1: Economic and 
Government Policies 
Dimension 2: Restrictions 
on Business Operations 
Dimension 3: Government and 
Government Administration 
 Preferential tax policy 
provision 
 Preferential industrial policy 
provision 
 Other preferential/promotion 
policy provision 
 Earlier implementation of 
economic reform policy 
 Intensities of implementation 
of economic reform policy 
 Instabilities in political/social 
aspects due to unanticipated 
changes in central 
 governmental policies 
 Stability and continuation of 
economic policy 
 Local government FDI policy and its 
appropriateness 
 Freedom of capital and 
profit remittances 
 Fewer differential 
treatments between 
foreign and local 
enterprises 
 Easy settlements on 
foreign exchange balances 
 Looser regulations on 
export percentages 
 Looser regulations on 
foreign equity ratio 
 Adequate financing from 
local capital markets 
 Reasonable regulation on 
environment protection 
 Fewer labour disputes 
 Efficient government 
administration 
 Transparent government 
administration 
 Capabilities of government in 
regulating the economy 
 Commitments to economic 
reform by government leaders 
 Healthy/sound legal system 
 Limited government 
bureaucracy 
 Little government corruption 
 Little abuse in fees collection 
 High autonomy for  
business enterprises 
Source: Ng and Tuan (2001) 
 
Since the 1980s, along with the transitional reforms conducted by the Chinese government, 
there are a number of changes in the institutions, in the context of business constraints. Table 
3.1 lists three dimensions of measuring instruments about how a government influences the 
business performance, including government policies, restrictions on business operation, and 
government administration. The conceptual framework is partly built on the three dimensions as 
these three dimensions and the relating issues in details provide the main aspects of the 
constraining factors on business operation. In addition, when transiting autarky to a market 
oriented economy in China, it is practically essential to have social participation and cultural 
support to sustain a continuous progress of business operation in economic reforms. In this 
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chapter, the author presents the main research hypotheses on the relationships between the 
institutional constraints and the business performance to explore how to enhance business 
operation in developing or transition countries. The author chooses five aspects of business 
constraints, in terms of finance, legal institutions, business competition, business rule and 
regulation, and corruption. 
3.2 Research questions and research objectives 
3.2.1 Research questions and objectives 
In Chapter 2 we have discussed the importance of the institutional factors on the operation of 
firms. So far, we have suggested that institutional factors, both formal and informal constraints 
constitute the main obstacles to the business performance of enterprises in China. To answer the 
question of “the relations between institutions and business performance of the firms in China”, 
this research explores the business influences of institutions, through the investigation of 
business constraints on the firms with foreign investment, and on the firms with private 
ownership. 
 
In China, the FDI inflows and the ensued reforms of institutions resulted in the emergence of 
private ownership in this “Communist country” as the institutional reform does not only work to 
create a favourite business environment for FDI, but also bring more business freedom towards 
a market oriented economy (Chow, 2001). The FDI inflows and the development of private 
ownership work together to create a competitive environment where the firms are forced to 
enhance their efficiencies and operations. An efficient business environment should therefore be 
connected with a successful economic transition, including changing institutional framework in 
China. Employing the NIE as the theoretical framework, the author argues that a better business 
performance in China depends on an efficient implementation of institutions in the process of 
economic transition. In other words, the achievement of better business performance depends on 
the support of both formal and informal institutions.  
 
The research in this chapter examines and confirms two main arguments that emerge from the 
analyses of business obstacles carried out in Chapter 2. The first one argues that the perceptions 
across different owners and firm size vary with regard to individual constraints, including both 
informal and formal institutions. The second group of hypotheses covers the importance of both 
formal and informal institutional constraints in explaining the performance of firms in China. 
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3.2.2 Business performance measurement 
Business performance measurement systems are the information-based routines and procedures 
used to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities (Kellen, 2003; Simmons 2000). As 
a quantitative value that can be used for purposes of comparison, Simmons (2000) looks at 
business performance measurement as a tool to balance five major tensions within a firm:  
 Balancing profit, growth and control  
 Balancing short term results against long-term capabilities and growth opportunities  
 Balancing performance expectations of different constituencies  
 Balancing opportunities and attention  
 Balancing the motives of human behaviour  
 
As a multidimensional construct, firm performance can be measured both financially and 
strategically (Peng and Luo, 2000). In the market domain, the measurement is derived from the 
profit maximisation incentive (Dollery, 2001). China is not well developed, volatile, and market 
based measures may not reflect firms’ true performance (Peng, 2004). The author chooses sale 
data as a financial measure of business performance as Markides (1995: 114) found that “no 
matter which the three profitability variables are used, the result remains unchanged.” In 
addition, the performance of top managers in China, especially SOEs, is evaluated and 
measured by market expansion in terms of firm growth (Walder, 1995). Accordingly, the author 
selects the investment data as a strategic indicator to measure the business performance. 
 
Consequently, in this thesis, the measurement of business performance of the firms consists of 
their sales and investment respectively. The reason for including investment here is due to the 
fact that the value of sales itself may not provide a good indication on the actual performance of 
firms. One reason for this is the strategy of multinational cooperation in developing countries, 
particularly the strategy of transfer pricing. After all, foreign owners will never increase their 
investment in China unless they are satisfied with and are confident that the performance of 
their firms will be satisfactory, both at present and in the future. 
3.3 Research hypotheses 
3.3.1 The insiders-outsiders difference  
It has been observed in countries which undertook rapid transition and reforms to free market 
with an institutional template not developed enough to support the reforms in question. Taking 
into account the poor institutions of China, the weak institutional framework, information flow 
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across and between the actors in the business environment cannot move efficiently (Ghecham 
and Albahri, 2011). The deficiencies of the institutional infrastructure undermine the 
effectiveness and consistencies of the enforcement of rules across the players. As a result, the 
opportunities do not spread evenly across the players in the society in general and across the 
investors in the business environment in particular. The opportunities are contingent on the 
amount of special connections that players in the environment are endowed with. The informal 
institutions can be either the type of relationships that investors can legitimately have by 
building long-term contacts that foster trust and cooperation amongst them, or the concepts 
related to corruption. 
 
Udayasankar and Das (2007) note that the business operation is affected by: (1) legislative 
content, such as private property protection laws (LaPorta et al., 1998); (2) judicial efficiency 
(Klapper and Love, 2002); (3) support for business operation (Klapper and Love, 2002), which 
can understood as business rules and regulations, efforts to sustain competition, and anti-
corruption. In addition, the business performance is sensitive to the different types of firms, such 
as the factor of firm size and ownership. The weak formal rules and their level of enforcement 
lead to the emergence of two kinds of firms: insiders and outsiders. The institutions governing 
the business environment in these circumstances is more favourable to insiders who are more 
locally endowed that can allow them to have more access to the business environment and face 
lower transaction costs than outsiders. In fact, a firm without foreign ownership may have more 
advantages than the FIEs because of the familiarity with the domestic formal and informal 
institutions. However, the domestic firms may also stand disadvantages in a given institutional 
environment than the FIEs. In addition, the influences of institutions can also be connected with 
the intervention of government in China, such as government ownership. This leads to a set of 
hypotheses that highlight the fact that informal institutions (such as corruption) can conflict with 
the logic of formal institutions and will make market entry difficult for new entrants and for 
firms that do not share the same information flows as others. In this case, the market is divided 
into two sorts of firms, outsiders and insiders, where the outsiders usually have higher 
transaction and uncertainty costs than insiders because of less information and connection 
disadvantages compare to insiders (Jacobs, 1999; World Bank, 2002a; IMF, 1999). This is 
explained by the fact that “much reform consists of struggles by ‘outsiders’ to gain the status of 
‘insiders’ and by ‘insiders’ to protect their territory” (Jacobs, 1999: 10). 
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Graph 3.1 Insider and outsider firms in the business environment of China 
 
 
 
 
In this research, as shown in Graph 3.1, the insiders are the firms without foreign ownership 
(domestic firms thereafter) and outsiders are the FIEs (foreign firms thereafter), or the insiders 
are the firms without government ownership (private firms thereafter) and the outsiders are the 
firms with government ownership (non private firms thereafter). A private firm can be invested 
in by FDI or domestic owners. The blue area represents the institutional constraints in China. 
Both the formal and informal institutional constraints are considered, consisting of financing, 
legal system, business competition, rules and regulations, and corruption. In regards to the 
influences of these institutional factors on the business performance, the author is going to 
investigate the differences between insiders and outsiders and to build a number of hypothesis 
related.  
 
3.3.2.1 Constraints on business competition  
All firms try to survive in market competition and the factors that influence the level of business 
competition is another business constraint. Price difference is among the business competition 
constraints, the most unfair competition directly results from this. High prices negatively affects 
local market growth and accounting return as the consumers appear to be price sensitive (Luo, 
1995), and consumers tend to value low cost over the other product attributes (Mahatoo, 1990).   
 
From the experiences of Hong Kong and Guangdong, economic/ government policies and 
government/government administration toward business operations are the two major 
dimensions in determining a FDI-friendly environment (Ng and Tuan, 2001; 2002). Given the 
WTO agreement, it is important to meet the expectations of foreign investors, in terms of a 
healthy/sound legal system, government bureaucracy and corruption, and transparency and 
efficiencies of government administration. The reform in China can create new obstacles of 
business competition when removing the old ones. For example, since the middle of the 1990s, 
the Chinese government has initiated privatization and corporatization of SOEs (Chan et al., 
2007). However, the government still retains strong control over majority of them (Bai et al., 
 
Outsider 
Firms 
Business environment in 
China 
 Insider 
Firms 
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2004), and firms with larger shares of state ownership still appear to have smaller investment-
cash flow sensitivity than firms with lower shares of state ownership (Chow et al., 2010).  
 
Firstly observed by Kornai (1979, 1980, and 1986a), this is also called “soft budget constraint”. 
This constraint affects business competition that SOEs receive subsidies when they experience 
continual losses as the government bails out bankrupt SOEs to avoid unemployment and 
political unrest. That is, politicians offer subsidies to the SOEs in financial difficulties to save 
jobs and maintain their reputation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), despite the fact that soft budget 
constraint affects incentives of economic agents. The soft budget constraint was hence a major 
cause of inefficiency in socialist economies (Krugman, 1998). At an inter-firm level, a SOE has 
access to subsidized credit from the government up to a maximum amount, and the soft budget 
constraint reduces the credit multiplier faced by the SOE. World Bank (1997) estimated that 
more than 30% of the bank loans in China to the SOEs were non-performing, and that in turn 
leads to the competition obstacles to the private sector. Therefore, the foreign firms and the 
private firms are more constrained as they cannot receive subsidies. 
 
Collude for credit is another business competitive constraint. The credit risk in China is 
generally higher than that in North America, Japan, and Europe. There are three main reasons: 
(1) state-owned banks are driven by policies rather than risk-adjusted profit, (2) the shortage and 
other problems of specialist, and (3) poor internal control. As a senior officer may be able to 
influence a credit approval (Li, 2006), it is beneficial for foreign investors to invest in regions 
where they are able to establish a stable relationship with the local governments (Tse et al., 
1997; Zhou et al., 2002). Although non-state firms and SOEs all have incentives to collude, 
SOEs face the least collusion costs because their political power as small local auditors are 
under strong government influence. Being a major client of the region’s local auditors, the 
government can threaten these auditors by asking its SOEs not to use the auditors’ services. 
Further, many of the local auditors’ partners are ex-bureaucrats of the local governments, and 
the same governments serve as controlling shareholders of the SOEs as these audit firms’ 
clients. Governments can also influence the audit firms through their finance bureaus, audit 
bureaus, and local institutes in the licensing of audit firms, the administration of qualifying 
exams, and regulating audit firms’ daily operations (Tang, 1999). As a result, SOEs are more 
likely than private firms to operate in the business environment with more government 
intervention and less developed credit markets (Wang et al., 2008), and both the foreign firms 
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and private firms are more constrained by the competitive constraint of credit collusion than the 
SOEs. 
 
The competition constraint of credit collusion is connected with government interference in 
business operation, and should originally be indicative of protection of private properties (Du et 
al., 2008). On one hand, government intervention is a second-best solution to the lack of formal 
protection of private properties, particularly because of the lack or weakness of the court 
system. On the other hand, government assistance may lead to rent-seeking and even corruption 
as entrepreneurs lobby or bribe officials to seek favour in resolving business disputes (Frye and 
Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). Based on the study of Du et al. (2008), there should 
be the practices favouring the foreign firms and the SOEs with large or medium size, against the 
private firms. In other words, the private firms are apparently more constrained by the 
competitive obstacles with government involvement, though it is actually difficult to judge these 
constraints on business performance with different ownership once the rent-seeking behaviour 
happens.     
 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed with the United States in 1992, covering 
a range of issues ranging from market access to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection. 
For the first time, the MOU required China to phase out internal trade regulations and import 
restrictions such as import quotas and strict sanitary standards (Huang, 2003a). However, China 
is still at the centre of debates about intellectual property violations and has been part of many 
international disputes with several industrial nations over IPR infringements (Cheung, 2009). 
The lack of protection and enforcement of IPR include (a) clarification on the enforcement 
thresholds needed for prosecuting acts of trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy; (b) 
Chinese customs’ disposal of confiscated goods that infringe intellectual property rights; (c) the 
scope of coverage of criminal procedures and penalties for unauthorized reproduction or 
distribution of copyrighted works; and (d) the denial of copyright protection and enforcement 
for creative works that are unauthorized or censored in China (WTO, 2009; Zhu and Liu, 2008). 
The high level of complaints against IPR practices indicates the existing gap between IPR laws 
on the books and actual enforcement in China (Awokuse and Yin, 2010). Based on a panel data 
set (1993-2001), Du et al. (2008) suggest that US multinationals prefer operating their business 
in the regions that have a better IPR protection. That is to say, the foreign firms should be 
theoretically beneficial and less constrained by the constraint related to violation of patent. 
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Some researchers have different opinions. For example, You and Katayama’s (2005) empirical 
observations indicate that, working as a subsystem of the overall IPR protection system, the 
patent and trademark registration system does not function effectively in China. Their results 
furthermore suggest that patent and trademark registration instead provide a means of local 
imitation and could be facilitating technology transfer/diffusion in China. The investigation of 
these competitive constraints on business performance can be implied as the hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1a): The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of business 
competition than the domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1b): The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business 
competition than the non private firms.  
 
 
3.3.2.2 The financial constraints  
Graph 3.2 Structure of the Chinese financial system 
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Graph 3.3 Structure of the Chinese financial system 
 
As a result of China’s entrance to the WTO in 2011, more foreign banks enter the domestic 
credit markets because China is committed to opening its financial markets substantially to 
foreign investors. However, La Porta et al. (2002) indicate the government still owns 99.45% of 
the 10 largest commercial banks, and this governmental control was strengthened recently 
(Shang, 2009). As displayed in Graph 3.2 and 3.3, the structure of the financial system is still a 
planning system alongside with the rapid development of financial markets (Lau et al., 2000). 
The banking sector includes four inefficient state-owned banks, and its financial system is 
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definitely dominated by a large but inefficient banking sector totally under the control of the 
government. 
 
Typically, three types of financial institutions handle the vast majority of the financial business, 
which are commercial banks, life insurance companies, and investment banks (Stearns and 
Mizruchi, 1993). Allen et al. (2005) find that there are four most important financing sources for 
all firms in China, comprising bank loans, firms’ self-fundraising, state budget, and FDI. 
Among them, the two most important financing channels are bank loans and self-fundraising. 
Bank loans provide a large amount of funds and constitute a large portion of firms’ financing 
needs, up to 25% of their total financing needs in setting up period. Self-fundraising includes 
proceeds from capital raised from local governments, communities, other investors, internal 
financing channels such as retained earnings, and all other funds raised domestically by the 
firms. The China Statistical Yearbook (2000-2002) displays total self-fundraising reached 
US$275.5 billion in 2002, while domestic bank loans were US$106.6 billion for the same year. 
Moreover, private sector relies mostly on self-fundraising, about 90% of total financing. Even 
for SOEs, self-fundraising still captures a range between 45% and 65% of total financing.  
 
Although China’s stock markets are actually relatively more efficient than banks, they are 
relatively smaller, in terms of both market capitalization and the total value traded as a fraction 
of GDP (Allen et al., 2005). Chinese authorities traditionally treat its banking system as a 
substitute for state financing in order to fund too many inefficient firms with large size, 
especially the SOEs. The lending quotas were issued to the SOEs based on the authorization, 
while private firms were excluded from lending quotas. Because the access to the stock market 
is mainly restricted to large- / medium-sized SOEs and the Chinese banks are mostly state 
owned, there is a bias towards SOEs and against other firms in the access of finance (Chow and 
Fung, 1998). Given that private sector now produces more than half of the GDP of China, they 
only receive 27% of loans and are excluded from the country’s corporate bond markets (Farrell 
and Lund, 2006).  
 
In addition, there was a legal bias against private firms, which made it harder to collateralize 
their assets in order to obtain loans, and also made it riskier for banks to lend them money 
(Huang, 2003). Although China theoretically abolished lending quotas at the end of the 1990s, 
banks still consider private firms to be riskier, either due to their short credit history or smaller 
chance of being bailed out by the government. Moreover, state banks are still determined by 
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political reasons rather than commercial motives (Park and Sehrt, 2001). The financial system in 
China therefore has the inefficient consequences: wasteful investments yielding negligible 
returns, restrictive funding for the private firms that drive growth, pervasive state ownership of 
financial institutions which stifles competition and lowers efficiency, a feeble array of financial 
products for consumers, and minimal growth in corporate bond markets (Hericourt and Poncet, 
2009). 
 
Cost of borrowing constitutes a major component of business costs. When the cost becomes 
higher at home relative to the host country, firms are more likely to refrain from borrowing 
money at home for overseas investment (Grosse and Trevino, 1996). Higher capital costs may 
cause the foreign firms to lose cost advantages in the host countries, and the risk to access the 
foreign financial sources at a high cost for overseas investment can be regarded as the business 
constraints for the foreign firms (Zhao, 2003). The firms are variously constrained by financing 
as these overwhelming barriers are obvious for domestic firms in the economies with 
underdeveloped capital markets, and the foreign firms might have a competitive advantage 
because of their access to better functioning foreign capital markets (Foley et al., 2004).  
 
In China, private firms have to depend on internal capital for better performance and 
development. But as internal capital is often limited, especially for entrepreneurial firms, 
external finance is crucial to the growth of private firms to provide an additional source of 
capital and to allocate the capital factor efficiently (Levine, 1997). However, in China, the 
protection of private properties was not formally written until 2004, and the legal protection of 
private property would cost more time to set up. As a result, for private enterprises, access to 
bank loans can be blocked due to the lack of protection of private properties. Like the other 
developing and transition economies, the economy of China is dominated by the public sector 
(Todaro and Smith, 2009). The public sector may influence the government to change its 
lending policies to favour the SOEs and against the private firms (Bai et al., 2006). In other 
words, poor protection of private properties is the fundamental reason for expropriation and 
discrimination, which leads to financial constraint on the business performance of private firms. 
 
In general, when private firms face higher risks of expropriation, banks are less willing to lend 
them money, thereby making their access to bank loans more difficult (the supply side effect). 
The demand side story is more complicated. On one hand, with the risk of expropriation, private 
firms have less incentive for investment and hence lower demand for bank loans. On the other 
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hand, as Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002), and Cull and Xu (2005) argue, in the 
presence of expropriation, private firms actually prefer external finance to internal finance for 
further development, though the incentive for further development itself has been weakened. 
Overall, the supply side effect seems the dominant effect for private enterprises in China. That is 
to say, the private firms are more constrained by limited access to external finance.  
 
Thus, a firm’s business organisation and corporate governance practices ultimately determine its 
business performance (Liu, 2005). Xu and Wang (1999) reported that the business performance 
in China is negatively related to the level of state ownership. Sun and Tong (2003) also find that 
share issue privatization is associated with improved corporate performance. In the context of 
the ownership structure and the Chinese listed firms’ stock market valuation, Tian (2001) finds 
that government ownership worsens a firm’s performance when government ownership is small, 
but improves a firm’s performance when government ownership gets significantly larger. 
 
There are a number of empirical studies at the firm-level to illustrate the financial constraints on 
business performance. Forssback and Oxelheim (2008) also find that financial advantages may 
be important for all firms but should be particularly important to FDI in small industrial or 
emerging market countries with relatively illiquid and/or segmented domestic capital markets. 
Firth et al. (2008) discovered that state-owned banks in China tend to impose fewer restrictions 
on the capital expenditure investments of low growth firms with a high state ownership. It was 
also suggested that political obligations of state-owned banks to support these firms meant that 
they fail to play a monitoring and disciplining role in preventing overinvestment. Guariglia and 
Poncet (2008) confirm that over the period 1989-2003, FDI is used to lighten the costs 
associated with the inefficient banking system in China. Using the data of 1300 domestic firms 
from 2000 to 2002, Hericourt and Poncet (2009) note that it is helpful for private domestic firms 
to avoid financial obstacles by developing cross-border relationships with foreign firms.  
 
In a cross country research, Beck et al. (2005) empirically finds that the foreign firms face lower 
financing obstacles when keeping higher growth rates, and the non private firms are subject to 
more financial constraints. Conversely, Li et al. (2009) highlights the difficulty of the private 
firms in accessing financing. In this research, the factor of private ownership increases large and 
medium firms’ abilities to access financing supports, while reducing the small firms’ chances of 
having long term financial support. Unless these firms are large enough, small private firms are 
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more likely to be constrained from having long term financing. Therefore, two hypotheses are 
applied to investigate the financial constraints on the business performance: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2a): The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of finance than the 
domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2b): The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of finance than 
the non private firms.  
 
3.3.2.3 Constraints of business rules and regulations 
The government has a number of choices to deliver the targets of job creation, innovation and 
improve competitiveness (Dennis, 2004). This includes lowering the entry barriers to new firms, 
reducing the difficulties on those individuals already operating their business, and using public 
funds to support individuals (Van Stel et al., 2007). It is thus crucial to develop and change in 
accordance with the development and change of economic, political, cultural and other 
conditions. In a fast growing economy, regulatory rules change rapidly along with different 
economic policies, and a rationale in the creation of these rules and regulations is intentionally 
and inherently flexible, which may lead to the basis of uncertainty in the implementation and 
interpretations of the law (Corne, 1995). In China, administrative bodies and local governments 
both use administrative specification and interpretation to introduce specificity to suit the 
implementing agency properly. Instead of taking the letter of law for granted, the foreign firms 
have to access the relevant rules, interpretations, and circulars at both the national and local 
levels. More interestingly, in practice, the business operation of foreign firms also depends on 
the reinterpretation with legal flexibility (Corne, 1995).  
 
We can associate corruption within governments with the predictability of policies and 
regulations that protect contracts and property (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Corruption can 
be prevented by facilitating contractual arrangements between transacting parties and by 
preventing public officials from acting arbitrarily for personal gains. Investment and growth 
appear better explained by the latter; whilst the former primarily influences only the forms of 
contracting that occur. Business regulations should reinforce the attractiveness of business 
opportunities to investors by providing credible assurances about the permanence of those 
policies, honouring policy commitments, implementing and enforcing property rights (Fan et al., 
2007). Thus, regulation serves to improve corporate governance standards, particularly as firms 
seek to avoid disciplinary costs. However, meeting the standards mandated by regulation itself 
also creates certain costs for firms. 
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The foreign exchange reform in China is a gradual transformation of an exchange allocation 
mechanism. The foreign exchange regulations require a firm to generate all foreign exchange 
needed for the remittance of dividends, expenditures and other distributions. Beginning in 1994, 
three changes constitute the foreign exchange reform that is moving toward a more liberalised 
regime and toward a greater facilitation of FDI. The WTO accession was a driving force for the 
liberalization of its capital mobility control regime as China is committed to opening its 
domestic financial markets to a large extent. However, China still depends on these controls to 
ensure the functioning of its exchange system, i.e. the complicated approval procedures for 
transactions under the capital account, transaction based verification for import payments and 
export receipts, continuous monitoring of exporters’ performance in meeting foreign exchange 
surrender requirements, active intervention by the central bank in the foreign exchange market, 
heavy use of circulars for policy clarification and changes, and continuous crackdowns on 
illegal foreign exchange transactions (Lin and Schramm, 2003). Given the risk of reducing the 
effectiveness of its efforts to attract FDI, there are two reasons why China still uses such 
regulations to constrain the foreign investment. The foreign exchange regulations help China to 
protect its foreign exchange reserves and encourage the foreign firms to export in order to 
improve the trade balance of China. Moreover, these regulations promote localisation of FDI by 
speeding up the transfer of technology and upgrade the manufacturing capabilities (Chen, 1997).  
 
During the transition, there is a rapid increase in labour disputes and considerable difficulties in 
dispute resolution because the previous labour regulations associated with politics, 
administration and common interests have been broken down. Moreover, the increasing 
competition has created new pressures on enterprises to increase productivity and lower costs as 
the downward pressures on workplace conditions. To reform labour administration, China has 
promulgated a range of laws, regulations, and decrees that codify workers rights and health and 
safety protections. A new Labour Law came into effect on Jan. 1, 1995. A revised Trade Union 
Law was announced October 28, 2001. A Law on Occupational Diseases Prevention and 
Control became effective May 1, 2002. A Law on Safe Production came into effect November 
1, 2002. The government has also advanced a range of regulations specifying health and safety 
standards in industrial operations, such as: Regulations on Safe Management of Dangerous 
Chemicals; Regulations on Labour Protection for Using Toxic Substances in Workplace; and, 
Regulations on Protection against Radioisotopes and Radiation-Emitting Apparatus.  
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However, on almost every level, workers struggle to protect themselves, such as to increase 
wages, reduce working hours, set reasonable production goals, curb physical and sexual 
harassment, and even minimally improve workplace safety conditions. It becomes urgent and 
indispensable to direct and regulate labour relations to achieve a stability and healthy 
development of the economy (Cheng, 2004). Although there are opportunities for workers to sue 
their employers for compensation, they still have to face courts that generally are not 
independent from the state and regional government (Pan, 2002). Actually, the government is 
more interested in attracting FDI, than in protecting workers and the environment. Accordingly, 
the foreign firms should be less constrained by the labour regulations than the domestic firms.  
 
In an emerging economy, the difficulty associated with making regulations is to draw the 
distinction between competition and concentration (Lall 2000). Nee (2000) shows how the 
elimination of a free market creates speculation and the corruption of bureaucrats. As a pro-
market force with legal-rational bureaucratic discipline, the regulation on market competition 
increases the regulatory burden of the states, negatively influencing the business performance. 
When taking industrial promotion as the priority, competition becomes less important. This is so 
crucial that even domestic firms are not treated equally, as the less efficient SOEs systematically 
receive preferential support while private firms are discriminated. This form of protectionism in 
rules and regulations can only encourage less efficient firms and prevent the improvement of 
business performance, at heavy cost to domestic consumers and economic growth (Wang, 
2003). That is to say, both the foreign firms and the private firms are more constrained by the 
rules and regulations.   
 
Similarly, Wieneke and Gries (2011) note the financial regulations constrain the business 
performance of the enterprises. This is due to the fact that financial regulations limit competition 
in the banking sector, and therefore decreasing the availability of the start up costs for the small 
and medium size enterprises. In China, some specific restrictions influence the business 
performance of the FIEs negatively as some regulations of capital controls prevent FDI inflows 
(Kinoshita and Campos, 2006), such as capital account measures that liberalize inward FDI, as 
well as approval requirements and restrictions on profit remittance abroad (Lin and Schramm, 
2003).  
 
According to a study of the relationship between regulation and entrepreneurship, when private 
business owners face more the regulatory constraints, they are more likely to set up their 
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business in the informal sector (Van Stel et al., 2007; World Bank, 2005). Their empirical 
results also show that labour regulations have a negative influence on both nascent and the 
young business operation for private owners (Van Stel et al., 2007). Javorcik and Wei (2004) 
find that FDI is deterred by tight environmental standards. Zhang and Fu (2008) similarly note 
that environmental regulations influence the business operation of the FIEs, and their empirical 
results indicate that foreign investors are attracted by the relatively weaker environmental 
regulations in China. 
 
In theory, all firms are likely to benefit equally from the application of business rules and 
regulations. Udayasankar and Das (2007: 270) find that “When the focal firm fails to meet the 
levels of governance mandated by regulation it suffers losses, while firms which respond 
quickly gain in comparison with other firms”. Therefore, the relationship between the business 
performance and the regulations is also dependent on the competitiveness of the business 
environment. To study this relationship, two hypotheses are summarised: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3a): The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of business rules 
and regulations than the domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3b): The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business rules 
and regulations than the non private firms.  
 
3.3.2.4 Corruptions constraints  
Corruption is a form of white collar crime and involves the exploitation of an entrusted power 
for private gains (Sun, 2004). It refers to the exercise of public power for private gain, or a 
public employee uses his or her specific position to obtain private benefits. When an official has 
discretion over the distribution of a good (Rose-Ackerman, 1999), he or she has an incentive of 
corruption to ask for a bribe to increase his or her income in exchange for a good that has little 
cost to him or her (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Corruption ultimately results in the inefficient 
resource allocation (Mauro, 1998). The World Bank (2006: 1) states, “Bad governance is 
associated with corruption, distortion of government budgets, inequitable growth, social 
exclusion, lack of trust in authorities”. The corruption basically indicates a lack of respect for 
the rules and regulations that govern economic interactions (Curevo-Cazurra, 2006), and firms 
have to make additional, irregular payments to get things done (Kaufmann et al., 2003) as they 
have to offer a bribe and obtain benefits to which it would not otherwise have access. However, 
the official can withhold approval of a permit until a bribe is paid. Even worse, government 
officials have an incentive to create additional regulations with the sole purpose of generating an 
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opportunity for more bribes (De Soto, 1989). As a result, even when the bribe results in 
fulfilment of the promise, the firm still faces costs increasing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).  
 
In a research of Allen et al. (2005: 67), China’s corruption index is the worst among the seven 
developing countries in transition to a market based economy, consisting of China, India, 
Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The corruption in China is connected 
with “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, which resulted in inevitable problems in business 
operation. The huge increasing opportunities in private sector is combined with the traditional 
power of government that has led to a creation of corruption, recognised as a challenge to 
China’s economy and to its reforms (Cole et al., 2009). The extensive state control and state 
intervention in the national economy, the lack of democracy and freedom of media, the weak 
rule of law, etc. have contributed to the severe corruption problem (Du et al., 2008).  
 
Moreover, since the early 1990s, the Chinese financial sector gradually moved from a highly 
centralized regime to a relatively decentralized system that gave local governments and SOEs 
more discretionary power in fiscal policy. The decentralization gives local officials more power 
and at the same time the distribution of power at local levels became more compartmentalized 
(Sands, 1990). Under the control of the government, the resources of financial institutions 
become the major targets for corruption. There was not any meaningful supervisory mechanism 
in place to control illegal trading activities of the stock market in China, such as the corruption 
of the executives of financial institutions and the regulatory officials (Deng, et al. 2010).  
 
Although China should open its market after entering the WTO, the state maintained its sole 
monopoly over some key sectors and refused to introduce any competition in these sectors 
because of ideological, political, and economic reasons, such banking, railway transportation, 
telecom, and etc. The officials use every possible means to seek rent through monopoly in the 
economic areas that had not been open for market competition (Pei, 2006). As a result, 
corruption in banking area has continued to be a serious problem due to the state strict sector 
control and lack of efficient monitory mechanism. The China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
reported that between 1998 and 2003 there were 203,880 corruption cases investigated 
involving 13,854 officials and retrieved approximately $3.18 billion. In 2004, 43,757 
government employees were investigated by prosecutors for corruption and dereliction of duty, 
of which 30,788 were brought to court. Xie and Lu (2005) examined China’s corruption in 
financial institutions, and they found that customers of banking had to pay extra costs to bribe 
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banking officials for services. Bribes to officials given by foreign investors have tended to 
increase and have had an adverse effect on competition and fair resource allocation (Cole et al., 
2009).  
 
Corruption affects both the foreign firms and domestic firms, but domestic investors are better 
than foreigners in managing the transaction and coordination costs because of the familiarity in 
the local market (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001). Fung et al. (2004) prove that lower degrees of 
corruption play an important role in attracting higher inflows of FDI. Wei (2000a) shows that 
both corruption and tax rates have negative effects on FDI flows. Wei also presents corruption 
that is not transparent ultimately create more uncertainty over the total questionable payments or 
the final outcome. Consequently, the uncertainty induced by corruption leads to more 
constraints to foreign firms and decrease FDI inflows. In transition economies, Javorcik and 
Wei (2009) find corruption makes local bureaucracy less transparent and adds the business cost 
to the foreign firms. Hines (1995) also finds the foreign firms are more constrained by 
corruption as FDI from the USA grew faster in less corrupt countries than in more corrupted 
countries. 
 
However, there are also different theoretical opinions. In a country with rigid regulations and 
inefficient bureaucracy, corruption may increase bureaucratic efficiency by speeding up the 
decision making process (Bardhan 1997). Fan et al. (2009a) find the exemption from corruption 
does not significantly affect FDI inflows. In other words, the foreign firms are not more 
constrained by the corruption. Several researches also support that corruption promotes private 
investment and private initiative and expands the tax base in China (Qi, 1992, 1994; McKinnon, 
1992; Montinola et al., 1995; Qian and Weingast, 1996, 1997; Jin et al., 2005; Blanchard and 
Shleifer, 2000). In fact, the corruption constraints may not apply to all foreign investors equally 
because there is variability in the cost of engaging in bribery abroad (Curevo-Cazurra, 2006). 
Investors from countries that have laws against bribery abroad are likely to be more constrained 
by the corruption in the host country. In contrast, investors from countries with high levels of 
corruption appear not to be more constrained by the high levels of corruption. Among the 
studies of corruption in China, Cole et al. (2009) reveals that FDI is attracted to regions that 
have done the most to tackle corruption and that have the most efficient local government. 
Conversely, Chen (2004) considers corruption in local government to be consistent with the 
incentives to help the development of private sector as an increased private income expands the 
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local tax base. Thus, the private firms are apparently less constrained by corruption. To find 
how corruption constrains the business performance, there are two hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4 (H4a): The foreign firms are more constrained by the constraints of corruption 
than the domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4b): The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of corruption 
than the non private firms.  
 
3.3.2.5 The legislation and constraints of legal institutions 
Table 3.2 FDI legislations and regulations in China 
Source: summarised from Tuan and Ng (2004) 
 
A successful legal system is able to put the policies into operation properly, comprising political 
stability, transparent and accountable government, and the prevention of corruption, in order to 
attract and retain more investment (DFID, 1997). In China, the changes of legislation can be 
conceived of as a two-dimensional evolutionary process (table 3.2) (Ng and Tuan, 2001; Tuan 
and Ng, 2004). In the first stage, the reforms include “the relaxation of ideological constraints, 
revision of the constitution and efforts to provide legal status and legitimacy for FDI related 
activities in a socialist economy” (Tuan and Ng, 2004: 675). The second stage is aimed a full-
Stage I (1979–1991) Stage II (after1992) 
 Equity Joint Venture Law (1979) 
 Constitutional Law revision for FDI 
(1982) 
 Wholly Owned Subsidiaries (WOS) Law 
(1986) 
 Wholly Foreign-Invested Enterprise Law 
(1986) 
 Provisions for the FDI Encouragement 
(1986) 
 Constitutional Status of Foreign Invested 
Enterprises in Chinese Civil Law (1986) 
 Interim Provisions on Guiding FDI (1987) 
 Delegation on Approval of Selected FDI 
Projects to more Local Governments 
(1988) 
 Law of Cooperative Joint Ventures (1988) 
 Rules for Implementation of WOS Law 
(1990) 
 Income Tax Law and its Rules for 
 Implementation (1991) 
 Trade Union Law (1992) 
 Company Law (1993) 
 Provisional Regulations of Value-added Tax, 
Consumption Tax, Business Tax, and Enterprise 
Income Tax (1993) 
 Law on Certified Public Accountants (1994) 
 Provisions for Foreign Exchange Controls (1994, 
1997) 
 Insurance Law (1995) 
 Law of Commercial Bank (1995) 
 Guideline for FDI (1995, 1997, 1999) 
 Further Delegation for Approving FDI to Local 
Government (1996) 
 Custom Administration Reform (1998) 
 Regulation on Trial Operation of Foreign Banks in 
Shenzhen and Putong (1998) 
 Law of Land Management (1999) 
 PRC Contract Law (1999) 
 Regulation Governing FDI to Domestic Commerce 
Sector (1999) 
 Establishment of National Finance and Insurance 
Commissions (1999) 
 Accession to WTO (2001) 
 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement with Hong 
Kong and Macau (2003) 
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scale economic liberalization and marketization, and the major legal regimes have been 
progressively liberalized with important modifications to the laws governing the foreign firms. 
As a result, China accepts and implements the three basic legal concepts in its reform of 
legislations (Huang, 2003a): (1) the concept of “legal person” that indicates the independence of 
a firm; (2) the introduction of ownership and the associated benefit right from ownership; (3) the 
recognition that firms have a broad range of decision rights, especially the control right. 
 
In China, while certain laws and regulations apply to business activities of foreign firms, others 
apply only to domestic businesses (Huang, 2003a). The dualist nature of legal system has 
already influenced basic issues such as company incorporation, corporate governance, contract, 
and tax. In order to better encourage inward flow of funds, technology and knowledge, China 
offers numerous preferential treatments to the FIEs in taxation (table 3.3), such as income tax 
reductions and exemptions. In addition, to develop local economy, local authorities usually 
extend the sector limitation of the FIEs to accept preferential treatments and give extra 
advantages combined with preferential treatments. Because the reforms in the Chinese 
legislation and legal institutions all aim to encourage FDI inflows and better FIEs operation, 
theoretically, the FIEs’ business performance should be less constrained by the legal institutions 
than the domestic firms. 
Table 3.3 Current differences of Tax Categories 
Tax categories Tax payer Tax Tax scope Tax rate 
 Corporate 
 Income Tax 
 Levied on 
domestic 
financially 
independent 
enterprises and 
organizations. 
 Based on 
taxable 
revenue. 
 The general tax rate is 33%. 
 If the taxable revenue is 
below RMB100, 000, the 
tax rate is 27%. 
 If taxable revenue is below 
RMB30, 000, the tax rate is 
18%. 
 Foreign-invested 
Enterprises & 
Foreign Enterprise 
income Tax 
 Levied on 
foreign-invested 
enterprises and 
foreign 
enterprises. 
 Based on 
taxable 
revenue. 
 The general tax rate is 33%. 
 In special economic zones, 
the tax rate is 15%. 
 The pre-paid tax rate is 
10%. 
Sources: Zuo (2006) 
 
As a result, the legislative and regulatory treatments of domestic firms have been far less 
transparent and more restrictive, and the legal protection of foreign firms far exceeded that of 
domestic private investment. The state has made a legislative commitment not to nationalize or 
expropriate foreign investment without due cause and compensation while there is no similar 
protection for domestic private firms. This dualist nature of legislations is originally rooted in 
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the design and the approach of economic reform, as the initial purpose to maintain two legal 
systems was to use FDI to preserve socialism, instead of demolishing it (Huang, 2003b). 
Accordingly, a legal mechanism was designed in an attempt to preserve socialism and to control 
the reforming process and its influences, for the foreign firms. There is hence an internal logic 
between encouraging the foreign firms on the one hand and restricting domestic private firms on 
the other hand. As a result, the domestic private firms have to face more legal constraints. 
 
Business performance is also linked with contract enforcement depending on legal institutions 
and law enforcement, as a fine legal framework is fundamental in the stability and flexibility for 
business operation (Du et al., 2008). The legal system includes all institutions and officials who 
are involved in creation and implementation of law, including courts and judges; bureaucrats; 
and politicians, in their capacity as makers and implementers of law (Perry, 2002). To have an 
effective law enforcement system, a country must have an independent and efficient judicial 
system with a sufficient supply of qualified legal professionals (Allen et al., 2005).  
 
However, in China, the customary rules require an individual to obey rules drafted by 
community leaders over and above the laws. At an operational level, the limited authority of the 
courts presents a more basic issue. Courts are only parallel to, rather than superior to, other units 
of the Chinese bureaucratic hierarchy. The powers of the courts are subject to serious limitations 
because, although the reforms reconstructed them, they remain part of a state apparatus that still 
reflects the severe limits that the doctrine, structure and practice of the state places on the 
judiciary. When courts seek to enforce judgments, agencies whose actions are required to assist 
the courts sometimes refuse to cooperate. Furthermore, the decision-making behaviour of the 
courts is similar to other administrative agencies in China, and adjudication is seldom different 
from other bureaucratic processes. Judges are selected and paid by local governments, a 
relationship that leads to pressure on the courts to favour their localities in litigation involving 
foreigners and parties from elsewhere in China, consequently impeding fair adjudication and 
enforcement of judgments. Therefore, the power of local courts is impaired by local 
protectionism, which has a negative impact on the effectiveness of judiciary (Huang, 2003a). It 
is also reasonable to question the effectiveness of the contract enforcement as government 
values community benefits above private ones (Vu et al., 2008).  
 
Beck et al. (2005) find that the foreign firms face lower legal constraints, while the non private 
firms face more legal constraints in their cross country study. The finding of Li et al. (2009) is 
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consistent with the research conducted by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) that better 
legal protection is associated with long-term financing. In their research, financial constraints 
for the private firms are related to more legal constraints. Especially in a transition country, the 
performance of private firms is more constrained by the absence of legal institutions for the 
consistent protection of private property and for the enforcement of private contracts (Kornai, 
1990a). Because the lack of status and legal protection of private firms leaves them vulnerable 
to much interference from government officials and the judiciary, the private firms are more 
constrained by legal obstacles in China (Ahlstromet al., 2003; Ahlstromet al., 2008; Peng and 
Luo, 2000). For non-state controlled firms whose shareholders do not enjoy political power, 
legal investor protection is negatively related to ownership concentration (Wu et al., 2009). In 
other words, the business growth of the private firms is more constrained by the legal obstacles. 
However, investigating contract enforcement, Cull and Xu (2005) express a different opinion 
that the private firms are not more legally constrained as the owners express greater faith in that 
their rights would be well protected by the legal system. To find the relations between legal 
constraints and the business performance, the two hypotheses are implied:  
Hypothesis 5 (H5a): The foreign firms are less constrained by legal constraints than the 
domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5b): The private firms are more constrained by legal constraints than the non 
private firms.  
3.3.2 The constraints on the firms with different size 
The factor of firm size is an important variable taken into consideration in this research. Fawzy 
(1998) and Galal (1996) argues that the firms with different sizes, (i.e. small, medium and large) 
behave differently in the business environment as they display different capabilities. Large firms 
can have bigger access to infrastructures and information compared to medium and small size 
firms (Beck et al., 2000; Hellman et al., 2000a; Hellman et al., 2000b) and government rules and 
regulations may also be biased in favour of large firms (Schiffer and Weder, 2001). Moreover, 
since large firms are usually endowed with more financial resources (Rosner, 1968), the ability 
of firms to strengthen skills and knowledge and gain access to advancing technologies, depend 
on the firm size (Santoro and Chakrabarti, 2002).  
 
Beck et al., (2008) finds that firm size plays an important role in explaining the business 
performance constrained by institutions. Their results indicate that small firms benefit from 
higher levels of property rights protection and use more external finance from banks and equity 
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markets, while finance from banking system and other government sources are largely used by 
larger firms. In a business environment characterised by weak institutional framework, the size 
of a firm is determined by state plan rather than by market forces in China as many large 
Chinese firms are a legacy of the old planning system. Even with the openness reforms, the FDI 
inflows and the implementation of the Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) are still determined 
by regulations and laws issued by the Chinese government (Tuan and Ng, 2004). Therefore, 
firm size is directly linked to the setting up and business operation of a firm. The large firms, 
such as many State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) bailed by the government, lack competitive and 
entrepreneurial mind that directly lead to inefficiencies (Shepherd, 1972). As a result, most 
Chinese firms have an incentive to increase firm size as much as possible without considering 
efficiency (Zhou et al., 2002). Schiffer and Weder (2001) indicate that small firms are likely to 
face tougher obstacles in obtaining finance, accessing legal systems, or dealing with corruption. 
Beck et al. (2005) indicates the firms’ perception of business constraints relates to firm size. On 
average, smaller firms report higher obstacles of financing and corruption than large firms. In 
contrast, smaller firms report lower legal obstacles than larger firms. The author summarises the 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6 (H6a): The business constraints faced by the firms are positively related to the 
factor of firm size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of formal institutional 
constraints than medium firms that in turn have fewer problems than small firms have. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6b): The business constraints faced by the firms are negatively related to the 
factor of firm size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of informal institutional 
constraints than medium firms that in turn have fewer problems than small firms have.  
3.4 Summary 
This chapter outlines the two steps in outlining conceptual framework to study the aims and 
objectives of the research. The first step is to investigate the impact of institutional factors on 
insider and outsider firms in China. The second step is to answer the questions about how the 
formal and informal institutional constraints influence the business performance differently. 
There are totally six main hypothesises. Among the business constraints discussed in this 
chapter (table 3.4), corruption is the representative of informal institutional constraint, while the 
formal institutional constraints include financial system, legal system, business competition, 
rules and regulations. In chapter 4, the author pays more attention and more emphasis on the 
institutional issues in China, to discuss the role of institutions in influencing the process of 
changes of the institutions and subsequently impact on the business performance.  
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Table 3.4 Institutional indicators 
Institutional 
factor 
Theoretical sources 
in the literature 
Examples of previous studies 
Corruption  Curevo-Cazurra (2006);  
Kaufmann et al. (2003); 
Mauro (1998); Sun (2004);  
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
Blanchard and Shleifer (2000);Fan et al. (2009a);  
Fung et al. (2004); Habib and Zurawicki (2001); 
Hines (1995); Javorcik and Wei (2009); 
Jin et al. (2005); McKinnon (1992);  
Montinola et al. (1995); Qi (1992, 1994);  
Qian and Weingast (1996, 1997); Wei (2000)  
Financing  Foley et al. (2004); Huang (2003); 
Levine (1997); Park and Sehrt (2001); 
Hericourt and Poncet (2009);  
Zhao (2003) 
Beck et al. (2005);  
Forssback and Oxelheim (2008);  
Firth et al. (2008); Guariglia and Poncet (2008); 
Hericourt and Poncet (2009); Li et al. (2009)    
Court  Allen et al. (2005); DFID (1997);  
Du et al. (2008); Perry (2002)  
Ahlstrom et al. (2003); Ahlstrom et al. (2008);  
Beck et al. (2005); Cull and Xu (2005); 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999);  
Kornai (1990);  Li et al. (2009); Peng and Luo (2000) 
Business 
competition 
Kornai (1979, 1980, and 1986); 
Luo (1995); Mahatoo (1990); 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
Du et al. (2008);  
Wang et al. (2008); 
You and Katayama (2005) 
Rules and 
regulations 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005); 
Corne (1995); Fan et al. (2007); 
Van Stel et al. (2007) 
Javorcik and Wei (2004); Kinoshita and Campos (2006); 
Udayasankar and Das (2007); Van Stel et al. (2007);  
Wieneke and Gries (2011); Zhang and Fu (2008)  
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Chapter 4: Institutions and the firms’ business performance 
with the FDI inflow and the private ownership in China 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter highlights the economic growth in China, covering the connections between 
institutions, FDI and the firms’ business performance. In this chapter, the author reviews the 
effects of the formal and informal institutions on the business performance of firm, such as laws, 
regulations and corruption. In the second and the third sections, based on the NIE, the author 
reviews the relations between the institutions, business performance, the main economic 
developments and the growth of the Chinese economy since the 1980s. The fourth part displays 
the changes in the institutions along with the reforming policies in China. The fifth section 
reviews the institutional changes and their influences respectively. This includes the external 
aspect of internationalisation through FDI inflows and the internal aspect of ownership change. 
Given the influences of the introduction of FDI and private ownership, the author explores the 
different aspects of institutional framework in China, consisting of institutional constraints, 
institutional changes, and the problems in the existing institutions.  
4.2 The institutions and the firms’ business performance  
According to North (2003), the general economic environment is characterized by uncertainties, 
and those uncertainties stem primarily from human interaction and the human environment. 
“The structure we impose on our lives to reduce uncertainty accumulates from prescriptions and 
proscriptions, which produce a complex mix of formal and informal constraints embedded in 
language, physical artefacts, and beliefs. …… The dominant beliefs, that is, of those political 
and economic entrepreneurs in a position to make policies, over time result in the accretion of 
an elaborate structure of institutions, both formal rules and informal norms, that together 
determine economic and political performance. The resultant institutional matrix imposes severe 
constraints on the choice of entrepreneurs when they set out to create new or to modify 
institutions in order to improve their economic or political positions…….Change is continually 
occurring, although the rate of change will depend on the degree of competition among 
organizations and their entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs enact policies to improve their competitive 
positions, resulting in alterations of the institutional matrix” (North, 2003: 2-3). Along with the 
economic development, the difficulties in enforcing agreements increase transaction costs. The 
transaction costs arise also because the exchanging parties hold information costly and 
asymmetrically. Accordingly, it is necessary to build a more complex institutional structure to 
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permit anonymous, impersonal exchange across time and space. As North (1993c: 5) mentioned, 
“To overcome them entails the creation of institutions that so structure the rules and their 
enforcement as to alter the pay-offs to induce cooperative solutions”. That is, the institutions are 
designed to achieve efficient operation by reducing uncertainties caused by transaction cost. 
According to the NIE, both the formal and informal institutions work together to influence the 
entrepreneurs’ decisions and ultimately determine the business performance in the institutional 
matrix. Institution is therefore the fundamental determinant of the efficiency of the firm and 
resource allocation in a modern market economy. 
 
According to Hare (2001), institutions are characterised by public goods. As the “supply of 
institutions” generated by the market mechanism does not efficiently keep up a correspondence 
to the social level, “there is evidently a role for the state both in creating institutions which the 
market does not provide and regulating in the public interest those which it does” (Hare, 2001: 
6). Coase (1937) furthermore writes the substitute relation between transaction cost and the 
operation of a firm. He notes that the format of firms is to replace markets in order to gain the 
efficient management, when the cost of internal management is smaller than transaction costs 
across the market. The comparison between these determines the decision regarding the 
organisational management within a firm against business behaviour through market (Demsetz, 
1988).  
 
“In a world where it was costless to think about, plan for, and write down provisions for future 
events, parties engaged in trade would write a comprehensive contract which specifies precisely 
what each of their obligations is in every conceivable state of the world. Under these conditions, 
there would never be any reason for the parties to modify or update their contract since 
everything would be anticipated and planned for in advance. Nor would any disputes ever occur 
since an outsider could determine whether one of the parties has been in breach of contract and 
impose an appropriate penalty” (Hart, 1988: 121-122). Therefore, the contractual relation is the 
essence of the firm, with employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors, etc. The firm acts as 
the framework including a set of contracting relationships among individuals. The principal 
engages the agent under a contract to perform a service on their behalf by giving authority to the 
agent. However, the problem of agency costs and monitoring independently exists for all of 
these contracts. As transaction costs are large in practice, the presence of transaction costs 
indicates that it is impossible for the parties to write a contract that anticipates all the problems 
and the appropriate actions related. It is hence generally impossible for the principal or the agent 
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at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When contracts are incomplete, the importance of a proper 
ownership structure emerges in order to reduce the transaction costs and to maximise the profits 
of the firms.  
 
Business growth usually involves an expansion in terms of assets and employees, an increase 
measured by sales and profit levels, or generation of new products and services (Peng and 
Heath, 1996). This growth depends on the role of the entrepreneurs to make decisions by the 
managerial and organizational capabilities (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Penrose, 1959). 
At an inter-organisational level, a firm’s business operation is constrained by its efforts to 
reduce the uncertainties by employing all the necessary resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Again, the firm’s business success and operational failure depends on the amount of transaction 
costs of inter-organisational relationships, subject to the partners’ trust and understanding to 
smooth the potential problems (Browning et al., 1995; Powell, 1990).  
 
Strictly speaking, a firm is “one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting 
relationships and which is also characterised by the existence of divisible residual claims on the 
assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of the 
other contracting individuals…… There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex 
relationships (i.e., contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labour, 
material and capital inputs and the consumers of output” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311). 
Any strategic choice of a firm is rationally affected by the institutions (Oliver, 1991), and the 
firm have to face the pressure coming from the formal and the informal institutions as a set of 
systems (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; North, 1990; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). The firm 
operates within and is constrained by a given institutional framework that decides transaction 
costs and controls resource allocation (Xu and Li, 2001). In other words, “organization and 
environment permeate one another both cognitively and relationally” (Child, 1994: 12). From 
this perspective, modern organisation reflects both its institutional past and its present situations 
(Shenkar, 1996), and “industrial enterprise is a complex modern adaptation of pre-existing 
patterns of domination to economic situations in which profit, efficiency and control usually 
from the very conditions of existence” (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988: 54).  
 
Based on the discussion above, we can conclude that institutional constraints limits business 
performance (Peng and Heath, 1996). However, in an economy with problematic institutions, 
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the absence of marketing function applies two more constraints on firms (Brauw et al., 2002). 
First, when transaction costs rise due to institutional constraints that limit market-based 
exchange under infant markets, the firms are unlikely to change the allocation of their resources. 
Even given the information of price change, the entrepreneurs are not sensitive enough to make 
a proper business decision. When we look at the economic development in China, from the 
beginning of the 1980s, all reforming efforts were aimed to remove the inefficient institutions 
and replaced with better ones. This includes the development of a market mechanism in the 
economy, the introduction of the idea of entrepreneurs to the firms, changes in the laws, 
business regulations and economic policies. In the next part, the author is going to talk about the 
problematic characters of institutions in China and the problems related to the business 
performance of Chinese enterprises.    
4.3 The institutions in transition and the firms’ business performance 
Table 4.1 Two features of communist systems giving non-system co-operation 
Market Intermediate goods Consumer goods 
Agents Firms Households 
Feature Plan fulfilment pressures and 
slowness of planning apparatus 
Supply constraints causing queuing and 
quality problems 
Reaction Fixer and barter networks. 
Often large-scale deals. 
Shopping and barter networks. 
Premiums on good connections. 
Legality Grey, often tolerated. 
Often close to corruption 
Partly legal or moderately grey. 
Sometimes close to corruption. 
Source: Nove (1977) 
 
Scott (2001: 65) presents four principles that characterise a Communist system: 
 Party control over management, including economic decisions at all levels  
 Use of mass methods, such as production campaigns  
 Militarization of management, including the use of military terms and approaches  
 Worker education, in areas including Marxist-Leninist ideology, and work attitudes  
Nove (1977) summarise two features of the communist economic system, named supply 
constraints and plan fulfilment pressures (table 4.1). In this economy, the households were 
supply-constrained, and the firms are to fulfil plan targets made by official channels. It is 
logically impossible to value the true costs of goods and services as the costs are irrelevant in 
making decision. When people have the right to distribute goods and services, they often care 
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little about the costs, so values for goods and services vary and differ from the true cost 
structure (Paldam and Svendsen, 2001). Obviously, under the control of the Communist Party, 
the institutional networks are inefficient, and the connections between firms were grey and often 
corrupt (Paldam and Svendsen, 2001). Accordingly, a firm that lacks abilities to acquire and 
allocate resources is less competitive (Child, 1990; Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos, 1990). 
 
Graph 4.1 The interaction of institutions and organisations in the economy of transition 
 
Source: Peng and Heath (1996) 
 
Stiglitz (1997: 15) notes there are “...special problems facing developing and transition 
economies, in which markets are lacking; the markets that do exist may function less 
effectively, and information problems are more severe than in industrial countries simply 
because of the rapid change in the economic environment”. Peng and Heath (1996: 504) 
summarises three characteristics of the constraints of the formal institutions, which are “lack of 
a property-rights-based legal framework, lack of a stable political structure, and lack of strategic 
factor markets. Overall, these formal constraints are characterized by extreme volatility and 
unpredictability, which …… have a strong bearing on the strategic choice of the firm for 
growth”. Graph 4.1 exhibits the institutional framework in the transition economies in which the 
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firms survive, and the most fundamental feature is the complete use of central economic 
planning and bureaucratic control with the overwhelming effect on the business performance. 
Before the transitions, “a national plan was developed by the central government and then was 
incrementally decomposed into a set of targets and orders for specific (state-owned) firms” 
(Carroll et al., 1988: 235). Instead of being an independent decision-making unit, the firm taking 
order from the planning regime has little incentive to improve its business performance.  
  
“Although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political and judicial decisions, 
informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more 
impervious to deliberate policies” (North, 1990: 6). In transition, the formal constraints in the 
planning regime are weakened, and the new formal constraints toward a market-based economy 
are not entirely set up. Hence, pre-existing networks of affiliation are activated, and network ties 
become more important, acting as the constraints of informal institutions (Nee, 1992; Peng, 
1994). Regarded as a set of dominant logic that shapes the institutional frameworks (Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1986), the informal institutions are able to present some essential constancy and 
predictability of the change in the formal institutions, by reducing uncertainties. For example, 
“To operate with any degree of predictability, firms must be able to take and place orders, 
arrange the future delivery of goods and services, and seek and provide warranty” (Fafchamps, 
1996: 444). There are two main ways of dealing with risk-sanctions and trust. When successful, 
this predictability becomes a strong expectation of a “taken for granted” character and greatly 
facilitates transaction (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1998). If contracts cannot be enforced, firms 
have to build up personalised trust relationships to sustain the exchanges (Fafchamps, 1996). In 
other words, they both increase the predictability in a transaction, and the informal constraints 
therefore play an important role to regulate economic exchanges and influence the business 
performance. 
 
Transaction costs of enforcing contracts are usually high in a transition economy (Choi et al., 
1999). This is mainly due to the presence of three types of imperfections in the institutions (Che 
and Qian, 1998a: 9-10). “First, state institutions are imperfect … due to a lack of the rule of law 
and institutions that constrain the state from arbitrary revenue expropriation. …… there is no 
independent judiciary system: the parliament, executive branch, and courts are all under the 
control of the Party. Therefore, there is no law or institution-based commitment……, the state 
has the ultimate authority for …… enterprises and lower level governments. This creates serious 
commitment problems which can distort investment incentives”. Second, the capital market is 
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under developed. “As investor may also be unable to force the entrepreneur to take an 
appropriate action, entrepreneurs find it difficult to raise capital, and many investment 
opportunities pass by without financing”. Third, the government controls the SOEs and banking 
system. “The central government can order a state bank to provide funds to a state enterprise 
and to order the central bank to print money whenever it appears necessary”. Accordingly, the 
government is responsible for the business inefficiency and the investment failures (Kornai 
1980; Dewatripont and Maskin 1995).  
 
Socialist state ownership means the complete control of property, and it is impossible for the 
communist party to consider any options about transferring property rights to others (Kornai, 
1990b). “There were too many barriers: the ideology of state ownership; the power structure of 
the party, based heavily on state-enterprise managers and bureaucrats loath to allow real 
competition to the state enterprises; the communist leaderships’ lack of legitimacy among the 
public, making it impossible to impose the short-run costs of deep economic restructuring” 
(Lipton and Sachs, 1993: 34). In reality, “there is …a…contradiction in the whole reform 
process: how to get the active participation of the very people who will lose a part of their 
power if the process is successful” (Kornai, 1986b:1729). 
 
He (2000: 244-245) stated “leaders of public institutions use their institutional power to increase 
the revenue of their institutions and improve the welfare of their staffs through various legal, 
semi-legal and illegal ways. Such practices include public institutions making profit by 
engaging in business activities (such as a public bank entering into the stock market, or the 
bureau of environment protection selling environment protection facilities to their clients), 
setting up satellite companies, and imposing fines or collecting administrative fees or charging 
the so-called ‘service fee’ and then putting the income into their own coffers … … Such 
‘unhealthy tendencies’ and the associated corruption, both significantly increasing the cost to 
the public, have led to a significant public outcry”. This has led the Chinese authorities make 
efforts to stop these practices. However, “A reform reduces the power of the bureaucracy by 
definition, and most of the administration will inevitably oppose reform. Therefore, a successful 
reform must break the power of the party and state bureaucracy might be seen as the key 
problem of a reform” (Aslund, 1991:14). When the private ownership was introduced in the 
socialist China in the 1980s, for the first time, owners and managers are responsible “for the full 
range of business decisions and for the financial benefits and costs of those decisions” 
(Borenzstein and Kumar, 1990: 230). Private property provides the only means for owners to 
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“monitor, assess, and control the performance of the managers effectively running the 
enterprises” as private property provide incentives for managers to minimize costs and respond 
to market signals (Borenzstein and Kumar, 1990: 229). The reform should include an anti-
communist revolution in the beginning and the economic liberalization afterward (Nolan and 
Wang, 1999). The transition should comprise anti-bureaucratic revolution, privatization, closure 
of the large scale SOE sector, and globalisation. This reform is principally a necessary 
movement from the communist bureaucracy toward a market economy as foreign capital will 
not favour a communist bureaucratic country. 
4.4 The reform in China and the firms’ business performance 
Unlike most other transition economies, China has adopted a dual-track system in which market 
forces are introduced but the government still plays a very important role in resource allocations 
(Li and Xia, 2008). Park et al. (2006) suggest that firm performance in China is affected by 
three institutional changes----decentralization, privatization, and targeted industrial policy. The 
institutional changes shape managerial incentives and operation efficiencies, and in turn 
influence the business performance. Partly due to institutional weaknesses and partly due to the 
political desire to control, state regulations, and policies still interfere with the market and tend 
to favour certain industries or firms. These institutional weaknesses affect the market structure 
and firm performance in terms of firm status, resource access, and strategy. Old institutions 
linger and new institutions are not effectively and efficiently enforced. As a result, the newly 
established laws are not taken seriously by officials, citizens, or firms. The legal enforcement 
tends to favour government officials or firms that have good connections with the officials (Li et 
al., 2004). Under such circumstances, firms must seek unique and scarce resources to gain 
competitive advantages (Meyer et al., 2004; Xin and Pearce, 1996). In the following sections, 
the author tries to explore these different aspects related to these reforms. 
4.4.1 Openness reforms and the institutional changes  
The institutional changes in China are closely connected with the openness reforms that started 
in the 1980s. Before the 1980s, China had no foreign investment from non-Communist nations. 
Under its Marxist governance, any words and behaviours connected with market, private 
ownership, or free competition were made illegal although they are both elementary issues for 
efficient business operation. To achieve this and to bring necessary market reforms, the Chinese 
government resorted to reforms from outside to avoid the risks from the Maoist control and to 
overcome the internal obstacles to improve business operation. As a result, the Chinese 
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government chose international connection in order to kick start and initiate the process of 
economic reform. In the beginning of 1980s, China began its reform along with the application 
for the membership in the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (which became an 
integral part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995) (Norlan and Wang, 1999). Apart 
from the economic gains connected with the openness (McGrattan and Prescott, 2009; Tsui et 
al., 2004), the WTO negotiation and accession were able to make business operation more 
efficient through its integration with the global economy and standardization of management 
and regulations to an international level (Morgan, 1999; Shafaeddin, 2002).  As the WTO is a 
rule-based international organization, China apparently adhered to all WTO rules and ensures 
conformity of its domestic laws and regulations to those of the WTO’s. The legal instruments 
around the WTO accession set forth not only its market access commitments but also a number 
of provisions stipulating the rules under an international mechanism. The change in the central 
legal principles in China is thus one of the most important impacts. The rules not only cover 
trade in goods, services and intellectual property, but also govern investment, competition 
policy, trade facilitation, and transparency in government procurement. China’s policies and 
regulations accordingly become more transparent and accountable, creating a favourable and 
fair environment for investment. When the WTO membership enshrined China’s commitment to 
a certain set of policies, a change against these agreements has not only domestic ramifications 
in China, but also constitutes a breach of international commitments (Simmons, 2000). For 
instance, there are several disputes between China and the US based on the WTO mechanism 
(in table 4.2.1), and mostly China has to alter the barriers of its policies and regulations against 
the commitments related to the Chinese WTO accession.  
 
The importance of the process of economic openness to the institutional changes lies in the 
Communist governance in China, in its closed economy, and in its under-developed institutions. 
Given the difficulties with the largest less developed Communist economy, the initial movement 
toward openness is the key to start the engine of the economic growth in China. The opening 
market access increases the inflows of foreign goods and investments while heightening the 
level of competition. Indeed, the openness reform is related to the strategy of using international 
obligations as a lift to push forward the Chinese internal domestic reform and relying on 
increased international competition to induce domestic firms to improve their efficiency. 
Increased competition is seen as an additional source of pressure on domestic enterprises, 
forcing them both to undertake badly needed structural reforms (Kong, 2004).  
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Table 4.2.1 U. S. WTO Disputes against China in 2011 
China – Market Access for Books, Movies and Music  
Initiation: April 2007  
Dispute: The United States challenged China’s barriers to importing and distributing books, newspapers, 
journals, theatrical films, DVDs and music in China.  
Third Parties: Australia, the EU, Japan, Korea and Chinese Taipei  
Status: A WTO panel issued its decision in August 2009, ruling in favor of the United States on all significant 
claims. China appealed the panel’s decision in September 2009. The WTO’s Appellate Body rejected China’s 
appeal in December 2009. China agreed to come into compliance with the WTO’s rulings by March 2011. Since 
then, China has taken compliance steps with regard to the market access barriers on books, newspapers, 
journals, DVDs and music, but not theatrical films.  
China – Export Restraints on Raw Materials  
Initiation: June 2009  
Dispute: The United States, the EU and Mexico are challenging China’s export restraints on several key raw 
material inputs used to produce downstream products in steel, aluminium and chemical sectors around the 
world.  
Third Parties: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Japan, Korea, Norway, Saudi Arabia, 
Chinese Taipei and Turkey  
Status: A WTO panel issued its decision in July 2011, rejecting China’s defences and finding in favour of the 
United States and its co-complainants on all significant claims. China appealed the panel’s decision in August 
2011. The WTO’s Appellate Body is expected to issue its decision in 2012.  
China – Electronic Payment Services  
Initiation: September 2010  
Dispute: The United States is challenging China’s restrictions on foreign suppliers of electronic payment services 
like the major U.S. credit card companies.  
Third Parties: Australia, Ecuador, the EU, India, Japan and Korea  
Status: Hearings before a WTO panel took place in October and December 2011. The panel is scheduled to 
issue its decision in 2012.  
China – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Grain-Oriented Electrical Steel  
Initiation: September 2010  
Dispute: The United States is challenging China’s imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties on 
imports of grain-oriented electrical steel from the United States.  
Third Parties: Argentina, the EU, Honduras, India, Japan, Korea, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam  
Status: Hearings before a WTO panel took place in September and December 2011. The panel is scheduled to 
issue its decision in 2012.  
China – Import Substitution Subsidies in Wind Energy Sector  
Initiation: December 2010  
Dispute: The United States challenged what appeared to be prohibited import substitution subsidies being 
provided by the Chinese government to support the production of wind turbine systems in China.  
Third Parties: Other WTO members did not have an opportunity to join in as third parties before this dispute 
was resolved.  
Status: Consultations were held in January 2011. Following consultations, China repealed the measures at 
issue.  
China – Antidumping and Countervailing Duties on Chicken Broiler Products  
Initiation: September 2011  
Dispute: The United States is challenging China’s imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties on 
imports of chicken broiler products from the United States.  
Third Parties: It is not yet clear whether other WTO members will join in as third parties.  
Status: Consultations took place in October 2011.  
Source: United States Trade Representative (2011)  
 
The international institutions affect the incentives that governments face when choosing 
between alternative policies. Openness and cooperation with international institutions lead to 
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increased monitoring and the gathering and dissemination of information about non-compliance 
with institutionalized commitments, which facilitates punishment by foreign governments, 
domestic and foreign private actors, through mechanisms established in the context of creating 
the institution. They change the relative cost of policy choices, making some more costly than 
they would be in the absence of the institutions (Keohane, 1989). Violating one’s internationally 
institutionalized commitments might cause reputation loss, which adds to the long-term cost, 
beyond the more immediate economic and political costs incurred as punishment or retaliation. 
These prospects of such costs create political and economic incentives for governments to 
minimize reneging on the commitments that are enshrined in an international treaty, which in 
turn should make these commitments more credible and reliable. In practice, governments who 
want to attract further FDI therefore have a long-run economic incentive not to violate the trust 
of current foreign investors (Tomz et al., 2004). 
  
Due to the strict protection in China in the beginning of the 1980s, FDI inflow and the FIEs 
connected should be the unique way to gain access to the market as they created tangible or 
intangible assets of competitiveness, such as “the stock of physical assets, technological know-
how, goodwill, the learning and interpersonal relationships forged by individuals, and the 
cultures and organisational structures of institutions” Dunning (1993: 190). Krasner (1982: 186) 
also noted international agreements embody “principles, norms, rules … around which actors’ 
expectations converge”. The participation in institutions that commit a country to economically 
liberal policies toward international trade and finance should contribute to a general reputation 
for the liberal economic policies that make a country a good location for FDI. In China, 
domestic business operation is still subject to political constraint, even after the government 
makes a commitment to a liberal economic policy. However, there are strong incentives to 
maintain the reforms and reduce redistributive intervention, so as to obtain the full benefits from 
liberalization in international cooperation (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). In addition to these 
economic incentives to boost economic growth, there may be political incentives for 
governments to combine liberal foreign economic policies with liberal domestic ones, as the 
economic success of the FIEs who are guaranteed liberal treatment strengthen those in the 
domestic economy who seek to maintain and increase liberal policies toward all economic 
players.  
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4.4.2 The institutions and the firms with state ownership 
An SOE is legally owned by the 1.3 billion Chinese people, and the real control rights are 
handled by the central/regional government and their industrial bureaux. As state ownership 
implies that it is impossible for these firms to operate independently and to avoid governmental 
intervention (Groves et al., 1994), transaction costs become less important to the firms as they 
can ask for compensation from the state for their losses (Boisot and Child, 1988). These firms 
are financially protected by the national fiscal system (Guthrie, 1997). Social disturbance, 
especially the unemployment pressure, makes the government unable to harden the budget 
system and eliminate fiscal support. In China, an SOE has never been a pure economic actor 
with many other social and political functions, and the heave social burden may be one 
dominant factor undermining the economic efficiency of SOEs. The increasing weight in 
supplying a large set of public goods has severely prevented the development of SOEs (Perotti 
et al., 1999). In addition, many new projects that are typically established by local governments 
or industrial ministries often become new sources of loss. The failures of these projects are due 
to China’s state investment system, characterised by bureaucratic co-ordination (Sun, 1998). 
Under this system, managers are not very cost-sensitive. Inevitably, described with long lasted 
market imperfections under previous planning regime, this transformation is determined by the 
market force but accompanied with governmental intervention, especially the use of fiscal 
levers, such as subsidies (Luo, 2002). Correspondingly, the state has to bear the losses made by 
SOEs, through either direct subsidies or the state bank system, named the soft budgeting system 
(Walder, 1992).  
 
When the reform started in the 1980s, the initial condition of the institutions is a centrally 
planned system with the dominating public ownership, and central decisions distribute goods 
and services through a vertical hierarchy (Polanyi, 1957). This system is a structured centricity 
of economic transactions, and the firm with state ownership operates as an appendage of the 
state, responding to commands sent. During the transition, the hierarchy of the classic economy 
is replaced by market dependence and the horizontal market transactions increase as the firm 
more and more depends on market exchange. Along with the marketisation reform, the 
traditional advantages belonging to the SOEs have gradually diminished. However, the SOEs 
still make a large contribution to the government revenue. For example, by 1995, the SOE 
sector produced about 44% of GDP, but contributed 71% of national fiscal revenue (SSB, 
1997). Displayed in table 4.2.2, although the share of the firms with state ownership decreased 
steadily, the industrial contribution of these firms is still more than 45% in 2007. 
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Table 4.2.2 The industrial contribution of the firms with state ownership 
Unit: 100 Million yuan at 
current prices 
Gross industrial output 
value 
Gross industrial output value of 
the firms with state ownership Share (%) 
1994 70176 56449 80.44 
1995 91894 69351 75.47 
1996 99595 72058 72.35 
1997 113733 78958 69.42 
1998 119048 80926 67.98 
1999 72707.04 50508.25 69.47 
2000 85673.7 56988.7 66.52 
2001 95449 59467.2 62.30 
2002 110776.5 65366.3 59.01 
2003 142271.2 76933.2 54.08 
2004 187220.7 97475 52.064 
2005 222315.9 105472.9 47.44 
2006 316589 149272.6 47.15 
2007 405177 183525 45.30 
2008 507285 N/A N/A 
2009 548311 N/A N/A 
2010 698591 N/A N/A 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 
Note: N/A---No official data is available after 2007. 
 
Originally, the economic reform seeks to increase productivity by introducing the elements of 
market-oriented institutions into China, and the government moves away from the direct 
corporate involvement by using its ownership and control, to privatization, corporatization, and 
securitization (Qian, 2001). In a stage from redistribution to market coordination, China 
improves incentives for direct producers, stimulates the growth of private markets, and provides 
entrepreneurs with an alternate path for socioeconomic mobility (Child, 1994b). The Chinese 
firms are only quasi-marketized during economic transformation (Nee, 1992), and they are still 
constrained by hierarchical and market institutions. (Peng and Heath, 1996). The reform 
involved the decentralization of power to the enterprise and local government, and its aim was 
to overcome administrative problems associated with central planning and to support and pursue 
market-oriented economic development. The close interorganizational relationship between 
enterprises and government is actually based on both the structure of property rights and the 
bilateral dependency. First, the SOEs have to rely on the connections with local government to 
secure business resources and credit needed, and governments fiscally depend on revenues from 
the SOEs. Second, the connection between the SOEs and government cut down transaction costs 
when the institutional arrangements toward marketing operation are weak. In the absence of 
contractual law, enterprises need political assurance reduce transaction costs in contract 
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negotiation and enforcement, particularly for compensation. Government backing may also 
fulfil the terms of the business contract in a timely manner (Nee, 1992). 
 
In theory, separation of ownership and control of finance and management is likely to lead to 
agency problems, in the context of self-interested managerial behaviour that imposes agency 
costs on the firm or on the absentee owners’ welfare. A multiple series of principal-agent 
problems exist in the SOEs because of the conflicting roles assigned to the managers and to the 
supervising bodies, and by the fact that SOEs’ assets are similar to public goods (Jefferson, 
1998). The state assumes the role as representative of the people and acts as the principal on 
behalf of the public, but the controlling authorities who exercise state ownership rights over 
SOEs do not bear any risks over the control and use of an SOE’s assets. Officials are unaware of 
profitability, and they do not have sufficient incentives to preserve and increase the value of the 
firms. Such systemic features as soft-budget constraints, the lack of independent financial 
accountability and the impossibility of bankruptcy, undermine the incentives and disciplinary 
mechanism essential to corporate governance of SOEs (Qiang, 2003). 
 
A widely implemented contract obligation system increases managerial discretion, and reduces 
the bureaucratic costs embedded in hierarchical firms. In the contract for the SOEs, 
governmental authorities set the financial and operational goals.  The general managers are 
given profit sharing in terms of economic rationality and managerial discretion (Guthrie, 1997). 
Nevertheless, in the absence of a rule of law and an independent judicial system, acting as the 
enforcer of a contract, government may be a party of the contract. Therefore, contracting is 
likely to be incomplete due to imperfect institutions, and an enforceable contract may become 
unenforceable in developing and transitional economies (Che and Qian, 1998b). Apparently, 
managers of SOEs were given specific control rights in production, investment, sales, profits, 
personnel management, and distribution of fringe benefits via contracts, therefore managers 
have partial incentives to generate cash flows and expand wages in the form of bonuses and 
fringe benefits. However, the contractual relationship between managers and the government 
was asymmetric and incomplete. The state, in fact, remained responsible for final losses, mainly 
through the state-owned banks, which were not contractual parties in the contractual relationship 
between enterprise and government. As a result, profitability is not management’s priority and 
the firms continue to act as government agencies or social security institutions providing welfare 
services to employees instead of perusing profit-maximizing businesses (Su, 2005). 
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China starts its transiting reforms by commercialising some SOES as managers are more 
concerned with profits than politicians are (Boycko et al., 1996). However, the extent that 
SOEs’ commercialism ultimately leads to more productivity, it is also limited by agency-cost 
problems. In the absence of complete and fully enforceable contracts, principal-agent problems 
arise because owners (principals) want to maximize firm value while managers (agents) 
maximize their own utility, which in general reduces the value of the firm. When government is 
also an actor, the involvement of government may call for the cut of benefits that might belong 
to either principals or agents. These interrelationships become complex because of conflicting 
goals: politicians, civil employees, and citizens themselves (Hart, 1995). In transition, Grossman 
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) additionally argue that residual rights of control, 
not confirmed by contracts, are critical determinants of managerial incentives. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994) also argue that reform without allocation of residual rights to management is 
unlikely to guarantee more productive or profitable operation. Moreover, it is unlikely to 
enhance productivity when government can still indirectly subsidize management to maintain 
political and social objectives through control over transfers from the treasury, in terms of a soft 
budget constraint. Subject to strong political influences to maintain SOE’s social 
responsibilities, managers of the SOEs have minimal rights to control the state assets and have 
little interest in technology investment, profit maximization and efficient resource allocation, 
which inevitably led to high costs of government interference. 
 
Several factors can lessen agency costs of managerial discretion, such as debt, takeover threats, 
legal protection of owners, market competition, etc. Jensen (1986) and Stultz (1990) show that 
debt with the threat of bankruptcy imposes a hard constraint on managers and limits 
management’s control over firm’s operation, which reduces agency costs of managerial 
discretion. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show if a company is badly managed, then there is an 
incentive for someone to acquire a large stake of the company, improve its performance and 
profit on the shares purchased. The threat of such action can persuade management to act in the 
interest of shareholders. Weisbach (1988) shows that the level of investor protection is 
negatively related to agency costs and positively related to firm performance. Maksimovic and 
Titman (1991) argue that product market competition makes profits more sensitive to 
managerial effort, reduces agency costs and enhances investment efficiency. 
 
In China, a firm with state ownership has major disadvantages. Having political objectives 
rather than economic ones matters a great deal. Governments are not motivated by profit as 
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private owners are. However, as the market institutions are imperfect and the changes will take 
some time, there are reasons for governmental involvement in the transition. For example, state 
ownership may still be more successful than private ownership when there is a lack of rule of 
law in securing property rights, a lack of a functioning capital market, and a lack of adequate 
taxation and fiscal institutions. Although the privatization generally increases competition, state 
ownership is still necessary to solve some economic issues, i.e. a lack of a social safety net, a 
lack of legal framework for corporate governance, and a lack of regulatory institutions for 
financial industries. Chang and Wong (2003) find that the decision-making power of local Party 
committees relative to the largest shareholders is positively associated with firm performance, 
indicating that political control may help improve business performance through the mitigation 
of large shareholders’ agency costs. On the other hand, the decision-making power of local 
Party committees relative to managers is negatively associated with firm performance, 
suggesting that the existing political control is excessive from the perspective of managers. 
Overall, they find that reducing political control tends to improve the performance of listed 
firms. 
 
In a statistical analysis, Xu et al. (2006) found the reformed SOEs and newly formed private 
firms to be more competitive than the SOEs. After 20 years of reform, the various types of firms 
transformed from the former SOEs have achieved evidently better performance than the 
unreformed SOEs. It is also the first time that the positive profit outcome of reform in China has 
been reported on a nation-wide scale. Wei and Wang (1997) use the Wilcoxon test to examine 
the connection between the state-owned banks and state-owned industrial enterprises. They find 
evidence that banking lending is biased in favour of SOEs as cities with a higher SOEs’ share in 
output are more likely to receive a rapid growth in bank loans. According to their research, the 
banking system and its lending policy have to be reformed to enhance the industrial reforms in 
China. Chen and Feng (2000) find that the share of SOE negatively affects the country’s 
economic growth. High growth is caused by the non-state-owned enterprises. Instead of trying 
to support and reconstruct this inefficient sector, the expansion should be connected with new 
small and medium-sized enterprises with high tech (Blanchard et al., 1991). Nevertheless, in 
China, the initial conditions had long-lasting effects, not only because they were difficult to 
change, but also because government policies and other institutions tended generally to foster 
their persistence (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002: 63-64). For example, although the public 
services provided by the SOEs prevent the efficient operation, traditional Chinese family values 
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and employment pressure may have strengthened such welfare obligations and making them 
difficult to change.  
 
To overcome the barriers in reform, the integration into the international economic system can 
improve the firms’ performance. “The vision is of one large inter-linked network of producers 
and consumers plugged into an efficiently operating level playing field of the open international 
and globalised economy. International markets provide co-ordination in and of themselves, 
which national strategies and policy interventions can merely distort” (Hirst and Thompson, 
1995: 59). When China enters the more competitive international market, individual enterprises 
are free to do their own market research and development and governments can use their 
connections and bureaucratic position to serve economic growth. Globalisation is thus an 
essential step to rapidly remove obstacles between the domestic communist prices and 
international market prices, to send the price signal to entrepreneurs. Accordingly, “it is… 
essential to move as rapidly as possible to a transparent and decentralised trade and exchange 
rate system, in order to hasten the integration into the world economy…… to market clearing 
levels” (IMF et al., 1990: 17).  
4.4.3 The institutions and the firms with foreign ownership 
Instead of a short-term achievement, the reforms in China is characterised by long-term values 
(Hofstede, 1991) such as thrift and perseverance to sustain steady economic growth (Jackson 
and Bak; 1998). Its economic growth is at an average rate of 9.5 % for more the twenty years, 
which is the highest one in the world (table 4.3). This achievement depends much on the 
adoption of reforming policies to encourage inward FDI. From an isolated economy, the FDI 
has largely helped China to overcome the shortage of capitals in transition (table 4.4; table 4.5), 
and China has become the second largest recipient of FDI in the world since 1993 (Zhang, 
2001). In addition, the foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) have produced more than one fourth 
of total industrial output since 2002 (table 4.6) and created more than half of international trade 
since 2000 (table 4.7). 
Table 4.3 The GDP growth in China  
Year GDP (US$ Billion current price) Annual growth (%) 
1987 321.39 8.77 
1988 401.07 24.79 
1989 449.10 11.98 
1990 387.77 -13.66 
1991 406.09 4.72 
1992 483.05 18.95 
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1993 613.23 26.95 
1994 559.23 -8.81 
1995 727.95 30.17 
1996 856.01 17.59 
1997 952.65 11.29 
1998 1019.48 7.02 
1999 1083.28 6.26 
2000 1198.48 10.63 
2001 1324.81 10.54 
2002 1453.84 9.74 
2003 1640.96 12.87 
2004 1931.65 17.71 
2005 2256.92 16.84 
2006 2712.92 20.20 
2007 3494.24 28.80 
2008 4519.95 29.35 
2009 4990.53 10.41 
2010 5930.39 18.83 
2011 7321.99 23.47 
Source: World Economic Outlook. 
 
Table 4.4 Utilization of Foreign Capital in China 
Year Total Amount of FDI actually utilised (100Million US$ at current price) Annual growth (%) 
1989 33.93  
1990 34.87 2.77 
1991 43.66 25.21 
1992 110.08 152.13 
1993 275.15 149.95 
1994 337.67 22.72 
1995 375.21 11.12 
1996 417.26 11.21 
1997 452.57 8.46 
1998 454.63 0.46 
1999 403.19 -11.31 
2000 407.15 0.98 
2001 468.78 15.14 
2002 527.43 12.51 
2003 535.05 1.44 
2004 606.30 13.32 
2005 603.25 -0.50 
2006 630.21 4.47 
2007 747.68 18.64 
2008 923.95 23.58 
2009 900.33 -2.56 
2010 1057.35 17.44 
2011 1160.11 9.72 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2010. 
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Table 4.5 Total investment and foreign investment in China 
Year Total investment  Foreign investment  Share (%) 
1997 24941.11 2683.89 10.76 
1998 28406.17 2617.03 9.21 
1999 29854.71 2006.78 6.72 
2000 32917.73 1696.24 5.15 
2001 37213.49 1730.73 4.65 
2002 43499.91 2084.98 4.79 
2003 55566.61 2533.71 4.56 
2004 70477.4 3854.01 5.47 
2005 88773.6 4657.06 5.25 
2006 109998.2 5589.17 5.08 
2007 137323.9 6735.69 4.90 
2008 172828.4 7809.60 4.52 
2009 224598.77 7689.60 3.42 
2010 251683.77 8422.20 3.35 
2011 311485.13 9285.90 2.98 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. (Unit: 100 million Yuan at current price) 
 
Table 4.6 The industrial contribution of the firms with foreign ownership 
Year  Gross industrial output value 
Gross industrial output value of 
the firms with foreign ownership Share (%) 
1994 70176 6645 9.469049 
1995 91894 10722 11.66779 
1996 99595 12117 12.16627 
1997 113733 14399 12.66035 
1998 119048 17750 14.90995 
1999 72707.04 18954.23 26.06932 
2000 85673.7 23464.6 27.38834 
2001 95449 27220.9 28.51879 
2002 110776.5 32459.3 29.30161 
2003 142271.2 44357.8 31.17834 
2004 187220.7 58847.1 31.43194 
2005 222315.9 67137.76 30.19926 
2006 316589 100076.5 31.61087 
2007 405177 127629 31.49957 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. (Unit: 100 million Yuan at current price) 
 
Table 4.7 The contribution of FDI to the trade of China 
 
Total foreign trade (Billion 
US$ at current price) 
Foreign trade by FDI (Billion US$ at 
current price) Share of FDI (%) 
1990 115.4 20.1 17.42 
1991 135.7 29 21.37 
1992 165.5 43.7 26.4 
1993 195.7 67.1 34.29 
1994 236.6 87.6 37.02 
1995 280.8 109.8 39.1 
1996 289.9 137.1 47.29 
1997 325.1 152.6 46.94 
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1998 323.9 157.7 48.69 
1999 360.6 174.5 48.39 
2000 474.3 236.7 49.91 
2001 509.7 259.1 50.83 
2002 620.8 330.2 53.19 
2003 851.2 472.2 55.47 
Source: China General Custom, Custom statistics 2003; China Ministry of Commerce, 2003. 
 
Transaction cost theory suggests that it is more efficient for a firm to use hierarchies rather than 
market intermediaries to serve a foreign country (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976). In transition economies, FIEs, as the most common form of FDI, are designed to 
deal with market imperfections by internalizing business activities e.g., exporting and importing. 
They enjoy an advantage over local firms in the form of an internal market within their 
multinational networks (Ghoshal and Barlett, 1990), which allow them to allocate resources and 
conduct transactions most efficiently. On the other hand, this form is also associated with 
increased managerial costs due to large geographic distances and high demands on information 
processing. The FIEs are able to utilize the ownership advantages of their parent firms in 
competing with local firms (Dunning, 1981). These may include proprietary assets such as 
technological know-how and brand names, managerial practices and organizing routines, and 
strong corporate cultures. Furthermore, the FIEs can gradually acquire host-country specific 
information through learning from local partners and competitors (Delios and Beamish, 2001). 
This enlarges the ability gap between foreign and local firms.  
 
The advantages of FDI are now well recognised and studied. The FIEs’ strategies connected 
with a foreign partner can improve a local partner’s operational skills and competitive resources 
(Geringer, 1991), technological, and production capabilities (Dyer, 1997), and market power 
and competitive position (Hamel, 1991). FIEs can enhance the local partners’ managerial 
efficiency in business operation (Tallman and Shenkar, 1994), organizational legitimacy 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), and corporate reputation (Hamel et al., 1989). They all suggest 
that, as one important part of the reforms, the openness policies imply China looks for strategic 
or organizational attributes as the same essential as financial capability in choosing foreign 
partners (Luo, 2002). However, the FIEs have negative effects on the fundamental level of long 
term national welfare (Zhang, 2001). FDI may actually lower domestic savings and investment, 
while reducing China’s foreign-exchange earnings. Due to the practice of transfer pricing and 
the variety of investment allowance provided by the Chinese government, the contributions of 
FIEs usually are far less than expected.  
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FIEs generate technology spillover effects in domestic market, providing technical assistance to 
domestic firms to meet new requirements, collaborating for developing technology, training and 
then losing staff to domestic enterprises, and providing domestic enterprises with a 
manufacturing base. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) further investigated the theoretical possibility of 
vertical inter-industry spillovers. The spillover effects of FIEs take place through several 
channels, including training local suppliers of intermediate inputs, setting a higher standard 
regarding product quality and delivery, and the import competition as the FIEs have the option 
of international suppliers. Moreover, spillovers to downstream firms can also be created through 
a number of mechanisms (Meyer, 2003). These include quality of intermediate goods and 
machinery supplied by FIEs, support in terms of more effective marketing and management 
techniques shown by FIEs, and establish service infrastructures that are not locally available 
before. However, Girma and Gong (2008) note productivity spillovers may have geographical 
dimensions. First, direct contacts with domestic suppliers and distributors may be local only to 
minimise transport costs and facilitate communication. Second, although the staff training of 
FIEs and subsequent labour turnover is one of the main technology transmission mechanisms 
(Fosfuri et al., 2001), only local employers will experience the benefits of FIEs without an 
effective labour mobility. Similarly, demonstration effects may also be in local region 
(Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998).  
 
On the other side, FDI generates crowding-out effects upon the host country’s market, 
preventing domestic enterprises from developing. These effects occur in two ways in China. 
First, FIEs have easily recruited technologically talented workers with higher wages. Second, 
FIEs restrict any technological development by their domestic partners through their controls in 
joint ventures. A host country should encourage spillover effects and strict crowding-out effects 
from FIEs. Hu et al. (2003) finds that FIEs from developed economies may crowd out the 
domestic efforts of product innovation. Their analysis shows that innovation and technology 
transfer are not substitutes. When combined with innovation, FIEs’ technology transfer 
generates great productivity gains. The addition of technology transfer is also able to raise the 
returns to home-grown innovation. Long (2005) notes several factors determine that the 
spillover effects are more important than its crowding out effects in China. First, Chinese big 
market scale leaves enough growing space for domestic enterprises despite competition from 
FIEs. Second, the industrial foundation in China is well developed before the openness, and 
FIEs are encouraged to purchase domestically as much as possible. Consequently, FIEs 
establish strong links and cooperate with domestic enterprises, which cause significant 
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technology spillover effect. Third, competition between FIEs and domestic enterprises 
accelerate technology spillover. As a result, Fu (2004) empirically supports that exports and 
FIEs have played an important role to break the geographical fragments by increasing the 
efficient mobility of industrial resources across in China.  
 
Compared to developed countries, and even to other emerging economies, China’s legal and 
other institutional systems are underdeveloped, as are its infrastructure, resource supply and 
managerial competencies (World Economic Forum, 2000). It is a relatively complex and 
uncertain environment, which presents several performance risks to foreign investors (Child and 
Yan, 2003). Especially for the FIEs, there are institutional difficulties in China (Ahlstrom et al., 
2003), such as variations in legal systems across regions, laws oriented towards public order and 
control by governments, interference by bureaucrats and regulators, and the practice of bribes 
and corruption distorting law enforcement. Facing different institutions, foreign investors have 
to adjust their strategies to local institutions or to invest where institutions are most conducive to 
their type of business operations.  
 
According to the neoclassical theories, markets are usually a better way to organise economic 
activities than a centrally planned economy (Mankiw, 2001). FDI have the positive effects on 
China’s economic transition toward market-oriented systems (Zhang, 1993), comprising 
diversifying the ownership structure, establishing market-oriented institutions, facilitating 
reforms of SOEs. Particularly, FDI spurred the transiting progression by stimulating competition 
and encouraging China’s integration to the global economy. The FIEs also played a major role 
in transforming China’s ownership structure, from one with predominantly state ownership 
towards a more desirable one with private ownership that is more appropriate in marketing 
competition. By establishing special economic zones to attract the FDI in the beginning, the 
liberalisation applied pressure in introducing market mechanisms to other parts of China. FDI in 
China have thus stimulated the transition through introducing a market-oriented institutional 
framework. For example, the legal framework specifically designed for FDI has prompted 
changes in other laws and regulations governing domestic business operation, especially in 
relaxing foreign exchange restrictions, establishing a regulatory framework for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, and reforming accounting systems (Pomfret, 1997). FDI played a 
unique role in reforming the large SOE sector as FIEs have influenced the SOEs directly 
through joint ventures or indirectly through demonstration effects, i.e. incentive schemes, 
production organisation systems, accounting methods, and risk management. Thus, the FIEs 
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broke the state monopolies, and help China to promote its exports through the FIEs’ existing 
overseas marketing networks (Zhang and Song, 2000).  
 
The FIEs’ legitimacy is declining as domestic firms seek growth to face increasing competition 
in China. In addition, the legitimacy of FIEs is often politically affected in the international 
arena. For example, American firms were attacked by demonstrators when the Chinese embassy 
was bombed by NATO in 2000, and Japanese firms have also endured violent attacks by 
demonstrators at times since 2000 when the bilateral relations between China and Japan turned 
bad (Xu et al. 2006). The FIEs also suffer from conflicting demands caused by incompatible 
institutional rules of their home and host countries (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Xu and Shenkar, 
2002). Sometimes local legitimacy can only be achieved at the cost of operational efficiency 
within the system of FIEs (Westney, 1993). Although the majority of Chinese people are 
concerned about the competitive pressures on domestic firms from the FIEs as a result of the 
WTO accession, Xu et al. (2006) finds that many domestic firms achieve higher performance 
than the FIEs. Nowadays, the domestic firms have made progress through reform and 
competition, and the FIEs have gradually learned to cope with China’s unique institutional 
setting and competitive environment. Based on the study of Xu et al., apart from the SOEs, all 
other domestic firms have performed better than the FIEs in 2002. This result provides evidence 
that the openness policies are successful for China to improve the business performance of the 
firms. 
 
FIEs have assisted Chinese economic restructuring towards higher technical efficiency. For 
example, the diversified income distribution characteristic of FIEs has itself added to income 
inequality amongst Chinese employees, both between different kinds of enterprises and even 
within the organisation of a FIE (Zhang and Zheng, 1998). More importantly, because of the 
demonstrable effects of the foreign enterprises’ unequal wage structure, it has now been widely 
accepted that an unequal income structure within an enterprise is an important source of 
efficiency, and this unequality has been followed by most of the domestic enterprises (Guan, 
2001). Therefore, once the efforts to absorb FDI have introduced new management and 
marketing culture as reference for domestic firms, those social and cultural impacts have 
resulted in further reform of internal structure and prompted some changes in social foundation 
of China, such as the ownership of enterprises (Hussain, 1996). Those in turn led to the 
construction of a set of beliefs. Those changes work together to bring on the creation of 
marketing oriented institutions, consisting of further openness policies, the introduction of new 
 93 
ideas, and the efforts to increase competitiveness (Qian, 1999). Principally the work to better 
absorb and operate FDI is based upon moving transactions more effectively. Investment 
liberalisation in China is thus regarded as a major step toward an efficient institutional system, 
and this changing process is mainly started by the FDI in the beginning of the transition. In 
other words, institutions connected with investment liberalisation might largely determine the 
operation of FIEs and long-term economic growth. 
4.4.4 Ownership change and the emergence of private ownership  
The transition economy, characterized by a weak market structure, poorly specified property 
rights, and institutional uncertainty increases the relative cost of redistribution even while 
rendering costly market transactions (Nee, 1992). This condition of reform creates an 
institutional environment continuously shifting from redistribution to markets. As market 
institutions become gradually dominant in the transition economy and as the institutional 
foundation of a market economy is incrementally constructed, these changes result in an 
increase in the cost of centrally governance structures and decline in the cost for private firms. 
These institutional changes improve economic performance (Nee and Su, 1990) (table 4.8; table 
4.9). Key factors that explain the rapid growth are the expanding relative scope of market 
institutions in coordinating the economy, changes in the structure of property rights, and the 
incremental shift from a redistributive to a regulatory state (Nee, 1989).  
Table 4.8 The Economic Growth in China 
Year 
GDP (Billion US$ at 
current price) 
Annual growth 
(%) 
GDP per capita 
(US$ at current 
price) 
Annual growth 
(%) 
1985 305.26  288.39  
1986 295.48 -3.20 274.84 -4.70 
1987 321.39 8.77 294.05 6.99 
1988 401.07 24.79 361.24 22.85 
1989 449.10 11.98 398.48 10.31 
1990 387.77 -13.66 339.16 -14.89 
1991 406.09 4.72 350.61 3.38 
1992 483.05 18.95 412.26 17.58 
1993 613.23 26.95 517.42 25.51 
1994 559.23 -8.81 466.61 -9.82 
1995 727.95 30.17 601.01 28.80 
1996 856.01 17.59 699.41 16.37 
1997 952.65 11.29 770.59 10.18 
1998 1019.48 7.02 817.14 6.04 
1999 1083.28 6.26 861.21 5.39 
2000 1198.48 10.63 945.60 9.80 
2001 1324.81 10.54 1038.03 9.77 
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2002 1453.84 9.74 1131.81 9.03 
2003 1640.96 12.87 1269.83 12.19 
2004 1931.65 17.71 1486.02 17.03 
2005 2256.92 16.84 1726.05 16.15 
2006 2712.92 20.20 2063.87 19.57 
2007 3494.24 28.80 2644.56 28.14 
2008 4519.95 29.35 3403.53 28.70 
2009 4990.53 10.41 3739.62 9.87 
2010 5930.39 18.83 4422.66 18.26 
2011 7321.99 23.47 5434.36 22.88 
Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF. 
 
Table 4.9 The Chinese international trade data of total merchandise 
Source: the WTO statistics database. 
 
Conventional property right theory suggests that a clearly defined ownership is desirable for 
efficiency to reduce externality and improve incentives by assigning owners the right to claim 
income and to control the firm (Wen et al., 2002). Particularly, market competition can induce 
Year 
Export 
(Million 
US$ at 
current 
price) 
Annual 
growth (%) 
Import (Million 
US$ at current 
price) 
Annual 
growth (%) 
Trade 
(Million 
US$ at 
current 
price) 
Annual 
growth (%) 
1990 62091  53345  115436  
1991 71910 15.81 63791 16.38 135701 17.56 
1992 84940 18.12 80585 20.84 165525 21.98 
1993 91744 8.01 103959 22.48 195703 18.23 
1994 121006 31.90 115615 10.08 236621 20.91 
1995 148780 22.95 132084 12.47 280864 18.70 
1996 151048 1.52 138833 4.86 289881 3.21 
1997 182792 21.02 142370 2.48 325162 12.17 
1998 183712 0.50 140237 -1.52 323949 -0.37 
1999 194931 6.11 165699 15.37 360630 11.32 
2000 249203 27.84 225094 26.39 474297 31.52 
2001 266098 6.78 243553 7.58 509651 7.45 
2002 325596 22.36 295170 17.49 620766 21.80 
2003 438228 34.59 412760 28.49 850988 37.09 
2004 593326 35.39 561229 26.45 1154555 35.67 
2005 761953 28.42 659953 14.96 1421906 23.16 
2006 968978 27.17 791461 16.62 1760439 23.81 
2007 1220456 25.95 956116 17.22 2176572 23.64 
2008 1430693 17.23 1132567 15.58 2563260 17.77 
2009 1201612 -16.01 1005923 -12.59 2207535 -13.88 
2010 1577754 31.30 1396247 27.96 2974001 34.72 
2011 1898381 20.32 1743484 19.92 3641865 22.46 
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ownership restructuring, and existing social capital matters could make positive contributions to 
the transition (Sun, 2000). In a Communist country, the primary issues is that ownership 
changes combined with a more effective mechanisms start social acceptance of private 
ownership to furthermore create the incentives of marketing participation and involvement. 
Gradually, individuals could be knowledgeable of market and have a clear recognition of 
competition and individual rewards (Vanderslice, 1999). Sharing the values and objectives in 
competitions, both private owners and employees are fully committed to the business success 
because it is their future at stake (Wheelock and Baines, 1998; Wen et al., 2002). In essence, 
together with FDI inflows, the institutionally related ownership specific advantage comprises 
the structure of both internally generated and externally imposed incentives, regulations and 
norms. The composition and strength of ownership of firms is likely to represent the character 
of the institutional infrastructure (Dunning, 2006), and each of those constituents may influence 
most areas in the wealth-creating process (Dunning and Narula, 2004; Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
 
In theory, a private firm that is invested in by private owners should be independently operated 
of government or any others. However, in the absence of well-defined private property rights, 
they are exposed to intervention and a restriction of state agencies. The greater autonomy of 
private firm is thus connected with high transaction costs (Nee and Young, 1990). Private firms 
operate under hard budget constraints, as their survival depends on market performance and 
profitability. The private firm’s capacity for survival and growth is also constrained by difficulty 
of access to capital and raw materials controlled by the state owned sector. In a socialist 
redistributive economy, state banks and official sources of credit generally offer loans more on 
the basis of political considerations than economic ones (Walder, 1991). The SOEs enjoy 
priority in access to be allocated under the plan. Private firms lack the legitimacy and necessary 
political backing to have reliable access to capital and thus must depend on the sources with 
more costs. Due to these restrictions on factor resources in socialist state, private entrepreneurs 
depend more on short-term investment decisions aimed at fast returns, liquidity, and a low rate 
of reinvestment. Many private firms seek close ties with government, often paying a 
“management fee” for assistance in obtaining reliable access to factor resources and political 
protection, although such fees largely increase the transaction costs in business (Nee, 1992).  
 
The transition economy has given birth to private ownership in China, which is shaped by new 
pressures for efficiency and flexibility in rapidly changing environments in which market forces 
incrementally replace the state redistributive mechanism (Powell, 1988). Private entrepreneurs 
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have strong incentives to take risks and innovation, and their profit-maximizing orientation and 
hard-budget constraints encourage more cost-benefit calculations in their investment decisions. 
Because profits belong directly to them, entrepreneurial incentives are growth-oriented. Private 
entrepreneurs face greater uncertainties due to the continuing instability of fundamental rules of 
the game involving the market economy (Nee and Young, 1990). The private enterprises “use 
resources and/or governance structures from more than one existing organization” (Borys and 
Jemison, 1989: 235), with their capacity to reduce uncertainty in inter organizational 
relationships involving bilateral dependency (Pfeffer, 1972). Falling between market and 
hierarchy, transaction cost economics explains the emergence of private ownership as a means 
to economise transaction costs when “parties to the transaction maintain autonomy but are 
bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree” (Williamson, 1991: 271). Moreover, with less strict 
enforcement, an elastic contracting arrangement is a supplementary mechanism to facilitate 
continuity and efficiency of transaction (Williamson, 1991).  
 
The development of private sectors actually depends on the support of Chinese local 
governments, which are dependent on revenues gained from the private firms (Su, 1992). Local 
government and private enterprise constitute a loosely coupled coalition of interest groups, in 
which interests and group cohesion are continuously shifting and reconstituting themselves in 
new combinations according to changing environmental conditions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Such interventions of government ease the firm’s budget constraint to enhance the firm’s 
competitiveness in markets by offering subsidies, facilitating horizontal and vertical economic 
integration, providing access to credit capital, and investing in infrastructure. However, local 
government involvement has been interpreted as a distortion of partial reform that undermines 
the efficiency goals of economic reform (Wong, 1986, 1987). The inefficiency is transferred 
from central ministries down to local governments, still by the anti-market, protectionist 
conservatism of local officials and the Maoist legacy of closed local economies. By contrast, 
Nee (1992) argues the governments’ involvement is able to compete effectively in a partial 
reforming economy, in which the still-dominant redistributive institutions interact with market 
forces in a manner that subordinates market institutions. 
 
The type of reform implemented in China is one in which bureaucrats are intimately involved in 
promoting private activity without complete market liberalization or democratization (Frye and 
Shleifer, 1997). In fact, Chinese officials use the term “share ownership scheme” instead of 
“privatization” (Sun et al., 2002: 2). Privatization explicitly assumes capitalistic private 
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ownership whereas under the share ownership scheme, as long as the state still holds some 
shares of the SOE, it still conforms to the communist public ownership principle. Such an 
ideology of the socialist market economy leads the Chinese government to retain a substantial 
portion of the ownership of privatized enterprises (Sun and Tong, 2003). Although state 
ownership is theoretically regarded as the origin of agency problems in SOEs, it can also be 
argued that partial privatisation is better than complete privatisation to preserve the economy’s 
socialist structure. First, there can be a signal for continued state ownership (Mok and Hui , 
1998; Schmitz, 2000). From the incomplete contract approach, partial privatization could well 
be the optimal ownership structure as investors interpret high shares of the state as a guarantee 
against the uncertainty of transaction. Second, viewing SOEs as public goods, a quick and 
complete privatization is not desirable. In the absence of a well-functioning property-rights 
market, privatization can result in the transfer of public assets to private agents who do not use 
them more efficiently than under state ownership (Jefferson, 1998).  
 
Employing the accounting measures of an SOE’s performance before and after privatization, 
Sun and Tong (2003) find that ownership structures influence performance across firms and 
over time, and recently privatized SOEs are of higher quality and indicate more improvements 
after privatization. Specifically, the factor of state shares has a negative impact on a firm’s 
performance, which is consistent with the results of other scholars (Jin and Qian, 1998; Qi et al., 
2000). In addition, Sun and Tong (2003) state that the problem behind the ownership structure 
that prevents corporate governance to be effective as the government still keeps a major control 
on the SOEs so that non-state shareholders who can play a more active and positive role on the 
SOEs do not have either the power or the incentive to do so.  
 
There are arguments about ownership and business efficiency. Barberis et al. (1996) point out 
that it is not exactly clear how private ownership leads to greater efficiency, and government 
ownership is not always less efficient than private ownership (Martin and Parker; 1995; Kole 
and Mulherin; 1997). More studies show that government ownership is less efficient than 
private ownership (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Megginson et al. 1994; Vining and Boardman, 
1992). Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) support that government firm displays lower 
profitability, and Megginson and Netter (2001) provide empirical evidences in favour of private 
over public ownership. In addition, as there is no significant independent shareholders in China 
who can provide effective monitoring of the SOEs management, Lin et al. (1998) argue that, as 
an attempt of reforming efforts, expanding the managerial independence will worsen the agency 
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problems. Similarly, although the majority of Chinese are concerned about the competitive 
pressures on domestic firms from the FIEs, Xu et al. (2006) finds that many domestic Chinese 
firms have made progress through reform and competition, and FIEs have gradually learned to 
cope with China’s unique institutional environment. Based on the study of Xu et al. (2006), 
except the SOEs, all other domestic firms have performed better. This result confirms that 
ownership change is the right way to improve business performance.  
4.5 The business constraints of the institutions in China 
As a developing economy in transition, unavoidably, there are some business obstacles in the 
changing institutional framework in China. On the side of formal institutions, there is an 
increasing need to revise law making institutions to deal with the issues of economic reform and 
the FIEs. In China, “basic laws” are enacted by the National People’s Congress, whereas “laws” 
can be enacted by its Standing Committee, and the State Council can issue “administrative 
laws”. However, none of these critical terms are defined. In practice, most legislation originates 
in the State Council, which issues “administrative regulations”, while the more than 60 
ministries, commissions and bureaus that are subordinate to the State Council issue 
“administrative rules”. Provinces and sub-provincial governments issue “local regulations” and 
“local rules”, but the relative authority of these norms have been badly defined (Xin and Ding, 
2003; Lubman, 2006). In addition to the problems caused by tentative or incomplete laws and 
regulations, serious inconsistency exists between national and local legislation (Hung, 2004). 
The laws and regulations related to FIEs depend on a balance between encouraging economic 
activities outside the state sector on one hand and trying to control it on the other. For instance, 
government departments in charge of the enterprises operation must evaluate and approve 
proposed FIEs that include an SOE. The contract would then be reviewed for conformity to 
regulations on a wide range of business matters. As a result, “inconsistent regulatory 
performance is often the product of the conflicting goals of different bureaucracies” (Potter, 
1997: 239).  
 
As more legal rules appeared and reform stimulated the growth of commerce, the need to 
reorganize the judicial system increases. The powers of the courts are subject to serious 
limitations even after the reform. The courts still remain part of a state apparatus that still 
reflects the severe limits including the doctrine, structure and practice of the pre-reform Maoist 
Party-state on the judiciary. In addition, the courts have been hampered by judges’ low levels of 
legal education and professional standards. A more basic issue is presented by the limited 
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authority of the courts. In the bureaucratic hierarchy, courts are only parallel to, rather than 
superior to, other units of the bureaucracy in China. When courts seek to enforce judgments, 
agencies whose actions are required to assist the courts sometimes refuse to cooperate 
(Reinstein, 2005). Furthermore, the decision-making behaviour of the courts is similar to that in 
administrative agencies. Adjudication is only very slowly becoming differentiated from other 
bureaucratic decision-making processes. The power of local courts is impaired by local 
protectionism, which critically blunts the effectiveness of China's judiciary. Judges are selected 
and paid by local governments, a relationship that leads to pressure on the courts to favour their 
localities in litigation involving foreigners and parties from elsewhere in China, consequently 
impeding fair adjudication and enforcement of judgments (Lubman, 2006). 
 
For the business constraints of the informal institutions, similar to the most of developing 
countries and former Communist countries, corruption exists in the judicial system, in 
government procurement, and in investment approval process. The effects of corruption consist 
of unreliable contracts enforcement, a general waste of resources, delays in investment 
procedures, higher transaction costs, and the discouragement of further investment eventually 
(Meagher, 1997). On one side, the costs of corrupt negatively affect the business performance 
(Wei, 1997; 2000b). On the other side, corruption lowers uncertainty costs in the markets and 
allows transaction to take place and also allows markets to operate at a high level (Betancourt, 
1998). In particular, corruption could play a substitute role for an independent judiciary when 
transactions are non-self-enforcing, i.e. role as a third party enforcement mechanisms for the 
contract. More interestingly, a widespread corruption can be a sign of institutional weakness in 
transition economies (Abed and Davoodi, 2000). Apart from the differences, the relation 
between corruption and transaction stresses the importance of institutions in economic 
performances. 
4.6 Summary 
There are two major changes in China’s transition--- “the shift of ownership and property rights 
…the increasing role played by market transactions” (Boisot and Child, 1996: 600). As there is 
a cultural tradition of strong government involvement in China (Nee, 1992), government 
behaviour influences both the ownership reform and organisational behaviour, and also actively 
forms a partnership with the participants to smooth the market failure. The changes focusing on 
property rights or incentives involve some fundamental changes, regarded as legitimate and 
institutional logics that govern individual actions, although the focus on ownership seems to 
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reflect the imposition of western concepts that may be inappropriate for Chinese traditional 
context. As Child (1994: 19) noted, “there is a substantial difference between the western 
concept of ownership, together with the property rights attaching to it, and that conventionally 
followed in China. Chinese concept of ownership is appreciably more ambiguous and is a 
political and ideological consideration rather than an economic and legal one”.  
 
FDI are practically useful because of their capacity to penetrate authoritarian regimes and 
connect directly to individuals (Dunning, 1988). These FDI inflows continuously pressure China 
to set up institutions common in the West, but absent in China. This includes laws regarding 
bankruptcy, contracts, and transparency in governance mechanisms. More than just adjusting 
incentives and redistributing property rights, China introduced new logics of action, new roles, 
and new conceptions, to maintain an appropriate business operation or to maximise profits 
rather than central allocations and plan goals. Regarding FDI inflows, the operation of FIEs 
embody new economic and social logics. They represent new type of culture, combining the 
elements from existing forms and new materials. The new ways of thinking and acting supports 
the social change that eases the transition, with the “new” concept that individuals could pursue 
their private benefits equally (Campbell, 1997). 
 
Fan et al. (2007) notes that the business cost depends on intangible factors as “culture” affects 
the outcomes by affecting economic agents’ prior beliefs, preferred economic activities, and 
political choices. Attitudes can affect cross-border economic exchanges because they affect how 
people interact and negotiate on economic matters (Siegel et al., 2008). In conclusion, the 
success of FDI implementation depends on the abilities of protecting property right and of 
reducing agency and information asymmetry problem. Consequently, the cultural heritage of a 
society is one of the determinants in economic growth (North, 2005), while institutions of a 
nation are shaped by the culture in which they are embedded. Separating the cultural-cognitive 
duality, Chinese cultural beliefs clearly stress the extent to which agency—the power to make a 
difference—is restricted to the superordinate actors in hierarchy (Farh and Cheng, 1999). FDI is 
likely to have a more pronounced effect on the culture of host countries as they may introduce 
“a spirit of entrepreneurship and competition” to domestic firms through a long term business 
operation (Dunning and Bansal, 1997: 4).  
 
In this chapter, the author focuses on the relation between the institutions and the firms’ 
business performance in China’s transition. The author examines the business performance of 
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the firms with different ownership respectively, including the SOEs and the FIEs. The 
researcher considers that ownership change is the key to sustain the improvement of business 
efficiency, and review how the government of China uses external factors to overcome its 
internal obstacles in order to start and maintain its economic reform in the beginning. The 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations provide a market-oriented mechanism of international 
standard toward development. FDI acts as an important factor to fill the capital gap in economic 
growth and also direct Chinese government to follow the bilateral and multilateral agreements 
made. On the other hand, as a transition economy where some fundamental institutions are 
missing, the emergence of private ownership is the most important internal issue to support this 
sustainable reform in China. As both FDI and private ownership call for a basic reform of 
institutions in China, aiming a long term economic growth, they eventually and actually work 
together to start, to continue and to supervise the institutional changes in China. These changes 
include socio-political reform, regulatory and tax system, banking sector reforms, and 
corruption.  
 
However, although there are outstanding changes that support an economic miracle in China, 
the role of the institutional factors in explaining the business performance in China is not 
comprehensible. Notwithstanding, the literatures do not deeply clarify how the institutional 
constraints influences the firms with different ownership. To clarify the institutional influences 
on the business performance, chapter 5 will demonstrate the research design and methodology, 
and further investigation will be displayed in chapter 6, chapter 7 and chapter 8. 
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Chapter 5 Research design and methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the author will discuss the research design and methodology. This study involves 
using a positivist approach and a quantitative method to investigate the relationship between 
institutional constraints and the firms’ business performance, which is done by testing empirical 
relations between the research variables. The procedure consists of deducing hypotheses from 
the theory, expressing these hypotheses in operational terms, testing these hypotheses, 
examining the results, and confirming or modifying the theory if necessary (Robson, 1993). The 
beginning sections will consider the philosophical arguments and philosophical foundations, and 
also the methodological issues of this study. Based on the research hypotheses summarised, the 
researcher will investigate the characteristics of research data, statistical techniques and the 
design of this research.  
5.2 Methodological consideration 
5.2.1 Different research approaches and their philosophical positions 
There are different rules and steps to take in order to investigate social research questions. These 
steps follow different approaches which are either in favour of or against a particular way of 
research investigation. These arguments are based on different assumptions about the reality 
(Crotty, 1998). The choice of a particular method is linked to epistemological questions related 
to our understanding of what human knowledge is, what it entails, and what status can be 
ascribed to it, in addition to what kind of knowledge will be attained by research (Crotty, 1998). 
Social research is composed of the following four fundamental elements (Crotty, 1998): 
 Methods: the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to a 
particular research question. 
 Methodology: the strategy, the process or the design lying behind the process and its use 
of particular methods. And then relating the choice of strategy and its use of methods to 
the desired outcomes.  
 Theoretical perspective: the philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus 
providing a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria.  
 Epistemology: the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and 
thereby in the methodology.  
As the methodology would not necessarily constitute a consensus among all researchers (Burrell 
and Morgan, 1979), people have different approaches towards the nature of knowledge, their 
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understanding about the nature of knowledge varies, and so does the research methodology. 
Objectivism and subjectivism are two main approaches in social research (Easterby-smith et al., 
1991; Laughlin et al., 1986). Objectivism is an epistemological view that things exist as 
meaningful entities independent of consciousness and experience, and that they have truth and 
meaning residing in them as objects and that careful research can attain that objective truth and 
meaning (Crotty, 1998). The most important element of objectivism is a positivist position. 
According to positivism, social world exists externally, which should be measured through 
objective methods, rather than being inferred subjectively through sensation, reflection or 
intuition (Easterby-smith et al., 1991). Positivism is based on the assumption that knowledge 
consists of patterns and general causal relationship about the real world. Business research upon 
positivism generally engages in survey or use of published data and normally employs a 
quantitative method of statistical analysis. On the contrary, in an interpretive approach, 
subjectivist approach regards reality as socially constructed rather than objectively determined. 
They look for culturally derived and historically situated interpretation of the social world 
(Crotty, 1998; Easterby-Smith, et al, 1991), and the qualitative method is generally associated 
with this approach.  
 
Qualitative method emphasises an in-depth investigation to find out the meaning of social 
phenomena (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Ragin, 1994). This method groups a variety of 
techniques, such as interviews, observation and diary methods. Quantitative methods focus 
directly on the relations among variables, especially the effects of causal or independent 
variables on outcome or dependent variables. The strength of the correlation between 
independent and dependent variable provides evidence in favour of or against the idea that two 
variables are causally connected or linked in some way. Questionnaires, test/measures, 
observation and gathering data directly from database are used as techniques for this method. 
The decision of methodology follows the epistemological approach that a researcher chooses. 
However, the flaws attached to each of these individual methods implies that it is good not to be 
method-bound as it helps to avoid the biasness of these methods and to tackle research question 
from a different and richer perspective (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).  
5.2.2 Positivism and its limitations  
The constraints on the firms’ business performance are independent of social individuals. A 
research can thus employ mathematics and logical methods (Mill, 1965), via quantitative 
manifestations, in devising experiments to test social theories. To translate concepts into 
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empirical indicators that are observable and measurable in an objective way (Lazarsfeld and 
Rosenberg, 1955), it is important to use the key indicators between different phenomena to 
analyse the casual business relationships. In other words, an event can be predicted as a logical 
consequence, and hypotheses could be seen as solutions to a problem that can be connected with 
the explanation of the behaviour of some aspects of the universal world (Chalmers, 1999). The 
author also agrees that the research process is to translate concepts into empirical indicators, 
with the engagement of a researcher in a theoretical problem (Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, 1955). 
Survey data are available in official websites, and mathematical methods can be tested publicly. 
They can be replaced by new tests with the advanced technology, to constitute a scientific basis 
of social knowledge (Galileo, 1967). In addition, the investigation is not subject to our personal 
value and individual will, like objective examination of physical facts (Durkheim, 1964).  
 
According to positivists, an “explanation of an event means to deduce a statement… using as 
premises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together with certain singular statements” 
(Popper, 1959: 59). These methods are subject to well-grounded knowledge, an ability to hold 
constant factors to the relationship of interest, and clear deductive connections to the 
overarching theory (Halfpenny, 1982). As there might be a number of choices based on different 
theories, it is the scientist who actively decide which is the scientific method or the neutral one 
(Campbell, 1957). Moreover, there is no guarantee that these generalisations will hold in the 
future since they are based on previous evidence (Hume, 1987). Additionally, the truth of a 
scientific law is determined by its correspondence with the observed facts, and the neutral 
method of positivism is not absolute in reality because there are lots of social phenomena that 
are relative to the observer (Bridgeman, 1927). In order to reduce errors, the choice is to adopt 
the ideas that have been socially accepted (Ryan, 1970). 
 
This research consists of deducing hypotheses from the theory, expressing these hypotheses in 
operational terms, testing these hypotheses, examining the results and confirming or modifying 
the theory if necessary (Robson, 1993). As business theory might contain concepts that are not 
subjective to observational testing, the author uses theoretical and observational languages that 
are linked together by correspondence rules to interpret some theoretical concepts empirically 
(Nagel, 1961). In this study, the author chooses one survey to minimise subjective errors from 
different individuals in examining the phenomena. The combination of mathematical and logical 
interpretation formulates social rules with both observational and non-observable facts as 
mathematics represents a way of defining social phenomena within a neutral framework.  
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5.3 Research design 
5.3.1 Research data 
As the centre of business research, the more successful a model is at generating a testable 
implication, the greater its theoretical credibility (Ryan, 1970). The methodology upon 
positivism is a common mode of statistical explanation, wherein the scientists try to explain 
social phenomena in terms of its correlation with other variables. This study is to use the 
statistical explanation as a form of causal explanation which requires hypotheses about 
underlying causal mechanisms, as long as the explanatory way has been established properly 
among social variables (Little, 1991).  As some factors are not directly observable, this research 
seeks to operationalise the theoretical hypothesis in terms of observable indicators. A survey 
usually includes three inquiry levels, named the philosophy of science level, the science level, 
and the application level. Van Gigch (1991, 2002) additionally advocates that epistemological 
and methodological questions can only be studied from a meta-modelling perspective:  
 Philosophy of science level: This level accounts all inquiries concerned with the sources 
of knowledge of a scientific discipline. At this level, questions delve into the ontological 
nature of the domains of a scientific discipline as well as into its epistemology.  
 Science level: This level is responsible for the study of the scientific aspects of a 
discipline. It uses knowledge flowing from its meta-level, i.e. the philosophy of science 
level, where epistemologies evolve. At this level, the methodologies of a scientific 
discipline are formulated and designed. 
 Application level: The differences and similarities among scientific disciplines require 
that they be studied not only from the points of view of philosophy of science and of 
science, but also from the perspective of their fields of application. 
 
Among quantitative approaches, secondary data analysis is frequently adopted if a sampling 
frame existed to avoid the collection problem, especially for a large-scale data. With a sufficient 
number of respondents with certain character, researchers have access to public data that they 
can systematically examine. Together with financial incentives, the availability of these data 
sets has led to exciting research opportunities. However, as the richness of secondary data is 
mainly designed for policymakers, the ignorance of some fundamental issues may result in 
wrong understanding and incorrect evaluation (Thomas and Heck, 2001).  
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The author’s first concern is that the questionnaire design should be able to reduce likely errors 
from respondents, interviewers and coders. As people’s participation in a survey is voluntary, a 
questionnaire has to help them to engage their interest, encourage their co-operation, and elicit 
answers close to the truth (Hoinville and Jowell, 1978). However, there can be some problems 
due to the possibility of a researcher and respondent sharing different community of meaning 
structures (Hughes, 1980), such as the differences between what people say they do and what 
they actually do (May, 1995). In theory, questionnaires can adequately deal with this issue if a 
complete context can be obtained through the overall package---additional questions in the 
questionnaire can enable a researcher to identify such variation in researcher/ respondent 
understanding of the significance of responses (Marsh, 1982).  
 
Fernandes and Kraay (2007) chose firm-level datasets from two main sources, the World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) and the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys 
(PICS) to study the relationship between different types of institutions and economic 
performance at the firm level. They used the firms’ perceptions about the quality of the courts in 
capturing “contracting institutions” and their views on how corruption captures “property rights 
institutions”. It captures perceptions of the likelihood that property will be expropriated by the 
state, the likelihood that contracts will be enforced, and the likelihood that property is secure 
from crime, and so on. Their research shows that countries with poor contracting and property 
rights institutions according to the cross-country measures also have poor functioning of the 
judiciary and corruption as a major obstacle to business according to the WBES and PICS firm-
level measures. Moreover, there is another widely-used measure of “rule of law” produced by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). They combine information from a large number of 
cross-country sources measuring perceptions of governance and construct composite indicators 
summarizing these perceptions. The Rule of Law measure in particular captures the perceptions 
of individuals, firms, commercial risk rating agencies, NGOs, think-tanks, and multilateral 
development banks on issues relating to the protection of property.  
 
5.3.1.1 The evaluation of different data sources 
In practice, a common difficulty in conducting a social research in China is the scarcity of 
reliable data (Luo, 1995). There are a number of governmental and non-governmental 
organisations who have conducted the surveys that are related to the aims and objectives of this 
research. The Freedom House (FH) is the representative of non-governmental organisation 
 107 
having its own indicators, e.g. Freedom in the World Survey and Freedom of the Press Index. 
The FH has published its survey reports annually, but its indicators concentrate on a relative 
narrow area and can only cover the part of the research questions related to the institutional 
constraints, such as freedom and corruptions. Therefore, there are three reasons that the author 
cannot choose the FH data. The first reason is the FH data is all about the institutional 
constraints at a macro level and cannot directly reflect the constraints on business performance 
at a firm level. The second one is the selection of the FH data will have to bring in another data 
source about the institutional constraints at a micro level, and the combination of different data 
sources unavoidably causes new methodological problems. More seriously, the FH is a non-
governmental organisation, and its survey is not officially approved by Chinese government. In 
China, the unauthorised evaluation related to the operation of Chinese government or the 
behaviour of Chinese officials can be regarded as illegal and criminal offence. Hence, it is too 
politically sensitive for any non-official approved survey to be legitimately authorised in China. 
 
There are some surveys involved by Chinese organisations. Among them, the Business in China 
Survey provided by China Europe International Business School was recommended by several 
European organisations, i.e. China-Italy Chamber of Commerce. This survey mainly focuses on 
market environment, innovation, research & development, and intellectual property in China. 
The US-China Business Council has also done a survey named USCBS China Business 
Environment Survey, which addresses ten issues regarding business operation in China. The 
constraints are human resource, administrative licensing, competition with Chinese enterprises, 
cost increases, intellectual property rights enforcement, uneven local enforcement and 
implementation of laws and policies, investment restrictions, competition with foreign 
companies, competition with foreign or Chinese companies not subject to US Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, standards and conformity assessment, and etc.  However, because of the same 
political reason, these surveys all tried to avoid the evaluation of the Chinese government and 
officials’ behaviours, particularly such as corruption. It is therefore difficult for the author to 
select these surveys in an institutional study. 
 
For the governmental organisations, the World Bank is the most famous governmental data 
sources, as they carry out the WBES and the Enterprise Surveys (ES). Originally, the World 
Bank conducted with the Enterprise Survey Organization of Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics in 2001. The first survey covered 300 firms in each of five cities: Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdu, for a total of 1500 firms. The survey collected detailed 
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information on financial statements, and different aspects of corporate governance, financing, 
firm-government relationship, innovation, technology, labour, and so on. As this survey did not 
include the informal institutional data and only covered five better developed cities in China, the 
author does not choose this survey. 
 
The ES began in 2002 and were conducted by different units of the World Bank. Since 2005-
2006, most data collection efforts have been centralized within the Enterprise Analysis Unit. 
Centralization of the survey implementation has resulted in a unified set of core survey 
questions and a consistent application of survey methodology across countries. The strata for 
Enterprise Surveys are firm size, business sector, and geographic region within a country. Firm 
size levels are 5-19 (small), 20-99 (medium), and 100+ employees (large-sized firms). The 
manufacturing and services sectors are the primary business sectors of the ES, and registered 
companies with 5 or more employees are targeted for interview. Services firms include 
construction, retail, wholesale, hotels, restaurants, transport, storage, communications, and IT. 
The Enterprise Surveys Unit uses two instruments: the Manufacturing Questionnaire and the 
Services Questionnaire. The standard Enterprise Survey topics include firm characteristics, 
gender participation, access to finance, annual sales, costs of inputs/labour, workforce 
composition, bribery, licensing, infrastructure, trade, crime, competition, capacity utilization, 
land and permits, taxation, informality, business-government relations, innovation and 
technology, and performance measures. Over 90% of the questions objectively ascertain 
characteristics of a country’s business environment. The remaining questions assess the survey 
respondents’ opinions on what are the obstacles to firm growth and performance.  
 
The ES is answered by business owners and top managers. Sometimes the survey respondent 
calls company accountants and human resource managers into the interview to answer questions 
in the sales and labour sections of the survey. Officially announced by the World Bank, over 
120,000 firms in 125+ countries have been currently surveyed in the ES, and an ES is conducted 
about every 3-4 years for most countries. However, the ES of China only was conducted once in 
2004 and published in 2005, which was also called the PICS. 
 
There are three reasons that the author cannot use the ES. First of all, according to the 
official explanation of ES methodology, the firms with 100% government/state ownership are 
not eligible to participate in ES. In other words, the ES does not cover the firms with 100% 
government/state ownership. In this research, a number of hypotheses concentrate on the 
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difference of the business constraints on the firms with or without government/state ownership. 
The author seeks to find how the constraints influenced by the governmental involvement affect 
the firms’ business performance. A firm’s government/state share can range from 1% to 100%. 
Without full state owned firms, the dataset itself is not sufficient for research exploration. 
Eventually, it becomes impossible to provide a convinced investigation about the institutional 
constraints on the business performances of the private firms (without government ownership) 
and non-private firms (with government ownership) in China.  
 
The second reason is WBES “primarily collected perception data regarding constraints and 
some information on firm performance” (Aterido et al., 2009: 7). Nevertheless, these perception 
data is not widely available in the ES. This thesis’s theoretical foundation is NIEs, and it is 
necessary to have a collection of perception data to clarify the relationship between formal and 
informal institutions and their connections. The WBES can mostly fulfil this request.  
 
The third reason is the ES concentrates on the firms’ business performance data for the uses of 
accountants when filling in a financial statement, such as the business income, business 
expenses, and profits. It is thus not appropriate for this study because, for the business 
performance data at the firm level, the ES does not include the investment data and only report 
the income and profits, which cannot reflect the business operation as a whole. This is especially 
true for the firms with foreign ownership, because of the strategies of the foreign investors, such 
as transfer price and other means to avoid tax and to increase their real profits. In China, the 
business environment has provided mixed inducements on transfer pricing. On one hand, the 
policy of a low income tax rate and a host of tax incentives would induce FDI to locate their 
source of profits in China. On the other hand, the regulations on foreign exchange control 
provide incentives for foreign investors to speed up the outward flow of profits from China. 
 
Transfer prices are the prices that MNCs set for intra firm exports and imports across countries 
(Lecraw, 1985; Gray, 1993), which are different from the market prices used for transactions 
with unrelated units. The motivation of transfer pricing is to maximize the foreign owners’ 
global profit and minimize the total costs by avoiding or reducing taxes and tariffs in their home 
and host countries where their subsidiaries operate. The principal tools consist of under-
invoicing (underpricing) the exports and over-invoicing (overpricing) the imports of the host 
country. Many factors may influence the transfer pricing manipulation. These include tax rates 
and tariffs at home and host countries, import or export restrictions, foreign exchange control, 
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restrictions on the repatriation of profits, joint-venture partners’ capabilities to manage and 
influence the pricing policies and practices, taxation (or customs) authority’s expertise and 
ability to detect and prevent transfer pricing. In general, a large international differential in taxes 
and tariffs would encourage the FIEs to use transfer prices to reduce tax payments and tariff 
duties. In addition, business environment factors such as restrictions and regulations on imports, 
exports and foreign exchange control, can also stimulate the FIEs’ incentives to manipulate 
transfer pricing to avoid business risks and institutional transaction costs. 
 
The business environment in China may strengthen the motivation to use transfer prices to 
minimize business risks, unpredictability and transaction costs. Although the Chinese 
government has made great efforts to establish a legal framework for FDI and to liberalize the 
economy, there are still some legal and institutional factors negatively affecting the operation of 
FIEs. First, the lack of well-defined laws on property rights and foreign investment protection is 
a major concern of foreign investors. In many cases, the property rights in enterprises are not 
legally clear. As a result of a poor legal environment, foreign investors tend to transfer their 
income to low-risk countries by manipulating transfer pricing. Second, a number of restrictive 
regulations, such as foreign exchange control, withholding tax on profit repatriation and 
restraints on FIEs’ access to the domestic markets, increase the business risks and relevant 
transaction costs. These restrictions motivate MNCs to use transfer prices in order to shift their 
income to countries with less restrictions. Another important factor that deserves special 
attention is the ownership structure of FIEs in China. In fact, joint ventures and cooperative joint 
ventures are the principal forms of FIEs. Theoretically, both sides share profits, costs and 
management. In practice, however, as the interests and management goals are divergent between 
the two sides, each side is motivated to maximize its own interest and benefit. To reduce the 
profits accruing to local Chinese partners and to increase their own real profit share, MNCs have 
a high propensity to manipulate transfer pricing to shift profits to their parent companies or 
other subsidiaries located in other countries with low taxation and risks. As a result, by using 
transfer prices foreign investors undervalue the exports and overvalue the imports, the FIEs shift 
profits out of China, resulting in FIEs’ trade deficits and income loss (Sun, 1999). 
 
Shulman (1969) contended that transfer pricing might be determined by customs duties and tax 
differentials, fluctuation of exchange rates, and market information of the local subsidiary. 
Lecraw (1985) also found that the transfer pricing was to reduce customs duties and taxes, and 
to circumvent governmental control prices and capital-profit remittance controls. Besides the 
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major economic factors including the difference of tax and customs duties and the fluctuation 
degree of the foreign exchange rate, “inflation, subsidiary market information, nationalization 
and expropriation risk, competitive market factors, profit-dividend remittance controls, import 
restraints in the host country, profit maximization within the corporate family, and correct 
performance measurement of the subsidiary could be determinants of the international transfer 
pricing method” (Kim, 2007: 179). Moreover, Feenstra and Hanson (2002) note that a 
multinational firm engaging in international trade may be better able to transfer price, and 
higher taxes can act as an important incentive to attract the FIEs in China, particularly when the 
multinational also controls input purchases and can dictate the input prices. Thus, it is not 
convincing to use the data of income and profit to describe the firms’ business performance, 
especially the firms that are invested in by foreign owners. If selecting the data of business 
performance in the ES, the author still has to choose the investment data from the difference 
source to measure the growth of the firms in China, and that will cause another problem in 
research methodology. 
 
The fourth reason that the author cannot choose the ES in this research is the ES actually 
covers a similar area of that of the WBES, and it can be regarded as a simplified format of the 
WBES. The ES covers eight aspects about the business environment, including infrastructure, 
access to finance, labour market, corruption & regulatory burden, court & crime, innovation & 
technology, and trade. The WBES displays the questions about the nine areas, i.e. financing, 
infrastructure, policy instability, inflation, exchange rate, street crime, organised crime, taxes & 
regulation, and corruption. Apart from these general constraints, there are also survey questions 
about several specific constraints in the WBES. Compared with the ES, the WBES concentrates 
on the questions about the institutional constraints on the firms’ performance, and the questions 
related to the specific institutional constraint are also surveyed.  
 
5.3.1.2 The WBES as data source 
5.3.1.2.1 The introduction of the WBES 
Followed by the data source used by Beck et al. (2005), this research uses the WBES to examine 
institutional factors that may impede a firm’s activity. The WBES was implemented by the 
Gallup Organization in East Asia, Pakistan, Latin America, and OECD countries; AC Nielsen in 
Eastern Europe and Turkey; the Confederation of Indian Industries in India; the Harvard Center 
for International Development in Africa; the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies in Egypt; 
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Lidee Khmer in Cambodia; the University of the Chamber of Commerce in Thailand; and the 
Bangladesh export development project in Bangladesh (Batra et al., 2003). 
 
Table 5.1 Distribution of Firms by Region, Size and Sector 
 
Source: Brata et al. (2003) 
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Both small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (those with 500 or fewer workers) and large firms 
(those with 501 or more employees), were sampled in the WBES. Table 5.1 presents the 
regional breakdown of firms by size and sector. SMEs comprised the clear majority of samples 
(80 percent), with an almost equal proportion of small enterprises (50 or fewer employees) and 
medium enterprises (51-500 employees). Large firms accounted for about 20 percent of the 
sample. In terms of average firm age, the youngest sample age of firms was in Central and 
Eastern Europe (9.5 years). The oldest was in OECD (34.1 years). 
 
Table 5.2 Leading constraints of the WBES 
 Leading  
Constraint 
Second  
Constraint 
Third  
Constraint 
Fourth 
 Constraint 
World Taxes 
 and regulations 
Financing Policy instability Inflation 
OECD &  
newly industrialized 
 East Asia 
 (including China) 
Taxes  
and regulation 
Financing Policy instability Inflation 
Transition Europe Taxes  
and regulation 
Financing Inflation Policy instability 
Developing countries 
(Africa, MENA,  
East Asia Developing, 
 South Asia, 
 Latin America) 
Corruption Inflation Financing Policy instability/ 
infrastructure (tie) 
Africa Financing Corruption Infrastructure Inflation 
MENA Policy instability Corruption Inflation Exchange rate 
East Asia NIC/China Financing Inflation Anti-competitive  
practices 
Policy instability 
East Asia Developing Street crime Corruption Inflation/Exchange rate/organised crime (tie) 
South Asia Corruption/policy instability (tie) Inflation Infrastructure 
Latin America Taxes  
and regulation 
Policy instability Street crime Financing 
OECD Taxes 
 and regulation 
Financing Policy instability Inflation 
CIS Taxes 
 and regulation 
Financing Policy instability Inflation 
CEE Taxes and regulation/ Inflation (tie) Financing Policy instability 
Source: Brata et al. (2003) 
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The WBES also provides the rated responses about how a set of general constraints were 
problematic for business growth and operation. Table 5.2 presents the ranking of responses for 
the world, by regional groups and by individual region to the following question, “please judge 
on a four-point scale how problematic are the following factors for the operation and growth of 
your firm”. Based on a simple average for the overall world sample, four constraints are, taxes 
and regulations, financing, policy uncertainty/instability and inflation. Some crucial differences 
appear across regions, and particularly between industrialized and developing countries. For 
OECD, newly industrialized East Asian countries, and transition economies, the leading 
obstacles are taxes and regulations, financing, policy instability, and inflation. For developing 
regions as a group (Africa; Latin America and the Caribbean, LAC; Middle East/North Africa, 
MENA; South Asia; and East Asia), the leading constraint is corruption, followed by inflation, 
financing, policy instability, and infrastructure. In four developing regions, South Asia, Africa, 
developing East Asia and MENA, corruption is one of the top three constraints. 
 
There are other important regional differences. For example, in Developing East Asia, street 
crime imposes the leading constraint, whereas in Africa, infrastructure problems are one of the 
top three constraints. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), inflation ties with taxes and 
regulations as the leading constraints. The large variance across regions in the severity assigned 
by responding firms to the various constraints points to the importance of assessing the results 
by region and country. For Africa and East Asia, taxes and regulations are notably absent from 
the leading constraints. Surprisingly, in Transition Europe (CIS and CEE), corruption is not 
among the top four constraints although it is problematic for about half the firms. Tax and 
regulatory constraints were also rated individually in a separate question. Among these 
constraints, “high taxes” led in every region. Since taxes are generally a significant cost of doing 
business, it is not surprising that most businesses internationally regard them as too high. “Tax 
regulations and administration” led the remaining list of regulatory constraints. Customs and 
trade regulation were identified as the next leading regulatory constraint in Latin America, 
Africa, Developing East Asia, and MENA; while in OECD, South Asia and Newly 
Industrialized East Asia labour regulations rank next. In Central and Eastern Europe alone, 
business registration imposes the leading constraint after taxes. It is noteworthy that the great 
majority of firms in Newly Industrialized East Asia did not identify high taxes as a serious 
constraint, and were predominantly not seriously constrained by any category of regulation. 
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5.3.1.2.2 The reasons to select the WBES 
The WBES that was also conducted by the World Bank uses quantitative techniques to carry out 
the survey over a period of roughly 20 months between the end of 1998 and the middle of 2000. 
“The design of the sampling frame reflected several considerations. In general, the sample 
aimed to reflect the relative importance of manufacturing firms versus service and commercial 
firms in the economy - To ensure representative findings across countries, a sample frame was 
developed for most countries to reflect the distribution of privately own companies in each 
country by sector, size (measured by number of employees), and location - Each consulting firm 
hired to conduct regional surveys used desk research to generate a suitable sample frame, the 
primary research source being government registers of enterprises that are maintained by most 
of the countries under review. To ensure adequate representation of firms by industry, size, 
ownership, export orientation, and location, the following sampling targets were agreed on 
across all regions: 
 Sectoral composition: The number of manufacturing versus service companies were 
allocated according to their contribution to gross domestic product (GDP), with a 15 
percent minimum for each type of firm. 
 Size: At least 15 percent of the sample was in the small category (fewer than 50 
employees) and at least 15 percent was in the large category (more than 500 employees). 
 Ownership: At least 15 percent of the companies in the sample were firms with foreign 
control (where the law prohibited such a control arrangement, the companies had 
substantial foreign ownership). 
 Exporters: At least 15 percent of firms exported at least 20 percent of their output. 
 Location: At least 15 percent of firms were located in small towns (a population of less 
than 50,000), or in the countryside” (Batra et al., 2003:2-3). 
 
The WBES’s cross sectional data were collected though personal interviews conducted with 
managers in enterprises in China. The WBES includes categorical data and scaling data. The 
categorical data surveys the questions about the general nature of the firms, such as “Does the 
firm include foreign ownership, Yes or No?” and “Does the firm include government 
ownership, Yes or No?”  The scaling questions survey the constraints in different categories, 
including business competition, finance, rules and regulations, corruption, and judicial function. 
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There were 101 enterprises taking part in the WBES in China. Subject to the sample size, the 
standard error of a reported proportion or percentage (p) measures its accuracy, and is the 
estimated standard deviation of that percentage. It can be estimated from just p and the sample 
size (n), if n is small relative to the population size, using the following formula: The general 
formula for the margin of error for a sample proportion is 
 
Where is the sample proportion, n is the sample size, and z* is the appropriate z*-value for 
your desired level of confidence. For 95% of confidence level, the z value is 1.96. The table 5.3 
lists the survey errors related to the primary WBES data in this research. 
 
Table 5.3 Survey Errors of the primary research data 
Note: Response rate is based on the constraint with the lowest response rate in one constraint category. The 
response rates of other constraints in the same category are all higher than the figure listed in the table.  
 
Compared with the other data sources that are officially approved by the Chinese government, 
such as the ES, the WBES has a number of advantages. The most important one is, according 
to the official explanation of ES methodology, the firms with 100% government/state ownership 
are not eligible to participate in ES. As a result, the ES does not cover the firms with 100% 
government/state ownership.  However, the target firm categories of this thesis are the firms 
with / without foreign ownership and the firm with / without government ownership. In order to 
answer the research question, it is essential to choose the WBES as the research data source and 
abandon the others, such as the ES. The WBES has answered the following areas “: 
 To provide feed back from enterprises on the state of the private sector. 
 To measure the quality of governance and public services including the extent of 
corruption. 
 To provide better information on constraints to private sector growth, from the enterprise 
perspective. 
 To sensitize client governments to the importance of listening to firms and using this 
information to critically assess policies. 
Constraint category Response Rate Survey Error 
Competition 79.2% 8% 
Finance 69.3% 9% 
Rules and regulations 75.2% 8% 
Corruption 92.1% 5% 
Judicial function 84.2% 7% 
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 To establish the basis for internationally comparable indicators which can track changes 
in the business environment over time, thus allowing an assessment of the impact of 
market oriented reforms on private enterprises. 
 To stimulate systematic public-private dialogue on business perceptions and the agenda 
for reform” (Batra et al., 2003: 3). 
 
The second important advantage of the WBES for this research is, for the first time, China 
agreed to be a part of this type of survey. Data were collected though personal interviews 
conducted at the managerial level in enterprises in most regions, with the exception of Africa, 
where surveys by mail predominated. Response rates were generally high, with the exception of 
responses to questions on bribery. On a roughly parallel basis, the WBES implement a standard 
core enterprise survey to evaluate business conditions in a large, cross regional set in all 80 
countries throughout the world. It uses a consistent methodology and parallel parameters to 
survey at least 100 firms in each country. The WBES assesses the state of the enabling 
environment---the conditions for private enterprise growth, focusing on local economic policy, 
governance, regulatory, infrastructure and financial barriers, and services to businesses. The 
WBES has also standardised the evaluations of the conditions for private investment in 
developing and transition countries around the world. It provides a basis to make regional 
comparisons of investment climate and business environment. Furthermore, it permits 
comparisons of the severity of constraints affecting enterprise depending on their characters, 
such as size or ownership. For example, the WBES categorises firms by foreign or domestic 
ownership. In China, domestic firms are constrained in the area of regulations, as they are not 
satisfied with business and labour regulations and constraints on taxes and regulations. Thus 
indicating that there are more constraints for domestic firms than for foreign firms and on the 
issue of financing constraint substantially and corruption. Moreover, the legislative and 
regulatory superiority has apparently created a business environment that is more welcome to 
the FIEs than to domestic firms. 
 
To apply the NIEs theories, the data must represent a wide variety of issues. The third reason 
for the author selects the WBES is the WBES instrument is broad in its coverage and includes 
information on business environment attributes and firm level attributes including information 
on firm size; years of operation, sales, debt and growth performance, ownership nature and 
source of finance. There are also evaluations on issues such as corruption and governance, the 
regulatory regime, economic policy predictability, the nature of competition, public service 
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delivery and government bureaucracy, the judicial system, banking system, financing and 
general constraints to business operation. Based on face-to-face interviews with managers and 
owners, the WBES is designed to generate comparative measurements in such areas as 
corruption, judiciary, lobbying, and the quality of the business environment, which can then be 
related to specific firm characteristics and firm performance.  
 
Fourth, the WBES focuses on perceptions of factors external to the firm as the perception is 
very important to investigate the institutions, especially the institutional changes. Many 
dimensions of business environment were surveyed, ranging from perceptions of the national 
business environment as shaped by local economic policy; governance to the perceptions of 
regulatory, infrastructural, and financial impediments; and public service quality. The survey 
was done on more than 100 firms in each of some 80 countries. It is to be indicated that the 
WBES is, so far, the most comprehensive survey conducted in this area by an international 
agency in cooperation with Chinese governments. It is also the best publicly available survey 
about business operation in China. This was another important factor behind the author’s 
reliance on the WBES to finalise this business study, rather than on carrying out a completely 
new survey.  
 
The fifth reason is the cost of conducting such a survey is beyond the ability of the author. The 
problems are linked mostly to the nature of this research and to some of the questions it raises, 
particularly with regard to political related questions for the Chinese Communist Party that 
controls China, e. g. corruptions of the officials and the evaluation of the governmental 
behaviours. More seriously, it is most likely for a researcher to face some offences because of 
the corruption data collection in China. As managers regard such question as extremely 
sensitive to their activity and hence confidential, the collection of information requires a long 
time in order to build trust. Such problems have already been acknowledged by some observers 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995; Voigt and Engerer, 2000; Punch, 1994). Interviewees in China are 
thus not comfortable with such matters. This makes a direct data collection very difficult. The 
human, financial and political resources of the World Bank are difficult to match as the WBES 
provides panoply of different firms that embody different characteristics that are crucial to test 
this research’s hypotheses. 
 
Sixth, the subjective views expressed in these surveys are dependent on the questions’ 
reliability and validity. However, these problems are common to all researches which are based 
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on surveys that rely on the expressed opinions of agents. Notwithstanding, the questionnaire 
reduces the biasing errors that might result from the personal characteristics of interviewers and 
their understandings to the questions asked in the survey especially when the questions are 
simple and straightforward. In addition, the assurance of the anonymity with the questionnaire is 
especially helpful when the survey deals with sensitive issues like those treated by this research. 
Although individual existence most bounding up with problems of personality is situated at a 
micro level, it is still possible to collectively transform phenomena outside apart from being 
influenced by social environment of a macro level (Touraine, 1974). Hence, a quantitative 
approach based on WBES survey should be appropriate for this research. 
 
As a well accepted database, the WBES could thus contribute the proposed research to 
investigate the business constraints on the firms’ performance in China. Choosing the WBES 
data, the proposed study consists of a quantitative model design, quantitative hypotheses 
measurement, statistical analysis, and the adoption of survey data, to establish a framework to 
understand the nature of institutions and to get a model so that we might predict and control it 
(Yu, 2003).  
5.3.2 Statistical tests for research hypotheses 
5.3.2.1 The Levene’s test and Error bar  
Table 5.4 Statistical tests in this research 
Hypotheses Methods 
The importance of the institutions on different firm categories Descriptive test 
Insider-Outsider 
 hypotheses 
Firms with and without foreign ownership Levene’s test and Error Bar 
Private firms and non-private firms 
Business  
performance 
hypotheses 
Direct influences on sales and  
investment of the of the firms  
caused by institutional constraints  
Regression analysis: 
1. Logistic regression 
2. Categorical regression 
 
The author chooses a set of statistical techniques to test the research hypotheses (table 5.4). The 
Levene’s test is used to test the proportional differences in the perception amongst these 
categories with respect to their respective constraints (Miller and Graeffe, 2000; Hsieh and 
Miller, 1990). “In 1960 Professor Howard Levene proposed a new approach to this problem by 
applying the F-test to the absolute deviations of the observations from their group means. 
Levene’s approach is powerful and robust to non- normality and became a very popular tool for 
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checking the homogeneity of variances” (Gastwirth et al., 2009: 343). The Levene’s test does 
not only rely on similarity of the number of observations across the groups, but also examines 
discrepancies between categories with small proportion of observations. The Error Bar 
technique is used to display the direction of the differences, i.e. which one of the two categories 
values higher the constraint. The Error bar is to give an idea about the homogeneity of 
perception within the same category, i.e. whether all observations in the same category value the 
constraint with the same intensity (Mayer et al., 2004). The author employed these techniques to 
analyse complex survey data of the WBES as “it is common for survey analysts to apply 
descriptive analysis techniques … … to survey variables measured on scales that are not strictly 
continuous” (Heeringa et al., 2010: 120). 
 
Supported by SPSS, the Levene’s test investigates the differences in the proportional 
perceptions between the different categories reported by firms. It is preferred over other 
parametric and non parametric techniques such as Mann-Whitney U test (non-parameteric) and 
ANOVA test (parametric) because the Levene’s test is more flexible and safer to use when 
comparing groups having large disparities in the size of the number of observations. This is the 
exact case for the size categories investigated. It is also useful and appropriate when comparing 
between categories with small number of observations because the sample of this research only 
includes 34 firms in China. More importantly for this study, Levene’s test does not depend on 
the assumption of normal distribution of data (Milliken and Johnson, 1984; Zimmerman, 2004; 
Hsieh and Miller, 1990). The Levene’s test for homogeneity is also useful because the author is 
more concerned with testing the performance differences in the proportion of perception among 
the different categories regarding to the constraints, rather than testing whether or not a specific 
constraint is problematic for different groups. Together with Levene’s test, the Error Bar is to 
exhibit which of the compared categories value the business constraint most. The use of this 
technique enables the author to give a good indication about the variability in the opinions even 
within the category itself (Brace and Snelgar, 2000). The application of descriptive analysis 
(means, proportions, and totals) and linear regression intend to illustrate the model of 
multivariate relationships. 
 
5.3.2.2 The regression analysis  
Regression analysis has been widely used in business studies, particularly in the subjects 
connected with the FIEs’ business operation of in China. Luo (1995) uses three dependent 
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variables to explain the development of joint ventures in China, which are stock market related 
measures, market structure measures, and business strategy variables. Ng and Tuan (2002) 
studied the institutional differences or structural characteristics of investments. Their research 
examines six variables in building a FDI-friendly environment, which are (1) nature of industry; 
(2) size of investment; (3) sources of investment; (4) destinations investment by regions; (5) 
type of ownership; and (6) expectations on profit performance. Furthermore, Tuan and Ng 
(2004) explored the business constraints on regional FDI absorption at the city level, and they 
choose four indicators: residents’ income, the strength of the manufacturing base, the degree of 
urbanization by physical infrastructure, and the city’s relative wage level to the overall average 
wage. In terms of Guanxi that uses the connections or networks to secure favours in personal or 
business relations, Luo (1997) again used a general linear model to explore the influences of 
informal institutions on FIE performance in China. 
 
Following the approach used by Ghecham (2004) and Beck et al. (2005), based on the data of 
the WBES, the author uses regression analysis to investigate the hypotheses about the influences 
caused by both the institutions on the firms’ business performance in China, in terms of sales 
and investment. As a statistical investigation of relationships between variables, regression 
techniques have long been central to the field of economic studies. Usually, regression analysis 
is used when the investigator seeks to ascertain the causal effect of one variable upon another. 
To explore such issues, the scholar collects data on the underlying variables of interest and 
employs regression to estimate the quantitative effect of the causal variables upon the variable 
that they influence. The scholar also assesses the “statistical significance” of the estimated 
relationships, which is the degree of confidence that the true relationship is close to the 
estimated relationship.  
 
The assumption of normal distribution of research data determines the choice among several 
regression tools. A normal distribution is a statistical distribution in which data are represented 
graphically by a symmetrical bell-shaped curve, with the highest frequency in the middle and 
smaller frequencies towards the edges. Thus, technically speaking, checking the normality of the 
distribution of a variable is very important because many statistical tests require the normality as 
a prerequisite. Among the variables in this study, the age of the firms is the only one factor 
using numeric value. Reasonably, it is very necessary to ensure the normality of the distribution 
of the firm age factor. Shown in table 5.5, the result of Shapiro-Wilk test is 0.000 < 0.05 proving 
that the variable of firm age is not normally distributed. Moreover, it is very obvious that the 
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data of the firm age is not normal distributed (Graph 5.1 and Graph 5.2). Consequently, this 
research has to abandon the option of most linear regression approaches when using the original 
data of firm age from the WBES. Instead, the author has to use the other statistical tools without 
the assumption of normal distribution. 
Table 5.5 Result of Normality test of firm age 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Age .251 93 .000 .712 93 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
Graph 5.1 Histogram of firm age 
 
 
Graph 5.2 Plot of firm age 
 
 
Accordingly, a statistical technique used to investigate the influence on the firms’ business 
performance is categorical regression (Ghecham, 2004; Beck et al., 2005), such as sale and 
investment. Categorical variables serve to separate groups of cases, and the technique estimates 
 123 
separate sets of parameters for each group and it is not dependent on the assumption of 
normality of the variables (SPSS, 1998). Regression analysis applies the optimal scaling 
methodology to quantify categorical variables. This includes the response variable, 
simultaneously optimising the multiple regression coefficients, allowing for nonlinear 
transformation of the variables, and including the response variable (Van der Kooij et al., 2004). 
This statistical technique does not depend on normality assumption and is available in SPSS 
programme (SPSS, 1998). Therefore, categorical regression is appropriate for the assessment of 
the different variables in this research, which are categorised on different scales (ordinal scale 
for dependent variable, size and institutional constraints, nominal scale for sector, and numeric 
scale for age of the firms), for the type of testing investigated by this study and for the type of 
variables used in this study (table 5.6). This technique allows investigating the causal 
relationship between the institutional variables; the relationship with the dependent variable that 
refers to the performance of the firms measured by sales and investment achieved during the last 
three years preceding the survey; the impact on the business performance of the firms caused by 
the formal and informal institutions in the WBES, including corruption constraint, legal 
constraint, financial constraint, business competition constraint, rules and regulations constraint. 
Table 5.6 The categorical regression variables  
Variables Reason of adoption in this research 
 
 
Dependent 
variables 
 
Sales growth  
percentage  
change 
 
 
To use them as proxies for the business performance of the firms in China. 
Investment  
percentage 
 change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
Business  
competition 
As a formal institutional constraint, it is a crucial factor to influences the business 
performance in competition.  
Finance  
system 
As a formal institutional constraint, it is an important factor in business  
environment. It contributes actively to business transactions exchanges. 
Rules and  
regulations 
As a formal institutional constraint, it sets a formula to business performance  
in practice and affects daily business operations in China. 
Corruption As an informal institutional constraint, It can have both positive and negative 
 effect on the business performance. It can either increase the transaction costs  
of business exchanges normally, or reduce business  costs sometimes.   
Legal  
system 
As a formal institutional constraint, it is a determinant for generalising trust and 
impersonal transactions across actors. It plays a major role in providing third  
party enforcement mechanism to the exchange process.  
It can increase or decrease transaction costs.  
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However, although the categorical regression is able to answer a large part of research 
questions, it cannot provide to what extent the outcomes can be predicted. In other words, no 
matter if the statistical relationship is significant or not significant, we have no idea about when 
the probability of the predicted outcome will happen. Among the several choices of regression 
analysis that are independent of normal distribution, logistic regression is an approach for 
prediction, like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. With logistic regression, the 
researcher is predicting a dichotomous outcome. This situation poses problems for the 
assumptions of OLS as the error variances are normally distributed. Logistic regression analysis 
extends the techniques of multiple regression analysis to research situations in which the 
outcome variable is categorical. Technically speaking, logistic regression is good at dealing with 
the dependent variable that is binary rather than continuous, which is usually a categorical 
variable that has to values, such as “yes” and “no”. In fact, the data of the WBES involves a 
large number of categorical outcomes. More importantly, the WBES provides the previous and 
future sale and investment data, in the context of “change” or “no change”.  
 
In this thesis, the section of regression analysis is similar to the multilevel empirical research 
design of Boyacigiller (1990). The main difference between this research and Boyacigiller’s 
study (1990) is, in the second part of regression analysis, the author uses categorical regression 
instead of multiple regressions because the WBES data is not normally distributed. In the first 
step of regression analysis, the author chooses logistic regression to examine the same 
independent data used in the categorical regression. The binary logistic regression can explain to 
what extent the regression outcomes will happen, and whether the independent variables will 
result in the changes of business performances in China. The dependent variables are “change” 
and “no change” of the sale and investment both in previous three years and in future three 
years. The independent variables are the same ones used in the second step of regression 
analysis, which are categorised on a different scale (ordinal scale for dependent variable, size 
and institutional constraints, nominal scale for sector, and numeric scale for age of the firms). 
 
The author notes that the operational problems when running regression analysis, such as the 
omission from a regression of some variables that affect the dependent variable may cause an 
“omitted variables bias”. The problem arises because any omitted variable becomes part of the 
noise term, and the result may be a violation of the assumption necessary for the minimum sum 
of squared errors criterion to be an unbiased estimator. The omitted variables problem is 
troublesome to investigators not simply because it requires them to collect data on more 
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variables to avoid it, but because the omitted variables are often unobservable and may also 
become unavoidable. For an investigator concerned primarily with the coefficient of the gender 
dummy, the omitted variables bias caused by the exclusion of innate ability and motivation 
should be modest because the correlation in the sample might plausibly be assumed to be small. 
Where the problem appears likely to be serious, by contrast, the utility of conventional 
regression as an investigative tool diminishes considerably. 
 
The other running difficulty is “multicollinearity” that usually refers to a problem in the data 
short of the perfect collinearity in the illustration, but where changes in two variables are 
nevertheless highly correlated to the point that it is difficult to separate their effects. Because 
multicollinearity does not go to any property of the noise term, the minimum sum of squared 
errors criterion can still be unbiased, consistent, and efficient. But the difficulty in separating the 
effects of the two variables introduces greater uncertainty into the estimator, manifest as an 
increase in the standard errors of the coefficients and a reduction in their t-statistics. The 
multicollinearity problem does not result in biased coefficient estimates, but does increase the 
standard error of the estimates and thus reduces the degree of confidence that one can place in 
them. The difficulty arises when two independent variables are closely correlated, creating a 
situation in which their effects are difficult to separate. As a result, running regressions requires 
testing for multicollinearity, which is a common problem in regressions procedures. This 
problem can generate erroneous coefficient estimates and hence leads to misleading conclusions 
about the potential effect of the independent variables on the dependent variable. A common 
method to identify the potential presence of this problem is to run a correlation matrix amongst 
the independent variables to see whether there is high and significant correlation between them. 
 
Theoretically, the fact that the parameter is “statistically significant” simply means that by 
conventional tests, one can reject the hypothesis that its true value is zero. But there are surely 
many other hypotheses about the parameter value that cannot be rejected, and indeed the 
likelihood that regression will produce a perfectly accurate estimate of any parameter is 
negligible. About the only guidance that can be given from a statistical standpoint is the 
obvious--- parameter estimates with proportionally low standard errors are less likely to be wide 
of the mark than others. Ultimately, statistics itself does not say how much weight a regression 
study ought to be given, or whether it is reasonable to use a particular parameter estimate for 
some legal purpose or other. These assessments are inevitably entrusted to the researchers, 
whose judgments on the matter if well informed are likely as good as those of anyone else. 
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5.4 Other methodological limitation 
The questionnaire data collection of the WBES has four major disadvantages. First, compared 
with the numerous numbers of the enterprises in China, the sample size is so small that the 
results of data analysis and research conclusion become less convincing. However, subjective to 
the availability of survey data, especially related to the topic of corruption that is still politically 
sensitive area in China, the WBES is still the best option to conduct this institutional research. 
Larger samples and the availability of panel surveys would have increased the ability to draw 
country specific inference and track changes over time. Moreover, because perceptions are only 
imperfectly related to underlying physical and cost conditions, it would have been valuable in 
surveys to complement perceptual data with greater use of quantitative questions that evaluate 
constraints as much as possible, supporting cross-country comparisons and providing a check on 
perceptual responses. 
 
The second problem is the sampling size is not consistent throughout the whole research as the 
number of firms providing their survey answers are various. That is to say, the firms answering 
the survey questions might be different. It is possible that some firms only answer some survey 
questions and did not provide their answers to the other questions. As a result, it is difficult for 
the scholar to apply the result of data analysis to every firms involved in the WBES. Thus it 
would be additionally hard to make a convince conclusion based on the research discussion. 
However, the inconsistent sample size does not mean the opinions of the firms taking part in the 
WBES are worthless. The researcher can still analyse the mainstream of responses according to 
certain survey questions and then to demonstrate the business environment in China.  
 
The third problem is the WBES only contact managers or owners, excluding persons who are 
also connected with the business operation of FIEs from different aspects; there are possibilities 
that those persons could also provide some important information. The third problem is about 
the reliability of the WBES data collection. Many indicators in subjective areas might no longer 
be available either for memory lapse or as the particular information is only available at that 
time. Even if those data could be obtained, people might misclassify previous events and 
records, or recall details incorrectly. After all, some recent experiences and events may bias the 
recollection when people make about their earlier experiences, making inferences about trends 
or causation somewhat circular (Dex, 1991). Consequently, the information provided by even 
the proper person might bring extra bias and negatively influence the quality of research. In 
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addition, it is not easy for everyone to clarify those influences accurately, but the managers 
involved in survey must be capable of summarising the business operation. They should be able 
to understand the survey questions correctly, and express their ideas and minds clearly. In the 
procedure of the WBES data collection, translation is necessary, this involves translating 
questions into Chinese and translating their responses into English. In fact, it is difficult or 
might be impossible to choose the most accurate vocabularies in the translation, and the 
translation connected with data collection is dependent on the person who conducts the survey. 
 
In addition, there are issues from the data analysis practice. When using SPSS to analyse data, 
there are several statistical tests available for author to make judgements. That is to say, it is the 
researcher who chooses a business model to carry out mathematical calculation, and then selects 
some appropriate statistical tests to make a conclusion. The process of statistical investigation 
and research conclusion are therefore totally subject to the person doing this research.   
 
5.5 Summary of research design and methodology 
This chapter explains why the author adopts positivism as the philosophical foundation of this 
study. This part also discusses the issues of methodology and research design, and illustrates the 
fact that a quantitative approach is the most appropriate method for this research. Some methods 
were planned from the beginning while other methods were emergent and were adopted once 
their usefulness became apparent. The author discusses the regression analysis as a research 
method in detail and discusses the type of data collected and the way it is analysed. 
 
After comparing the ES and the WBES, the author explains why the ES is not appropriate for 
this research, and points out a number of advantages of using the WBES as a data source. In 
addition, a statistical analysis could provide factual accumulation of institutional changes, and 
this survey-based research should be able to explain how institutional factors influence the 
business performance of the firms with or without foreign ownership in China. The next three 
chapters will present the findings and further analysis of this empirical study, along with a 
discussion on the issues that are relevant to the research questions and research implications.  
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Chapter 6 Research finding: Initial descriptive analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
Data generated through SPSS software is used to examine the importance of institutions and to 
analyse the business constraints surveyed by the WBES. This chapter uses SPSS to examine the 
business constraints according to their rankings by undertaking descriptive data investigations in 
terms of frequencies and percentage. This approach presents an initial introduction to the main 
characteristics of the various types of firm, especially the one used for the sample, as well as the 
variables that define the various institutional constraints on business performance in China.  
 
The first step is to present an overview of the business constraint rankings according to their 
severity in China. This gives a general idea about what constraints may affect the firms’ 
business operations. By using descriptive analysis, one can demonstrate the perception of how 
different business constraints can cause problems. The second step involves looking at these 
constraints expressed in terms of percentages, which allows for making comparisons between 
the intensity of the factors in general and their intensity across the number of categories in 
detail. This chapter also gives a preliminary idea about how the factors are constrained across 
different categories, consisting of all firms, foreign firms and domestic firms, private firms and 
non-private firms, as well as the firms with small, medium and large sizes. The percentages and 
frequencies display how each firm category values the constraint compared to other categories.  
6.2 Descriptive analysis 
This section reviews the characteristics of the firms represented by the sample, focusing on size, 
sector and origins of ownership of the firms. Table 6.1 displays the frequencies of the variables 
characterising the nature of the firms. The frequencies of each category are displayed in terms of 
absolute numbers and percentages. (In this chapter, the differences in total number of different 
categories are due to missing values associated with the WBES data). 
 Foreign ownership: A number of the firms have either foreign ownership or government 
ownership. In this thesis, the author regards the firms with foreign ownership as a 
foreign firm and the firms without foreign ownership as a domestic firm. The 
number of foreign firms is 35 (34.7% of the respondent sample). There are 66 domestic 
firms, which represent 65.3% of the respondent sample.  
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 Private firm: 24 companies are with government ownership, which represent 23.8% of 
the respondent sample; 77 companies are without government ownership, representing 
76.2%. On the regulative side, “Chinese state is likely to act much less as a neutral 
referee, protecting property rights and individual freedoms and much more as an active 
player, promoting and controlling economic development” (Scott, 2002: 65). The firms 
are deeply influenced by the shares of government ownership because the government 
still has an overwhelming power to determine the firms’ business operations, although 
the share of government ownership is far less than 50% (bottom limit of legal control). 
Thus, the author only regards the firms without government ownership as a private 
firm and the firms with government ownership as a non-private firm.  
 Size and sector: The sample covers three different sizes of firms. They are 45 small, 30 
medium and 26 large firms. They represent, respectively, 44.6%, 29.4% and 29.7% of 
the respondent firms. The sample also covers different sectors. The manufacturing sector 
holds the biggest share of the respondent sample. There are a total of 61 firms which 
represents 60.4% of the respondent sample. The second one covers the services sector, 
which includes 36 firms and 35.6% of the total.  This sample also includes 3 firms that 
belong to the construction sector, and their share of the respondent sample is 3.0%.  
Only 1 firm is from the agricultural sector representing 1.0% of the respondent sample. 
 Legal organisation: Among the respondent firms, 9 firms are organised as single 
proprietorship, 11 firms in partnership, 12 companies in cooperative arrangement, 20 
privately-held corporations; these respectively represent 8.9%, 10.9%, 11.9%, 19.8% of 
the respondent sample. The largest category is the other legal organisation - 47 firms or 
46.5% of the respondent sample. There are only 2 listed corporations, 2.0% of the total.  
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistic of the firms’ character 
Foreign ownership Frequency (firm number) Percent 
Yes 35 34.7 
No 66 65.3 
Total 101 100 
 
Government ownership Frequency (firm number) Percent 
Yes (non-private firms) 24 23.8 
No (private firms) 77 76.2 
Total 101 100 
 
Size categories Frequency (firm number) Percent 
Small 45 44.6 
Medium 30 29.7 
Large 26 25.7 
Total 101 100 
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Sector Frequency (firm number) Percentage 
Manufacturing 61 60.4 
Service 36 35.6 
Agriculture 1 1.0 
Construction 3 3.0 
Total 101 100 
 
Legal organization of 
company 
Frequency (firm number) Percent 
Single proprietorship 9 8.9 
Partnership 11 10.9 
Cooperative 12 11.9 
Corporation, privately-held 20 19.8 
Corporation listed on a stock 
exchange 
2 2.0 
Others 47 46.5 
Total 101 100 
6.3 Business constraints considered by the WBES 
The WBES covers questions of which factors constitute business obstacles, reflecting two types 
of institutions that are formal (such as regulation) and informal institutions (such as corruption). 
These variables include financing; tax regulation; infrastructure; policy instability; inflation; 
functioning of judiciary; exchange rate; organised crime; street crime; and corruption. Table 6.2 
shows the frequencies across the sample according to the constraint level. This table also 
displays the intensity of the constraints, ranging from no obstacle to major obstacle.  
 Financing: This variable constitutes no obstacle for 12 firms, and 8 firms having minor 
obstacles in financing. 14 firms consider this as a moderate obstacle, and 67 firms regard 
financing as a major business obstacle, representing 66.3% of the responding sample. 
 Infrastructure: 70 firms saw infrastructure as representing either no or minor obstacle to 
their business environment. This constitutes 69.3% of total responding firms. 31 firms, 
representing 30.7%, see this factor as a moderate or major obstacle.  
 Political instability: There are 59 out of 100 responding firms which consider political 
instability to be either of no obstacle or as a minor obstacle. On the other side, 41 firms 
see this factor as either a moderate or major obstacle to their business activity. 
 Inflation: This factor is a major obstacle for 14 firms, 14.1% of the respondent sample. 
28 firms, 29 firms, and 28 firms respectively see it as no obstacle, minor obstacle, or 
moderate business obstacle, which are 28.3%, 29.3% and 28.3%.  
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 Exchange rate: 20 firms, which constitute 21.5% of responding firms, viewed this 
variable as a moderate or major obstacle. However, 72 firms see this variable as no 
obstacle or as a minor business constraint, 77.4% of the responding sample.  
 Street crime: Only 7 firms consider this factor as their major obstacle in business, 7.1% 
of the respondent sample, whereas this factor is seen as a major obstacle for 11 firms. In 
the rest of the responding firms, 45 firms regard this as no obstacle and 36 firms think it 
as a minor business constraint. They represent 62.2% of the total responding sample.  
 Organised crime: 52 and 26 firms respectively consider it as no obstacle or as a minor 
obstacle to their businesses. They represent respectively 53.6% and 26.8% of the total 
respondent sample. There are also 13 and 6 firms consider this factor as moderate and 
major business obstacle, 13.6% and 6.2% respectively. 
 Tax regulation: 36 firms in the sample regard tax and regulation as no obstacle and as a 
minor obstacle respectively, 35.6% of the total respondent sample. However, 14 firms 
think this factor as moderate obstacle, and 15 companies regard this issue as a major 
obstacle in their business.  
 Corruption: 42 firms consider corruption as no obstacle, 43.8% of the sample. In 
addition, 24 firms consider corruption as a minor business obstacle, representing 25.0% 
of the sample. 15 firms regard corruption as moderate obstacle, 15.6% of the 
respondent firms, and so are the firms considering corruption as a major obstacle 
 
Table 6.2 The main obstacles in the business environment of China 
 
 
Level of the constraints 
No obstacle Minor obstacle Moderate obstacle Major obstacle 
Categories Firm  
number 
Frequency Firm  
number 
Frequency Firm  
number 
Frequency Firm  
number 
Frequency 
Financing 12 11.9% 8 7.9% 14 13.9% 67 66.3% 
Infrastructure 42 41.6% 28 27.7% 24 23.8% 7 6.9% 
Policy Instability 
/Uncertainty 
32 32% 27 27% 23 23% 18 18% 
Inflation 28 28.3% 29 29.3% 28 28.3% 14 14.1% 
Exchange rate 47 50.5% 25 26.9% 12 12.9% 8 8.6% 
Street crime 45 45.5% 36 36.4% 11 11.1% 7 7.1% 
Organized Crime 52 53.6% 26 26.8% 13 13.4% 6 6.2% 
Taxes and regulation 36 35.6% 36 35.6% 14 13.9% 15 14.9% 
Corruption 42 43.8% 24 25.0% 15 15.6% 15 15.6% 
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Table 6.3 Ranking of the General Constraints 
 Categories  Moderate obstacle Major obstacle Problematic ranking 
FIN 13.9% 66.3% 80.2% 1 
INFR 23.8% 6.9% 30.7% 5 
PI 23% 18% 41% 3 
INFL 28.3% 14.1% 42.4% 2 
ER 12.9% 8.6% 21.5% 7 
SC 11.1% 7.1% 18.2% 9 
OC 13.4% 6.2% 19.6% 8 
TAR 13.9% 14.9% 28.8% 6 
COR 15.6% 15.6% 31.2% 4 
NB: A. Financing (FIN); Infrastructure (INFR); Political Instability (PI); Inflation (INFL); Exchange Rate (ER); 
Street Crime (SC); Organised Crime (OC); Tax and Regulation (TAR); Corruption (COR).  
        B. Ranking is based on the descending order of problematic percentage. 
 
Graph 6.1 Main constraints to the firms operating in China 
 
 
It is useful to classify how these general constraints are problematic according to their intensity 
across the whole survey sample in China. In Table 6.3, the problematic percentages only include 
the responses of moderate and major obstacle. Graph 6.1 gives an indication around the 
intensity of the general business obstacles according to the responses. These figures show that, 
according to more than 80% of respondents in the sample, financing is a major business 
obstacle in China. Inflation and political instability are amongst the secondary business 
constraints, 42.4% and 41% respectively. Corruption, infrastructure, tax and regulation are 
at the third level, 31.2%, 30.7% and 28.8% correspondingly. Exchange rate, organised crime 
and street crime have scored the lowest percentage with 21.5%, 19.6% and 18.2% respectively. 
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The responses clearly show that institutional factors are crucial for business operations. The 
non-economic factors such as political instability and corruption are as much constraining to 
business performance as economic factors. This reinforces the argument that institutions have an 
important effect on business performance. The next section will use the cross-tabulation method 
to underline how each variable is valued under each firm category.  
6.4 How constraining these variables for each category 
6.4.1 Major obstacles 
Table 6.4 shows how problematic the major obstacles are for each firm category, i.e. the foreign 
firms (Yes under Foreign firms) and domestic firms (No under Foreign firms), the private firms 
(Yes under Private firms) and non private firms (No under Private firms), and the small, 
medium, and large sized firms. The percentages reflect answers of moderate or major obstacle. 
 Foreign and domestic firms: Both the foreign and domestic firms regard “financing” and 
“inflation” as their top two business obstacles. All firms consider “political instability” 
as one of the main business obstacles. Nevertheless, these factors, although their 
intensity is more or less similar, differs from domestic firms to foreign firms. Whilst the 
foreign firms’ rate “exchange rate” as the fourth largest concern, domestic companies 
regard this as the most unimportant business factor. Foreign firms are more limited by 
“tax and regulation” rather than by “corruption”. On the other hand, domestic firms think 
“corruption” is more serious than “tax and regulation”. 
 Private firms and non-private firms: The private firms and non-private firms both chose 
“financing” and “inflation” as the most important business restrictions. Moreover, both 
sides mark “political instability” as one of the main constraints. 25% of non-private 
firms identify “exchange rate” as another main constraint. At the same time, the private 
firms regard this factor as the most unimportant constraint. On the other hand, the non-
private firms view “infrastructure” as a less limiting factor, whereas for the private firms, 
“infrastructure” is less vital than “financing”, “inflation” and “political instability”, but 
more important than any other obstacles.   
 Small, medium and large firms: The classification and the intensity of the constraints 
differ according to the firm size. They show different concerns as to how problematic the 
constraints are. The medium size firms report more concerns on “corruption”, “taxes and 
regulation”. The small firms mark “political instability” as the second most problematic 
constraint. Large firms showed less sensitivity to the majority of constraints as the 
degree of the intensity is less pronounced compared to small and medium sized firms. 
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“Political instability” and “financing” are still main concerns for large firms, and 
“infrastructure” appears much less restrictive to them than small or medium sized firms. 
Moreover, both large and small firms do not view “corruption” as a major concern. 
The descriptive analysis of general constraints cannot clarify the disparities in the ranking of the 
constraints between the firm categories. In the next chapter, the Levene’s test and the Error Bar 
technique are used to determine whether the perception about the constraints across these 
different categories changes, and the results will thus be stronger, despite the fact that the 
number of observations in the categories vary greatly. The next section illustrates the sub-
variables that form the above constraints, focusing on the types of financing problems and types 
of corruption in addition to the types of obstacles related to the judicial system, competition and 
regulation. 
Table 6.4 The problematic obstacles for each category of firms 
Categories  FIN INFR PI INFL ER SC OC TAR COR 
All 
firms 
 80.2% 30.7% 41% 42.4% 21.5% 18.2% 19.6% 28.8% 31.2% 
Ranking 1 5 3 2 7 9 8 6 4 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes  68.6% 25.7% 31.4% 34.3% 25.7% 8.6% 11.4% 25.7% 20% 
Ranking 1 4 3 2 4 9 8 4 7 
No 83.4% 33.3% 45.5% 45.5% 16.7% 22.7% 22.7% 30.3% 34.8% 
Ranking 1 5 2 2 9 7 7 6 4 
Private firms No 91.7% 16.7% 37.5% 41.7% 25% 12.5% 12.5% 33.3% 25% 
Ranking 1 7 3 2 5 8 8 4 5 
Yes 76.6% 35.1% 41.6% 41.6% 18.2% 19.5% 20.8% 27.3% 31.2% 
Ranking 1 4 2 2 9 8 7 6 5 
Size Small 82.2% 37.8% 48.9% 44.4% 20% 20% 22.2% 24.4% 28.9% 
Ranking 1 4 2 3 8 8 7 6 5 
Medium 80% 23.3% 23.3% 30% 13.3% 10% 10% 30% 30% 
Ranking 1 5 5 2 7 8 8 2 2 
Large 76.9% 26.9% 46.2% 50% 26.9% 23.1% 23.1% 34.6% 30.8% 
Ranking 1 6 3 2 6 8 8 4 5 
NB: A. Financing (FIN); Infrastructure (INFR); Political Instability (PI); Inflation (INFL); Exchange Rate (ER); 
Street Crime (SC); Organised Crime (OC); Tax and Regulation (TAR); Corruption (COR).  
          B.  Ranking is based on the descending order of problematic percentage. 
 
6.4.2 Competition constraints  
The competition constraints consist of avoiding taxes; paying no duties by other competitors; 
producers selling below international prices; domestic producers selling unfairly below normal 
prices; violation of patents; collude for credit; and foreign subsidies received. The judgement 
was based on four-point scale and only moderate and major scales are again taken into 
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consideration. Table 6.5 shows the percentages related to the number of firms and weight of 
opinion attached to each variable.  
Table 6.5 The competition constraints across different categories 
Categories  AT ND  FP  DP  VP CC RS 
 
All firms 
 
 
42.6% 34.1% 35.6% 64.6% 50.5% 44.1% 33.0% 
Ranking 4 6 5 1 2 3 7 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes 54.8% 38.2% 40.6% 66.7% 42.4% 45.5% 20.6% 
Ranking 2 6 5 1 4 3 7 
No 53.1% 31.6% 32.7% 63.5% 54.8% 43.3% 38.1% 
Ranking 3 7 6 1 2 4 5 
 
Private firms 
No 72.2% 40% 47.4% 68.2% 69.6% 50.0% 26.1% 
Ranking 1 6 5 3 2 4 7 
Yes 
 
48.4% 32.4% 32.4% 63.5% 44.4% 42.5% 35.1% 
Ranking 2 6 6 1 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Size 
Small 44.4% 23.1% 24.3% 71.4% 39.0% 39.0% 28.6% 
Ranking 2 7 6 1 3 3 5 
Medium 53.4% 40.7% 37.0% 51.7% 71.4% 30.8% 41.4% 
Ranking 2 5 6 3 1 7 4 
Large 66.7% 44.0% 52.2% 68.0% 46.2% 65.4% 30.8% 
Ranking 2 6 4 1 5 3 7 
NB: A. Avoid taxes (AT); No duties (ND); Foreign prices (FP); Domestic prices (DP); Violation of patent (VP); 
Collude for credit (CC); Receive subsidies (RS).  
        B.  Ranking is based on the descending order of problematic percentage. 
 
The biggest constraint of all firms is “domestic producers sell unfairly below normal prices”, 
and more than 50% of the firms consider violation of patent as the second major business 
obstacle. The bottom three constraints are nearly at the same level, which are subsidies received, 
paying no duties by other competitors, and producers sell below international prices. 
 Foreign and domestic firms: There is not a large difference regarding the obstacles to 
competition between the foreign firms and domestic firms. Instead, the foreign firms pay 
more attention to “avoiding taxes”, while the domestic firms focus more on “violation of 
patent” as an obstacle. The foreign firms regard the factor of “foreign subsidies 
received” as the most unimportant constraint in competition.  
 Private firms and non-private firms: The non-private firms regard “avoiding taxes” as 
their top concern in competition obstacles. This opinion of private firms is different from 
the concerns of non-private firms. Additionally, more than two thirds of non-private 
firms focus their concerns on the three obstacles, which are “avoiding taxes”, “violation 
of patent”, and “domestic producers sell unfairly below normal prices”. 
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 Small, medium and large firms: The medium size firms are most constrained by 
“violation of patent”, while the responses of small and large size firms are similar. 
“Paying no duties by other competitors” is the most unimportant constraint for small 
sized firms, while the medium sized firms choose “collude for credit” and the large sized 
firms select “foreign subsidies received” as the least constraining factors respectively. 
6.4.3 Finance factors  
There are ten kinds of financial constraints in the WBES, including special connections; paper 
work; collateral; high interest rate; lack of money to lend; corruption of bank officials; access to 
foreign banks; access to non-bank equity; export finance; lease finance; and credit. Table 6.5 
shows the percentages reflecting how each financial constraint is problematic. These constraints 
are categorised into four groups (no, minor, moderate and major obstacle), where only moderate 
and major obstacle options are considered as problematic constraints. This demonstrates 
intensity to how these problems are viewed. Inadequate credit information regarding customers 
is the top financial constraint. Lack of money to lend and high interest rates are the other two 
major financial constraints. Bank paper work and special connections are in the fourth and fifth 
position respectively, followed by lease finance, export finance, and collateral. The factors 
named as the least important constraints were access to foreign banks and access to non-bank 
equity.  
Table 6.6 The problematic finance constraints for each firm category 
Categories COL PW HIR SC LML AFB ANB
E 
EF LF CI 
All firms  20.2% 29% 35.4% 25.5% 37% 17.1% 12.8% 21.3% 22.5% 45.5% 
Ranking 8 4 3 5 2 9 10 7 6 1 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes  17.1% 25.7% 22.9% 27.3% 37.1% 29.6% 15.6% 22.2% 20.7% 41.2% 
Ranking 9 5 6 4 2 3 10 7 8 1 
No 21.9% 30.8% 42.2% 24.6% 36.9% 9.3% 11.1% 20.8% 23.3% 46.2% 
Ranking 7 4 2 5 3 10 9 8 6 1 
Private  
firms 
No 25% 50% 50% 20.8% 29.2% 20% 14.3% 16.7% 22.7% 37.5% 
Ranking 5 1 1 7 4 8 10 9 6 3 
Yes 18.7% 23.7% 30.7% 27.1% 39.5% 9.6% 8.5% 13.8% 23.4% 46.7% 
Ranking 7 5 3 4 2 9 10 8 6 1 
Size Small 7.5% 14.9% 14.9% 11.7% 19.2% 2.2% 5.3% 7.5% 6.4% 53.3% 
Ranking 6 3 3 5 2 10 9 6 8 1 
Medium 20.7% 26.7% 27.6% 25% 33.3% 16.7% 0 6% 19.2% 37.9% 
Ranking 6 4 3 5 2 8 10 9 7 1 
Large 26.9% 26.9% 50% 25% 34.6% 33.3% 26.1% 27.3% 37.5% 38.5% 
Ranking 7 7 1 10 4 5 9 6 3 2 
NB: A. Collateral (COL); Paper work (PW); High interest rate (HIR); Special connections (SC); Lack of money to 
lend (LML); Access to foreign bank (AFB); Access to non-bank equity (ANBE); Export finance (EF); Lease 
finance (LF); Credit Information (CI). 
        B.  Ranking is based on the descending order of problematic percentage. 
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In fact, there are two sorts of financial constraints - economic factors and non-economic factors. 
These results show that institutional factors are regarded with medium importance amongst 
financial constraints, including special connections and bank paper work. In China, these 
institutional constraints are less important than some economic factors, such as inadequate credit 
information, lack of money to lend and high interest rates. Table 6.6 demonstrates that the 
disparity between the two types is not obviously distinguishable.  
 Foreign and domestic firms: Credit information is the main concern for foreign and 
domestic firms. It also shows the differences in the weight attached to each financial 
constraint in both categories. Similarly, both consider the non-economic/institutional 
factors “paper work” and “special connections” as two of the main constraints. However, 
it is shown that for domestic firms, economic constraints such as “interest rate” are more 
limiting than non-economic/institutional constraints, in comparison to foreign firms 
which are more likely to worry about lack of money to lend. The factors of lack of 
money to lend and lease finance are the two foremost concerns for foreign firms, and 
access to foreign bank and special connections are the third and fourth constraints. On 
the other hand, domestic firms regard “access to foreign bank” as the most unimportant 
factor. Additionally, some institutional constraints are relatively important for both, i.e. 
credit information about customers, special connections and paper work. 46.2%, 24.6% 
and 30.8% of foreign firms view inadequate credit information on customers; special 
connection; and paper work as problematic compared with, respectively, to 41.2%, 
27.3% and 25.7% of domestic firms. 
 Private firms and non-private firms: Non-private firms regard both paper work and high 
interest rate as the most important types of financial constraints. Credit information, lack 
of money to lend and collateral are the following factors in their list. Credit information 
is the top concern for private firms, whilst lack of money to lend, high interest rate, and 
paper work comes immediately after as other important factors for their operation. Both 
categories of firms see “Access to foreign bank” as the most unimportant financial 
constraint. Likewise, both regard “Access to non-bank equity” and “export finance” as 
other unimportant financial concerns. Table 6.5 also shows that, when the non-private 
firms choose paper work as the top one constraint, the private firms value the same 
factor as of medium importance. In other words, the non-private firms have to face the 
limitations of bureaucracy, while the private firms do not have these same concerns. For 
the same reason, the constraint of special connection is more important for the private 
firms than the non-private firms. This is because non-private firms have the advantage of 
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internally using the administrative system which is controlled by the government to deal 
with finance constraints. 
 Small, medium and large firms: The firms’ state that “access to non-bank equity” and 
“export finance” are the two most unimportant concerns. They attach almost equal 
importance to the rest of the financial constraints they face. It is noted that small firms 
appear to concentrate on the one constraint, while their valuation on all other factors is 
averagely low. “Credit information” is the most important constraint for small firms, 
while “access to foreign bank” is the most unimportant. Again, the economic factors (i.e. 
high interest rate, lack of money to lend) are as important as the institutional constraints 
(i.e. paper work, special connections). The large firms also focus on one constraint, and 
report much higher averages compared with small and medium firms. Large firms attach 
greater importance to economic factors as obstacles rather than institutional issues. For 
example, high interest rate is the most important factor which impacts on the business 
activity of firms in this category. Special connections come in the bottom position, but 
the percentage number of large firms that consider it as problematic is still 25%, much 
higher than the bottom level of small and medium firms. Finally, credit information, lack 
of money to lend and high interest rate are the top constraints for the medium size firms.  
6.4.4 Rules and regulations  
This category covers seven factors: named business licensing; customs and foreign trade 
regulation; labour regulations; foreign exchange regulations; environmental regulation; tax 
administration; and high taxes. They are judged on the four-point scale: No obstacle, minor, 
moderate and major obstacle. Table 6.7 shows that the constraint of high taxes is the most 
pressing business obstacle for 50% of the firms. This is followed by tax administration 
regulations and business regulations. Foreign exchange regulations and labour regulations score 
the lowest percentages in this category. Table 6.8 also shows how constraining these factors are 
for the different firms by reflecting the distribution of the opinions across these categories. This 
table confirms that the regulation constraint of high taxes is the top obstacle to all firms.  
 Foreign and domestic firms: The foreign firms demonstrate higher levels of concerns to 
regulatory constraints than the domestic firms, except “business regulations” and 
“customs regulations”. Foreign firms consider “high tax” and “tax administration 
regulations” as their top two constraints. Domestic firms show more concerns about 
“high taxes” and “business regulations”.  
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 Private firms and non-private firms: High tax is the top concern for both private and non-
private firms. Secondly, the non-private firms choose “business regulation” while the 
private firms select “tax administration regulation” as their next concern. Non-private 
firms think “customs regulations” is the least important factor; whilst for the private 
firms, “foreign exchange regulations” is the least limiting factor. 
 Small, medium and large firms: “High taxes” is the most major concern to all firms 
regardless of their size. However, small firms are less constrained by “tax 
administration” than the categories of large and medium firms.  On the other hand, the 
medium firms are less constrained by “business regulations” than the small firms and 
large firms. These results indicate that small firms are not constrained by high tax rates. 
In comparison to small and larger firms, these results reflect the difficulties faced by 
medium firms in dealing with administrative issues. 
Table 6.7 The constraints of rules and regulation across the different categories 
Categories  BR CR LR FER ER HT TAR 
 
All firms 
 
 
27.7% 21.0% 16% 14.6% 19.8% 50% 30% 
Ranking 3 4 6 7 5 1 2 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
 
Yes  
22.9% 18.5% 22.9% 20.0% 20.0% 65.6% 37.1% 
Ranking 3 7 3 5 5 1 2 
No 30.3% 22.4% 12.3% 11.5% 19.7% 41.9% 26.2% 
Ranking 2 4 6 7 5 1 3 
 
Private firms 
No 29.2% 15.8% 16.7% 20.0% 21.7% 41.7% 20.8% 
Ranking 2 7 6 5 3 1 4 
Yes 27.3% 22.8% 15.8% 12.9% 19.2% 52.9% 32.9% 
Ranking 3 4 6 7 5 1 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Size 
Small 31.1% 24.3% 13.6% 15.4% 17.1% 41.9% 27.3% 
Ranking 2 4 7 6 5 1 3 
Medium 20.0% 21.1% 20.0% 13.6% 20.7% 50.0% 33.3% 
Ranking 5 4 5 7 3 1 2 
Large 30.8% 15.0% 15.4% 14.3% 23.1% 64.0% 30.8% 
Ranking 2 6 5 7 4 1 2 
NB: A. Business regulations (BR); Customs regulations (CR); Labour regulations (LR); Foreign exchange 
regulations (FER); Environmental regulations (ER); High taxes (HT); Tax administration regulations (TAR). 
         B.  Ranking is based on the descending order of problematic percentage. 
 
In summary, “business regulation” is less problematic than other regulations such as tax 
administration, the rate of taxes or customs regulation. This indicates that the regulation of 
business transactions is much less problematic because of undertaking reforms in China. 
However, informal constraints such as illegal payments and special connections are no less 
constraining than the business regulation constraint. This shows that reforms of informal 
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institutions still lag behind the reforms of formal rules. This may result in the ineffectiveness of 
the reforms in rules and regulations, especially noting that all firms still consider regulatory 
framework such high taxes and tax administration regulations as major impediments.  
 
6.4.5 Corruption factors 
There are many areas of concern regarding corruption in the WBES. This includes areas such as 
corruption as a general constraint; corruption of bank officials; corruption for firms to pay 
additional payments; corruption payments to telephone authorities, corruption payments to 
licensing authorities; corruption payment to tax authorities; corruption payments to gain 
government contracts; and corruption payments to customs. However, based on the WBES in 
China, the firms only mention two types of corruption - corruption as a general constraint and 
the corruption of bank officials. The answers to all other corruption questions are not available.  
Table 6.8 How problematic the corruption constraints across  
different firm categories in China 
Categories Corruption as a general constraint 
(percentage) 
Corruption of bank officials 
(percentage) 
All firms 31.2% 32.3% 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes 20% 22.8% 
No 34.8% 33.4% 
Private 
Firms 
No 25% 25% 
Yes 31.2% 31.2% 
Size Small 28.9% 33.4% 
Medium 30% 20% 
Large 30.8% 34.6% 
 
Table 6.8 ranks corruption factors from no obstacle to minor, moderate, and major obstacle. The 
next section follows similar methodology used in the previous section in order to look at the 
concerns of these different forms of corruption across the firm categories. Table 6.8 also shows 
that different types of corruption recorded different rates of frequencies. The medium sized 
firms and domestic firms regard the level of corruption of bank officials as below the general 
corruption level. In regards to corruption as a general constraint, the responses of private firms 
and non-private firms were the same. In other firm categories, the percentage of the concerns on 
corruptions of bank officials is higher than that of corruption as a general constraint. Hence, the 
corruption of bank officials is one of the business obstacles in China. 
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 Foreign and domestic firms: The foreign firms think “corruptions of bank officials” is 
worse than corruption in general, while domestic firms consider “corruptions of bank 
officials” as less problematic to their business compared to corruption as a general 
constraint. Although the literatures of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 list a number of 
advantages designed officially for foreign firms, in terms of financing, they in fact are 
limited by the corruption of bank officials.  
 Private firms and non-private firms: There is no connection between private ownership 
and the concerns of either corruption of bank officials or corruption as a general 
constraint. They are constrained by the factors of corruption equally. 
 Small, medium and large firms: Corruption of bank officials is a bigger worry than 
corruption in general for both small and large sized firms. However, the medium size 
firms think “corruption of bank officials” is less problematic than corruption as a general 
constraint. The feedback of domestic firms has demonstrated that there are some 
difficulties when putting official supports into practice, particularly for both small and 
large firms. As the domestic firms’ business operation and growth have to depend on the 
financial support of banks, the literatures in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 display that the 
official arrangements favour the business of foreign firms in China and it is difficult for 
domestic firms to obtain those same supports from banks.  
 
6.4.6 Judicial functioning 
Table 6.9 reflects the opinions regarding the quality of courts and how frequently they are seen 
as fair and impartial, honest, quick, consistent, enforceable, and affordable. The quality was 
assessed on the following scale: Always, usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom, never. Only 
the three categories of scale: always, usually, and frequently were taken into consideration to 
clarify their importance. It is quite apparent that there is wide range of firms that report positive 
opinions about the functioning of the courts, and only one judicial constraint whose quality level 
falls below 50% for all firms, which is “courts-quick”. Similar to the concerns of financial 
constraints, bureaucracy is an unavoidable barrier in the judicial system. One explanation is that 
the judicial system in China is still not totally independent from its government or the financial 
system. To find out whether the intensity of the opinions differs among the different categories, 
it is necessary to see how opinions are distributed across the categories of firms.  
 Foreign and domestic firms: The foreign firms are quite satisfied, as the lowest level is 
recorded at 50%. The feedback of foreign firms is consistent, and its satisfactory level 
lies between 63.3% and 50.0%. In regards to domestic firms, although 47.5% are not 
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satisfied with the efficiency of courts, their satisfaction levels between 68.3% and 59.3% 
with the rest of the judicial constraints are higher than that of foreign firms. The foreign 
firms are less satisfied with the quality of the courts than the domestic firms.  
 Private firms and non-private firms: The non-private firms value all judicial factors at a 
high level of satisfaction, from 90.5% to 68.2%. Nevertheless, the private firms are 
dissatisfied with two issues about the courts, which are “quick” at 43.5% and “honest” at 
48.6%. For the private firms, their most satisfied aspect is enforceability at 64.6%. 
However, the lowest satisfied percentage of the non-private firms at 68.2% was 
regarding enforceability, but which was still higher than the level of satisfaction of the 
private firms. 
 Small, medium and large firms: The different sized firms reported high instances of 
positive opinions about the quality of the courts. However, small sized forms reported 
the lowest level of satisfaction at 39%.  This was in regards to “courts-fair and 
impartial”, “courts-honest”, “courts-quick”, and “courts-affordable,” which could be 
explained as their satisfaction levels is positively related to their firm size.  
From the data, it appears that the firms’ report positive opinions about the functioning of courts. 
Does the intensity of the opinions differ among the categories? To answer this question, the 
author will review how the opinions are distributed across the categories of firms in the next 
chapter. 
Table 6.9 The quality level of the judicial constraints across the firms’ categories 
Categories  CFI CH CQ CA CC CE 
 
All firms 
 65.6% 56.0% 41.8% 65.9% 61.4% 65.5% 
Ranking 2 5 6 1 4 3 
 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes  60.6% 50.0% 59.4% 63.3% 54.8% 61.3% 
Ranking 3 6 4 1 5 2 
No 68.3% 59.3% 47.5% 67.3% 64.9% 67.9% 
Ranking 1 5 6 3 4 2 
 
Private  
firms 
 
No 85.7% 81.0% 77.3% 72.7% 90.5% 68.2% 
Ranking 2 3 4 5 1 6 
Yes 59.7% 48.6% 43.5% 63.5% 58.2% 64.6% 
Ranking 3 5 6 2 4 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Size 
Small 61.0% 53.7% 39.0% 62.2% 63.2% 70.3% 
Ranking 4 5 6 3 2 1 
Medium 59.3% 50.0% 76.9% 60.0% 50.0% 55.6% 
Ranking 3 5 1 2 5 4 
Large 80.0% 66.7% 87.5% 78.3% 70.8% 69.6% 
Ranking 2 6 1 3 4 5 
NB: A. Courts-fair and impartial (CFI); Courts-honest (CH); Courts-quick (CQ);Courts-affordable (CA); Courts-
consistent (CC); Courts-enforceability (CE). 
        B.  Ranking is based on the descending order of problematic percentage. 
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter provides a descriptive analysis on the importance of institutional and non-
institutional constraints for business performance in China. It also demonstrates the importance 
of these constraints across the three firm categories, which comprises of foreign firms and 
domestic firms, private firms and non private firms, and firms with different sizes.  
 
The results show that firms are concerned with institutional constraints and that these constraints 
are paramount factors for business operation in China. This involves informal and formal 
institutional constraints such as corruption, tax and regulation, and financing. In addition, firms 
in China attach significance to informal institutions, such as “court-honest” as a constraining 
factor. Factors such as tax regulation and corruption are more commonly reported by different 
firms than some of the non institutional factors such exchange rate and inflation. Furthermore, 
this chapter highlights the important point that informal institutions, such as corruption, are just 
as important for business operations of different firms in China as formal institutions, such as 
rule & regulation and legal systems. 
 
Finally, this chapter highlights the discrepancies between the different categories of firms. This 
concludes that the different categories of firms could differ in their abilities to face constraints, 
in the context of formal institutions and informal institutions. Hence, an in-depth examination of 
differences will be reviewed in the next chapter which makes use of more advanced statistical 
techniques, such as the Levene’s test and Error bar, to investigate the proportional differences in 
the opinions amongst the different categories (Zimmerman, 2004).  
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Chapter 7 Research finding: Empirical investigation  
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter investigates the insider-outsider propositions of the conceptual framework, which 
have been discussed in Chapter 3 (table 7.0). These hypotheses are related to the different firm 
categories in the WBES which includes foreign firms, domestic firms, private firms and non-
private firms. These hypotheses are H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5. In addition, the categories overlap 
each other and consequently the results associated with each classification could be affected by 
the characteristics of the remaining categories in testing differences between different categories 
(Hellman et al., 2000; Batra et al., 2003). Its scrutiny is necessary to understand the mode of 
entry of the foreign firms to the host country and the business environment, especially for 
private firms in China. The investigation about the H6 related to the firm size is summarised and 
discussed at the end of the chapter.  
         
Table 7.0 Research Hypothesis  
Hypothesis 1 (H1a) The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of business 
competition than the domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1b) The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business 
competition than the non private firms.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2a) The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of finance than the 
domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2b) The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of finance than the 
non private firms.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3a) The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of business rules 
and regulations than the domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3b) The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business rules 
and regulations than the non private firms.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4a) The foreign firms are more constrained by the constraints of corruption than 
the domestic firms. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4b) The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of corruption than 
the non private firms.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5a) The foreign firms are less constrained by legal constraints than the domestic 
firms. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5b) The private firms are more constrained by legal constraints than the non 
private firms. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6a) The business constraints faced by the firms are positively related to the factor 
of firm size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of formal 
institutional constraints than medium firms that in turn have fewer problems 
than small firms have. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6b) The business constraints faced by the firms are negatively related to the 
factor of firm size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of 
informal institutional constraints than medium firms that in turn have fewer 
problems than small firms have. 
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7.2 Methodology and variances homogeneity testing 
This chapter compares variances by using statistical techniques provided by SPSS, consisting of 
Levene’s test and Error bar. The author chooses Levene’s test to investigate the differences in 
the proportional perceptions between the different firm categories, over other parametric and 
non parametric techniques such as Mann-Whitney U test (non-parameteric) and ANOVA test 
(parametric) because the Levene’s test is more flexible and safer when comparing groups which 
have large disparities in the size of the number of observations. This is appropriate due to the 
size of the categories investigated in this research. It is also useful when comparing between 
categories with a small number of observations. In addition, this test does not depend on the 
assumption of normal data distribution (Milliken and Johnson, 1984; Zimmerman, 2004; Hsieh 
and Miller, 1990). Levene’s test for homogeneity is used because this research is more 
concerned with testing the differences in the proportion of perception among the different 
categories with regard to the constraints, rather than testing whether or not a specific constraint 
is problematic for different firm groups. Together with Levene’s test, the Error Bar is also used 
to exhibit which of the compared categories value the constraint most, to give a good indication 
about the variability in the opinions within the category itself (Brace et al., 2009). 
 
This section explores the impact of differences in the severity of the business constraints. It 
highlights the differences in the opinions of different firm categories with regard to the 
constraints. A number of conclusions and inferences that explain these differences are reported 
respectively. The scrutiny of the differences falls within the scope of studying the influences of 
institutions on the business operation. At the end of this chapter, there is a conclusion about the 
differences across the firm categories.  
7.3 The category of foreign and domestic firms 
This section investigates differences between the perceptions of foreign and domestic firms 
about the same constraining factors, including competition constraints, finance constraints, 
judicial constraints, corruption constraints, rules and regulations constraints. To study the 
differences in perception, this paper classifies the foreign firms as outsiders and domestic firms 
as insiders. The Levene’s test compares the homogeneity of the variances between foreign firms 
and domestic firms, the two types of firms seem to differentiate in their perceptions with regards 
to the same constraint (table 7.1, table 7.2, table 7.3, table 7.4, table 7.5, and table 7.6). Because 
of the difference of with/without foreign ownership, “financing” is the only one significant 
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general constraint (table 7.1). “Court-enforceability” and “finance-access to foreign bank” 
are the two significant factors among the specific constraints (table 7.3 and table 7.4). The other 
constraints are all not significantly related to the difference of foreign ownership factor. 
Table 7.1 Levene’s test of the general constraints  
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
General constraint 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Financing  4.022 1 99 .048 
Infrastructure  .018 1 99 .893 
Political instability 1.631 1 98 .205 
Inflation  .011 1 97 .916 
Exchange rate .339 1 90 .562 
Street crime 1.896 1 97 .172 
Organised crime 3.060 1 95 .083 
Taxes and regulations .092 1 99 .762 
Corruption as a general constraint .808 1 94 .371 
Functioning of the judiciary .497 1 92 .483 
Anticompetitive practices 1.307 1 96 .256 
 
Table 7.2 Levene’s test of the competition constraints 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Competition constraint 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Avoid taxes .123 1 78 .727 
No duties 2.412 1 89 .124 
Foreign price 3.666 1 85 .059 
Domestic price .728 1 94 .396 
Violation of patents .211 1 93 .647 
Collude for credit .016 1 91 .900 
Receive subsidies .076 1 95 .784 
 
Table 7.3 Levene’s test of the judicial constraints 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Judicial constraints 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Fair & impartial .212 1 91 .646 
Honest .029 1 89 .866 
Quick  .158 1 89 .692 
Affordable  1.399 1 83 .240 
Consistent  2.397 1 86 .125 
Enforceability 4.819 1 85 .031 
 147 
 
Table 7.4 Levene’s test of the finance constraints 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Finance constraints 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Collateral  .035 1 97 .851 
Paperwork  .225 1 98 .636 
High interest rates 2.645 1 97 .107 
Special connections .043 1 92 .836 
Lack money to lend .969 1 98 .327 
Access to foreign banks 10.608 1 68 .002 
Access to non bank equity .153 1 84 .697 
Export finance .155 1 73 .695 
Lease finance .013 1 87 .911 
Credit  1.032 1 97 .312 
Long term loan .154 1 94 .695 
 
Table 7.5 Levene’s test of the rules and regulation constraints 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Rules and regulation 
constraints 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Business regulations .244 1 99 .622 
Customs regulations 1.993 1 74 .162 
Labour regulations 3.753 1 98 .056 
Foreign exchange regulations 3.286 1 80 .074 
Environmental regulations .089 1 94 .766 
Fire regulations .728 1 95 .396 
High taxes .015 1 92 .902 
Tax administration regulations .802 1 98 .373 
 
Table 7.6 Levene’s test of the corruption constraints 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Corruption constraints 
Levene 
Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Corruption as a general constraint .808 1 94 .371 
Corruption of bank officials 3.025 1 91 .085 
7.3.1 Competition constraints 
7.3.1.1 Collusion for credit 
According to “collusion for credit”, foreign and domestic firms report similar level of 
perception. The Levene’s test (Table 7.1) is significant at 90%, that the two groups do not have 
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significantly different variances, i.e. different perception regarding to this constraint. As we 
assume variances are equal, we use the middle row of the output. The p value is 0.811 which is 
not less than or equal to 0.05, which confirms that we fail to observe a difference in the 
competition constraint of collusion for credit between foreign firms and domestic firms. This 
means that domestic firms do not have a large difference in opinion about how they are 
constrained by “collusion for credit” compared to foreign firms. 
 
Table 7.7 Levene’s test of the competition constraint---Collude for credit 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Collusion for 
credit 
dimension1 
Yes 33 2.18 1.310 .228 
No 60 2.25 1.310 .169 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Collusion 
for credit 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.016 .900 -.240 91 .811 -.068 .284 -.632 .496 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-.240 66.047 .811 -.068 .284 -.635 .499 
 
The Error bar (graph 7.1) shows, that the domestic firms are slightly more constrained by the 
collusion of the competitors for credit than the foreign firms. This insignificant difference can 
be expected if the foreign owners possibly have a better access to the credit market than 
domestic firms, especially under the financing control of the Chinese government (chapter 3: 
section 3.3.2.1). However, this variation in the perception is bigger in the category of foreign 
firms (table 7.7). This table shows that the standard error of foreign firms is bigger (0.228) than 
that of domestic firms (0.169). Thus, not all foreign firms have the same perception. This could 
imply that other firm characters, such as firm size, might play a role in explaining the 
heterogeneity of this category. Moreover, in Chapter 6, table 6.5 displays that foreign firms 
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consider the factor of collude for credit is less problematic, compared to domestic firms. Graph 
7.1 further confirms that the group of foreign firms is less constrained by this factor than the 
group of domestic firms. This could be due to the ability of foreign firms to access the credit 
market without less official difficulties (chapter 3: section 3.3.2.1).  
 
Graph 7.1 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences---
Collude for credit 
 
7.3.1.2 Reception of subsidies from competitors 
Table 7.8 Levene’s test of the competition constraint---Reception of subsidies 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Reception of 
subsidies 
dimension1 
Yes 34 1.9118 1.13798 .19516 
No 63 2.1746 1.10044 .13864 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed
) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Receptio
n of 
subsidie
s 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.076 .784 -
1.109 
95 .270 -.26284 .23698 -.73331 .20763 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  
-
1.098 
65.79
3 
.276 -.26284 .23940 -.74083 .21516 
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According to the table 6.5, there are 38.1% of domestic firms that are problematically 
constrained by “reception of subsidies”, while only 20.6% of foreign firms thinks this constraint 
is problematic. However, this constraint is significant at 78.4% level (table 7.8). Based on the 
data related to the situation of equal variances assumed, the p value is 0.270 that is still more 
than 0.05. We thus fail to conclude that there is a difference in this competition constraint of 
“reception of subsidies”. The Error Bar shows that the average constraint level of reception of 
subsidies faced by the group of domestic firms is higher than the group with foreign firms 
(graph 7.2). The graph 7.2 also displays that the domestic firms show less variation about this 
constraining factor than the foreign firms. 
 
Additionally, the range of concerns of domestic firms group focuses on a relatively higher level 
than that of foreign firms, as the variation within the domestic firms’ group is higher. This result 
indicates that foreign firms may be beneficial from subsidies, and they are therefore less 
concerned than the domestic firms are. This may also indicate that the competitors of domestic 
firms have more access to subsidies than the competitors of foreign firms. In other words, 
foreign firms have more changes than domestic firms to receive or access subsidies.  
Graph 7.2  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences---
Reception of subsidies 
 
7.3.1.3 Violation of patent by the competitors 
The two kinds of firms do not show proportional differences in their perception with regards to 
this constraint. This difference is significant at 64.7% level (Table 7.9), which is more than 5%. 
The difference is significant at 34.4% upon the assumption of equal variances, and that is still 
not less than or equal to 5%. The fact that there is no difference between the two categories is 
also related the case that China is internationally regarded as one of the worst offenders against 
intellectual property rights, even after its accession of the WTO. As the United States Trade 
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Representative (2011: 3) notes, “counterfeiting and piracy remain at unacceptably high levels 
and continue to cause serious harm to U.S. businesses across many sectors of the economy. … 
The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that U.S. businesses suffered a total of $48 
billion in lost sales, royalties and license fees due to IPR infringement in China in 2009---a 
figure that is more than two-thirds the value of the $69 billion in U.S. goods exported to China 
in the same year”.  
Table 7.9 Levene’s test of the competition constraint---Violation of patent 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Violation of 
patent 
dimension1 
Yes 33 2.3030 1.15879 .20172 
No 62 2.5323 1.09721 .13935 
 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Violat
ion of 
paten
t 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.211 .647 -.951 93 .344 -.22923 .24108 -.70796 .24950 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  
-.935 62.375 .353 -.22923 .24517 -.71926 .26080 
 
Graph 7.3  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences---
Violation of patent 
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The Error bar shows foreign firms are less constrained than domestic firms (graph 7.3). In terms 
of patent, the domestic firms are less protected than foreign firms. This could be the 
consequence of international agreements signed by China to protect the intellectual right for 
foreign firms rather than domestic firms (Chapter 3: section 3.3.2.1). Thus, the continuous 
efforts to attract FDI would be able to make the foreign firms in a relative better position of the 
patent protection, compared to the domestic firms. This unfair competition might become more 
severe because of the law connected with the foreign firms, which has made Chinese legislation 
regarding patent protection compatible with the international standards. These would invoke 
that the protection of the patent and all intellectual rights would be enforced more when it 
involves foreign investors rather than domestic firms in practice. 
 
7.3.1.4 Paying no duties by the competitors 
Table 7.10 Levene’s test of the competition constraint---Paying no duties 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Paying no 
duties 
dimension1 
Yes 34 2.0882 1.19005 .20409 
No 57 1.9825 1.04354 .13822 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. 
Error 
Differen
ce 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Paying no 
duties 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.412 .124 .444 89 .658 .10578 .23839 -.36790 .57946 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.429 62.469 .669 .10578 .24649 -.38688 .59844 
 
The two kinds of firms do not have differences in their perception about “paying no duties by 
the competitors”, as the difference is significant at 12.5 % (table 7.4). Given equal variances 
assumed, the difference is significant at 65.8% level, the difference is still not significant. The 
Error bar (graph 7.4) confirms that their means are close to each other. In other words, the 
foreign firms perceive no more problematic constraint than the domestic firms. As the firms in 
the WBES sample face the relatively same number of competitors, the small difference between 
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them might be related to other factors, such the firm size and the access to the network that 
would allow them not to pay import duties.  
 
Foreign firms constitute once again a heterogeneous group (graph 7.4). The variation inside this 
group is bigger than the one existing in the group of domestic firms. This variation implies that 
not all foreign owners have the same reaction according to this constraint. This might be 
because this category embodies firms with different sizes and different sectors. The 
discrepancies in size and sector constitute one of the most probable factors that are able to 
explain the variances in the perception of the firms. In addition, the variation within this group 
could denote the differences in the level of abilities to cope with this constraint across the firms. 
It could infer to the possibility that within this group some firms have a comparative advantage 
in using informal networks allowing them to reduce the intensity of the constraint. This could be 
due to the help of their domestic partners or to the fact that these firms with foreign owners have 
been operating in China already. This could confirm the different abilities in using some 
informal connections to avoid some formal rules (Eden and Molot, 2002).  
Graph 7.4  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences---
Paying no duties 
 
7.3.1.5 Foreign producers selling below international prices 
For the constraint of foreign producers selling below international prices, the Levene test 
implies the significant level of the difference is 5.9% (table 7.11). We can conclude that the 
difference between the two categories constrained by foreign producers selling below 
international prices is acceptable once we extend our critical range to 90%. Compared to the 
group of the domestic firms, the foreign firms are more constrained by this factor (table 7.11).  
 
The graph 7.5 shows that the variation inside the foreign firm group is bigger than the one 
existing in the domestic firm group. As both operate in a same market of China, the different 
 154 
constraints could principally be associated with the products or the services that those firms 
provide. In this context, the foreign firms produce similar goods that could be made 
internationally, and they are thus easily and directly affected by this constraint of “foreign 
producers selling below international prices”. The domestic firms might still supply goods and 
service as domestic standards. Although the quality of goods and service are not as good as 
international level, market segmentation could still help domestic firms ease the constraint of 
selling below international prices by competitors.  
Table 7.11 Levene’s test of the competition constraint---Foreign prices 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Foreign 
prices 
dimension1 
Yes 32 2.1250 1.26364 .22338 
No 55 1.9455 1.07872 .14545 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Foreign 
prices 
Equal variances 
assumed 
3.666 .059 .702 85 .484 .17955 .25560 -.32865 .68774 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.674 56.980 .503 .17955 .26656 -.35424 .71333 
Graph 7.5 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences---
Foreign prices 
 
7.3.1.6 Domestic producers unfairly sell below my prices 
For the constraint of domestic producers unfairly selling below my prices, the difference is 
significant at 39.6% (table 7.12). In the condition of equal variances assumed, the difference is 
significant at 60.5%, which is still far more than 5%. Thus, the two categories do not show 
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proportional differences in their perception regarding this constraint. The error bar implies that 
the variation inside the foreign firm group is slightly smaller than the domestic firm group 
(graph 7.6). Moreover, the difference between two types of firms (mean difference in table 7.12: 
2.9394-2.8095=0.1299) is also smaller than the constraint of foreign producers selling below 
international prices (mean difference in table 7.11: 2.1250-1.9455=0.1795). In fact, the domestic 
producers include both foreign and domestic firms, which are able to produce both goods with 
international standards or with domestic standards. If the market price is unfairly below the 
price of the firms surveyed, both foreign and domestic firms are under the price threat as market 
segmentation cannot help either group to ease the price pressure in competition. 
Table 7.12 Levene’s test of the competition constraint---Domestic prices 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Domestic 
prices 
dimension1 
Yes 33 2.9394 1.11634 .19433 
No 63 2.8095 1.18943 .14985 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Domestic 
prices 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.728 .396 .519 94 .605 .12987 .25036 -.36722 .62696 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.529 68.814 .598 .12987 .24540 -.35971 .61945 
Graph 7.6 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences---
Domestic prices 
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7.3.1.7 Summery of the competition constraints 
The analysis of the competition constraints is summarised in table 7.12.1. According to the 
competition constraints in the WBES, the foreign firms are less constrained by “collusion for 
credit”, “reception of subsidies”, and “violation of paten”. At the same time, they are more 
constrained by “paying no duties”, “foreign prices” and “domestic prices”. Based on the 
analysis above, the author has to reject the hypothesis 1a. In other words, the foreign firms are 
not totally less constrained by the constraints of business competition than the domestic firms. 
On the contrary, they might be more constrained.  
Table 7.12.1 Summery of the difference in the competition constraints 
Competition constraints H1a: The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of business 
competition than the domestic firms. 
Collusion for credit Accepted 
Reception of subsidies Accepted 
Violation of patent Accepted 
Paying no duties Rejected 
Foreign prices Rejected 
Domestic prices Rejected 
 
7.3.2 Finance constraints 
7.3.2.1 Financing as a general constraint 
As a general constraint of the WBES, the feedback of finance is significantly different at 95% 
due to foreign ownership (table 7.13). Based on the difference of foreign ownership, this is the 
unique constraint that is significant at 95% among the WBES general constraint (table 7.1). The 
foreign firms are less constrained by this factor than the domestic firms (graph 7.7). Based on 
the mean and standard deviation in Table 7.13, the variation inside the group of foreign firms is 
bigger than the one in the group of domestic firms. This variation implies that the foreign firms 
are differently constrained by this factor in the group of foreign firms than the domestic firms 
are in the domestic firm group.  
Table 7.13 Levene’s test of financing as a general constraint 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Financing  
 
Yes 35 3.0000 1.16316 .19661 
No 66 3.5303 .94819 .11671 
 
 157 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed
) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Financing Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.02
2 
.048 -
2.469 
99 .015 -.53030 .21477 -
.95645 
-.10416 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-
2.319 
58.39
3 
.024 -.53030 .22864 -
.98792 
-.07269 
Graph 7.7 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences---
financing 
 
7.3.2.2 Inadequate credit/financial information on customers 
In Chapter 6, both foreign and domestic firms regard “inadequate credit information on 
customers” as the most important business constraint (table 6.6). The Levene’s test displays that 
the difference is not significant at 95% (table 7.14). Even if equal variances assumed, it is 
significant at 70.8%. In other words, this constraint is not significantly different at 95% due to 
the factor of foreign ownership. The Error bar indicates that the foreign firms are less 
constrained by this constraining factor than the domestic firms (graph 7.8). In addition, the 
group of foreign firms holds a bigger variation compared to the variation existing in the group 
of domestic firms (table 7.14 and graph 7.8). The group of foreign firms displays a larger 
heterogeneity in the responses, implying that not all foreign firms face the constraints similarly. 
One reason might be that the differences such as the size or sector of these firms also play a role 
in explaining the disparities between the firms’ perceptions within the group.  
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This outcome indicates a better ability that foreign firms have in accessing the credit and 
financial information about their customers than domestic firms. This could also be connected 
with the fact that domestic firms have to depend on the domestic financial market. Additionally, 
it refers to the fact that foreign firms have a better access than domestic firms to the different 
market networks and hence the information about the firms that operate in their business 
environment, such as acquiring information from the banks in a more efficient manner through 
different channels (Chapter 3: section 3.3.2.2). Therefore, they would not be much aware about 
this constraint as the domestic firms.  
  Table 7.14 Levene’s test of the finance constraint--- Inadequate credit/financial 
information on customers 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Credit 
 
Yes 34 2.2353 1.18216 .20274 
No 65 2.3231 1.06225 .13176 
 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Credit Equal variances 
assumed 
1.032 .312 -.376 97 .708 -.08778 .23377 -.55175 .37619 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-.363 61.138 .718 -.08778 .24179 -.57125 .39568 
Graph 7.8  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Inadequate credit/financial information on customers 
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7.3.2.3 High interest rate 
In Chapter 6, table 6.6 shows that the two firms groups are differently constrained by high 
interest rate. The Levene test result confirms that the equality of variances between the two 
groups is not significant at 95%. Even after the equality of variances is assumed, it is significant 
at 23.8%. The author thus rejects the equal variance of this constraint on the foreign firms and 
domestic firms.  
Table 7.15 Levene’s test of the finance constraint--- High interest rate 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
High interest 
rate 
dimension1 
Yes 35 1.8857 1.02244 .17282 
No 64 2.1563 1.11581 .13948 
 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
High 
interest 
rate 
Equal variances 
assumed 
2.645 .107 -1.187 97 .238 -.27054 .22789 -.72283 .18176 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.218 75.442 .227 -.27054 .22208 -.71291 .17184 
Graph 7.9  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
High interest rate 
 
 
The table 7.15 and graph 7.9 show that the foreign firms are less constrained by this factor than 
the domestic firms. In China, the foreign firms might have two main ways to solve this problem. 
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In the short term, if they are more efficient in business operation and in producing goods whose 
quality is better than domestic firms are, they might be able to release this constraint internally. 
In the long run, as the internal organisation and the products are similar between the two firm 
groups, the only way for the foreign firms to overcome the obstacle of high interest rate is to 
find alternative finance approach with low interest rate. This difference in the perception can be 
expected as the foreign owners have a large access to the credit market either in their home 
country or in the host country. In fact, this alternative approach could either be available in 
China due to its special finance supports for the foreign firms, according to a number of official 
documents, or be obtainable through overseas finances, which will be connected with 
investigation of the next finance constraint (Chapter 3: section 3.3.2.2).  
 
7.3.2.4 Access to foreign banks 
Table 7.16 Levene’s test of the finance constraint--- Access to foreign banks 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Access to 
foreign bank 
 
Yes 27 1.8889 1.15470 .22222 
No 43 1.4884 .73589 .11222 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Access to 
foreign 
bank 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
10.608 .002 1.775 68 .080 .40052 .22562 -.04970 .85073 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
1.609 39.367 .116 .40052 .24895 -.10288 .90392 
 
Table 7.16 shows that the equality of variances is significant at 99%. Moreover, among all 
factors of financing constraints in the WBES, this factor is the only one constraint whose 
equality of variances is significant at 95% level. Recalling the fact that the foreign firms are less 
constrained by the constraining factor of “high interest rate” than the domestic firms, the 
conceptions upon the constraint of “access to foreign banks” confirms that foreign firms take the 
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advantage of overseas finance in business operation and in competition, such as the access to 
foreign banks. Thus, they are more constrained by the factor of access to foreign banks. 
Graph 7.10  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Access to foreign banks 
 
7.3.2.5 summery of financing constraints 
The summery is displayed in Table 7.16.1. The foreign firms are more constrained by “access to 
foreign bank”. On the other hand, the foreign firms are less constrained by “finance” as a 
general constraint, “inadequate credit/financial information on customers”, and “high interest 
rate”. Considering finance as a general constraint, the hypothesis 2a is accepted. However, the 
hypothesis 2a should be rejected in the consideration of specific financial constraints. As a 
whole, the author rejects the hypothesis 2a.The domestic firms have to depend on domestic 
finance, and they are thus more constrained by “high interest rate”. On the contrary, in addition 
to some special finance supports in China, the foreign firms can use overseas finances instead of 
domestic finance with high interest rates, and they are more constrained by “access to foreign 
bank”. Under the WTO agreement, although foreign banks are gradually permitted to open the 
business in China, they cannot equally organise their business in the same way as the Chinese 
domestic banks. As a result, “access to foreign banks” is not 100% open. That is the 
fundamental reason behind this finance constraint.  
Table 7.16.1 Summery of difference in the finance constraints 
Finance constraints H2a: The foreign firms are less constrained by the 
constraints of finance than the domestic firms. 
Finance as a general constraint Accepted 
Inadequate credit/financial information on 
customers 
Accepted 
High interest rate Accepted 
Access to foreign banks Rejected 
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7.3.3 Rules and regulation constraints 
7.3.3.1 Labour regulations 
Table 7.17 displays that the Levene test for equality of variances between two groups is 
significant at 94.6%, which is very close to 95%. The graph 7.11 indicates that foreign firms are 
more constrained by “labour regulations” than domestic firms. Moreover, the group of foreign 
firm holds a bigger variation than the one of domestic firms, and the group of foreign firms 
displays a larger heterogeneity. 
Table 7.17 Levene’s test of rules and regulation constraints--- Labour regulations 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Labour 
regulations 
dimension1 
Yes 35 1.7714 1.00252 .16946 
No 65 1.6615 .77615 .09627 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Labour 
regulations 
Equal variances 
assumed 
3.753 .056 .608 98 .544 .10989 .18061 -.24852 .46830 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.564 56.369 .575 .10989 .19489 -.28047 .50025 
Graph 7.11  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Labour regulations 
 
Differed from the special financing arrangement for the foreign firms, the Chinese government 
applies labour regulations equally on both foreign firms and domestic firms. There are also a 
number of labour regulations designed for the foreign firms only, such as local employment 
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ratio and labour working environment. Accordingly, the labour regulations for the foreign firms 
are actually severe than those for domestic firms. The World Bank notes the labour regulation in 
China seems to be more rigid than the world average (table 7.17.1). In this context, the result of 
our analysis is a reasonable outcome as the foreign firms are more constrained by “labour 
regulations” than the domestic firms (The rigidity of employment index measures the regulation 
of employment, specifically the hiring and firing of workers and the rigidity of working hours. 
This index is the average of three subindexes: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours 
index, and a difficulty of firing index. The index ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values 
indicating more rigid regulations.) 
Table 7.17.1 Rigidity of employment index 
 2008 2009 
China 31 31 
World average 28 27 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project (2008 & 2009) 
7.3.3.2 Foreign exchange regulations 
Table 7.18 Levene’s test of rules and regulation constraints--- Foreign exchange regulations 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Foreign 
exchange 
regulations 
dimension1 
Yes 30 1.7333 1.01483 .18528 
No 52 1.5769 .75006 .10402 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Foreign 
exchange 
regulations 
Equal variances 
assumed 
3.286 .074 .797 80 .428 .15641 .19615 -.23395 .54677 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.736 47.478 .465 .15641 .21248 -.27093 .58376 
 
Based on table 7.18 and graph 7.12, the foreign firms are more constrained by the constraining 
factor of foreign exchange regulations than the domestic firms. In table 7.18, the Levene test 
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value for the equality of variances is 0.074 that is not less than or equal to 0.05. In addition, in 
the condition of equal variances assumed, the p value of two tailed is 0.428, which is far more 
than 0.05. Therefore, when facing the constraint of foreign exchange regulations, we fail to find 
a difference significantly related to the factor of foreign factor. The different responses could be 
due to other reasons. Clearly, though Chinese governments have applied several rules on the 
foreign firms in product supply, these firms still have to import a number of necessary goods 
and service that is not domestically available in China. Consequently, they are more constrained 
by foreign exchange regulations than the domestic firms are as the domestic firms may not 
depend on frequent overseas business. Apart from this difference, graph 7.12 also shows that, 
the foreign firm group holds a bigger variation compared to the one of domestic firms, and the 
category that includes foreign firms displays a larger heterogeneity. A larger heterogeneity 
could be again associated with the size and the industrial sector of their business. 
Graph 7.12  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Foreign exchange regulations 
 
7.3.3.3 Customs regulations 
In table 7.19, Levene’s test is 0.162 that is not less than and equal to 0.05. Given equal variances 
assumed, the p value 0.640 is also more than the level of 0.05. We again cannot observe a 
significant difference because of the foreign ownership. Normally, both the foreign exchange 
regulations and the customs regulations should be connected with the business, the firm size, 
and the industrial sector. However, the information in section 7.3.3.2 and 7.3.3.3 are evidently 
diverse. On one side, the domestic firms are more constrained by “customs regulations” than the 
foreign firms are. However, domestic firms are less constrained by “foreign exchange 
regulations”. That is to say, domestic firms have to face the obstacles of import and export, but 
they do not have to worry about the international payment problems. The reason is international 
payment is actually out of their own control and under the control of Chinese government 
(Chapter 3: section 3.3.2.3). On the other side, according to the results of economic reforms in 
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China, the foreign firms have to deal with problems of international payment directly related to 
their business and are given more freedom in the business operation related to the procedure of 
import and export. This issue can only be explained by the special official supports in customs 
management, to attract FDI in China (Chapter 3: section 3.3.2.3). 
Table 7.19 Levene’s test of rules and regulation constraints--- Customs regulations 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Customs 
regulations 
dimension1 
Yes 27 1.74 .859 .165 
No 49 1.86 1.118 .160 
 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Customs 
regulations 
Equal variances 
assumed 
1.993 .162 -.469 74 .640 -.116 .248 -.610 .378 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
-.506 66.030 .614 -.116 .230 -.575 .343 
Graph 7.13  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Customs regulations 
 
7.3.3.4 High taxes 
In table 7.20, the Levene’s test result is 0.902 and the p value is 0.146 upon equal variances 
assumed. We cannot find the difference of high taxes constraint because of the foreign 
ownership factor. In fact, the two kinds of firms both consider “high taxes” as the top 
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constraining factor one among the rules and regulation constraints (table 6.7). The error bar in 
graph 7.14 confirms that the foreign firms are more constrained by “high taxes”, and the 
variation of either group is very close to each other. That is to say, no matter of the size and the 
sector, they both have to face the serious constraint of high taxes.  
  Table 7.20 Levene’s test of rules and regulation constraints--- High taxes 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
High taxes 
dimension1 
Yes 32 2.6563 1.12478 .19883 
No 62 2.3065 1.08021 .13719 
 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
High 
taxes 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.015 .902 1.467 92 .146 .34980 .23844 -.12376 .82336 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
1.448 60.564 .153 .34980 .24157 -.13332 .83291 
Graph 7.14  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
High taxes 
 
Table 7.20.1: Total tax rate (% of profit) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
China 80.0 80.7 81.2 79.9 78.5 
World 51.4 49.7 49.5 49.4 48.3 
Source: World Bank, Doing Business project (http://www.doingbusiness.org/) 
Note: Total tax rate is the total amount of taxes payable by businesses (except for labor taxes) after accounting for 
deductions and exemptions as a percentage of profit. 
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Table 7.20.1 illustrates why the foreign firms feel they are more constrained by “high taxes” 
than the domestic firms. Evidently, the total tax rate in China is unbelievably high than the 
world average level. Although Chinese government has provided several tax advantages to the 
foreign firms, the actual effects are not as good as expected and “high tax” still remains as the 
top one in the category of rules and regulations constraint, because the foreign firms compare 
the tax rate in China to those in other countries. For domestic firms, they have been used to 
surviving in this business environment of high tax rate already. It is impossible for them to 
experience a low tax rate as the world average level at all. Thus, their concerns on this constraint 
are not as high as that of the foreign firms. 
7.3.3.5 Tax administration regulations 
Table 7.21 Levene’s test of rules and regulation constraints--- Tax administration 
regulations 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
tax 
administration 
regulations 
dimension1 
Yes 35 2.0857 1.01087 .17087 
No 65 2.0615 .98230 .12184 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
tax 
administration 
regulations 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.802 .373 .116 98 .908 .02418 .20804 -.38868 .43703 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  
.115 68.022 .909 .02418 .20986 -.39459 .44294 
 
For tax administration regulations, we again fail to observe the significant difference (table 
7.21), and foreign firms are more constrained than the domestic firms. The proportional 
difference between the two groups is not as big as the other constraints.  The average concerns 
of the two firm groups are very close to each other. In Graph 7.15, the variation of foreign firms 
is bigger that that of domestic firms. “Tax administration regulations” is another concern for 
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both the foreign firms and domestic firms. This indicates the role that the regulatory framework 
can play in the context of increasing or decreasing transaction costs. Normally, the problems 
specific to tax administration are mainly related to the lack of trust between the tax collectors 
and tax payers, inefficiency of the dispute settlement system and arbitrary estimation of the 
taxable profit (Fawzy, 1998). This is highly associated with other related problems such as tax 
evasion and taxpayer’s high transaction costs in tax payment and uncertainty in negotiation 
amongst the parties and the level of bribery in the tax system (Asher, 2002). 
Graph 7.15  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Tax administration regulations 
 
7.3.3.6 Summery of Rules and regulations 
Table 7.22 Summery of difference in the rules and regulation constraints 
Rules and regulation constraints H3a: The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of 
business rules and regulations than the domestic firms. 
Labour regulation Rejected  
Foreign exchange regulation Rejected 
Custom regulation Accepted 
High taxes Rejected 
Tax administration regulation Rejected 
Among the constraints of rules and regulations, the foreign firms are only less constrained by 
the constraining factor of “custom regulation”, and are more constrained by all other constraints 
of rules and regulations (table 7.22). The way in which foreign firms may feel more constrained 
could be explained by the fact that the system of tax administration and regulations related are 
too inefficient to cover the costs of foreign owners by giving more advantages in tax 
concessions and tax exemptions and related procedures. This could be a disappointing result of 
the policies and reforming efforts undertaken by Chinese authorities to attract FDI. Moreover, 
the variation of the perceptions in the group of foreign firms could reflect the fact that although 
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some foreign firms are more constrained than the domestic firms are, still some of them may 
face the same or even a lower level of constraint as the domestic firms. One of the consequences 
about these constraints is the potential bribery practices that could arise.  
7.3.4 Corruption constraints 
7.3.4.1 Corruption as a general constraint 
Table 7.23 Levene’s test of corruption constraints --- Corruption as a general constraint 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Corruption as a 
general 
constraint 
dimension1 
Yes 33 1.8788 1.08275 .18848 
No 63 2.1111 1.12323 .14151 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Corruption 
as a 
general 
constraint 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
.808 .371 -.974 94 .332 -.23232 .23844 -.70575 .24111 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-.986 67.221 .328 -.23232 .23569 -.70274 .23810 
Graph 7.16  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Corruption as a general constraint 
 
 
In table 7.23, corruption as a general constraint is not statistically significant to either firms with 
or without foreign ownership. Therefore, although the foreign firms are less constrained by the 
corruption than the domestic owned firms (graph 7.16), the ownership is not the reason resulting 
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in the different responses. In addition, variation among domestic firms is bigger than that of the 
foreign firms, which suggests the corruption situation of domestic firms more various than the 
foreign firms.  
 
7.3.4.2 Corruption of bank officials 
Table 7.24 Levene’s test of corruption constraints --- Corruption of bank officials 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Corruption of 
bank officials 
dimension1 
Yes 33 1.8788 1.05349 .18339 
No 60 2.0500 1.19922 .15482 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Corruption 
of bank 
officials 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
3.025 .085 -.687 91 .494 -.17121 .24925 -.66632 .32390 
Equal 
variances 
not assumed 
  
-.713 73.592 .478 -.17121 .24000 -.64947 .30705 
Graph 7.17  The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Corruption of bank officials 
 
The other corruption constraint included in the WBES is the corruption of bank officials. The 
Error bar shows that the firms with foreign investors are less constrained than the domestic 
firms by the factor of corruption of bank officials (graph 7.17). As we failed to observe the 
difference at 95% level (table 7.24), the different responses on this constraining factor are not 
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because of the factor of with or without foreign ownership. In table 7.24, the standard deviation 
of foreign firms is 1.05349, which is smaller than that of domestic firms (1.19922). Therefore, 
the domestic firm group holds a bigger variation compared to the one of foreign firms, and the 
domestic firm group displays a larger heterogeneity. Thus, the constraints on domestic firms are 
more different than that of the foreign firms. 
  
7.3.4.3 Summery of corruption 
To sum up, the hypothesis 4a is rejected as the foreign firms are less constrained by corruption 
than the domestic firms (table 7.24.1). Consequently, it could be expected that the foreign 
owners should concern less about corruption than the domestic firms to get things done. 
However, this result is not pronounced as the difference when facing “corruption of bank 
officials” is only significantly related to the foreign ownership factor at 90%, less than the 
acceptance level of 95% in this research. In addition, the similar variance between the groups of 
foreign firms and domestic firms indicates that different responses of foreign firms to the 
constraint named “the corruption of bank officials” are similar to those of the domestic firms. 
This is also supported by the fact that both groups do not exhibit any discrepancies in their 
proportional perception with regards to corruption as a general constraint. 
Table 7.24.1 Summery of difference in the corruption constraints 
Corruption constraints H4a: The foreign firms are more constrained by the constraints 
of corruption than the domestic firms. 
Corruption as a general constraint Rejected 
Corruption of bank officials Rejected 
 
7.3.5 Judicial constraints 
7.3.5.1 Fair and impartial, honest, quick, affordable, consistent, and enforceability 
In the WBES, there are six constraining factors to describe the quality of court in China, 
including fair and impartial, honest, quick, affordable, consistent, and enforceability, measured 
from 1 (always) to 6 (never). The Levene’s test shows that the foreign firms and domestic firms 
differentiate in their opinions about how fair and impartial the courts are, how honest they are, 
how consistent and how enforceable their decisions are as well as the easiness to obtain law and 
regulation. The difference based on the factor of enforceability is the unique judicial constraint 
that is significant at 95% (table 7.3). The difference in the perceptions also reflects the fact that 
the judicial system is not seen in the same way by all types of firms, in spite of the fact that very 
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similar percentage of the overall firms in the sample believe that the Chinese courts are 
frequently fair and impartial (65.6%), honest (56%), quick (41.8%), affordable (65.9%), 
consistent (61.4%), and enforceable (65.5%) (table 6.7).  
 
These opinions are not homogenous amongst the group of foreign and domestic firms. The 
foreign firms are more constrained by “fair and impartial”, “honest”, “quick”, “consistent”, and 
“enforceability” (graph 7.18, graph 7.19, graph 7.20, graph 7.22 and graph 7.23). On the other 
hand, the foreign firms are less constrained by “affordable” (graph 7.21). Apart from the 
constraint of fair and impartial, the foreign firms embody large variation in the responses with 
regards to judicial constraints compared to those of the domestic firms.  These results could be 
attributed to the possibility that the foreign firms may confront the legal system more often than 
the domestic firms. Consequently they would have different perception about the quality of the 
courts than the domestic firms.  
 
Table 7.25 Levene’s test of judicial constraints ---Fair and impartial 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
fair and 
impartial 
dimension1 
Yes 33 3.1515 1.25303 .21812 
No 60 2.8000 1.29928 .16774 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
fair and 
impartial 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.212 .646 1.264 91 .209 .35152 .27810 -.20090 .90393 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
1.277 68.118 .206 .35152 .27516 -.19754 .90057 
 
Graph 7.18 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Fair and impartial 
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Table 7.26 Levene’s test of judicial constraints --- Honest 
 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Honest 
dimension1 
1.00 32 3.5000 1.29515 .22895 
2.00 59 3.1864 1.29288 .16832 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Honest Equal variances 
assumed 
.029 .866 1.104 89 .273 .31356 .28402 -.25078 .87789 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
1.103 63.630 .274 .31356 .28417 -.25419 .88131 
Graph 7.19 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Honest 
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Table 7.27 Levene’s test of judicial constraints --- Quick 
 Foreign 
ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Quick 
dimension1 
1.00 32 4.0000 1.27000 .22451 
2.00 59 3.4576 1.11914 .14570 
 
 
Levene's Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Quick Equal variances 
assumed 
.158 .692 2.105 89 .038 .54237 .25772 .03029 1.05446 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
2.026 57.190 .047 .54237 .26764 .00647 1.07828 
Graph 7.20 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Quick 
 
 
Table 7.28 Levene’s test of judicial constraints --- Affordable 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Affordable 
dimension1 
1.00 30 3.0000 1.17444 .21442 
2.00 55 2.9818 1.00905 .13606 
 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
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F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Affordable Equal variances 
assumed 
1.399 .240 .075 83 .940 .01818 .24280 -.46474 .50110 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.072 52.485 .943 .01818 .25395 -.49129 .52765 
 
Graph 7.21 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Affordable 
 
 
Table 7.29 Levene’s test of judicial constraints --- Consistent 
 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Consistent 
dimension1 
1.00 31 3.2581 1.41345 .25386 
2.00 57 3.0175 1.18760 .15730 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Consistent Equal variances 
assumed 
2.397 .125 .848 86 .399 .24052 .28363 -.32332 .80436 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
  
.805 53.253 .424 .24052 .29865 -.35842 .83947 
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Graph 7.22 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Consistent 
 
7.3.5.2 Enforceability 
Among the judicial constraints, enforceability is the unique one that is significant at 95%. Table 
8.30 displays that the foreign firms are more constrained by the constraining factor of “court-
enforceability” than the domestic firms. Moreover, the standard deviation of foreign firms 
(1.55127) is bigger than that of domestic firms (1.18308) (table 7.30). Therefore, the opinions of 
foreign firms embody large variation in the responses of this judicial constraints compared to 
those of the domestic firms.  
Table 7.30 Levene’s test of judicial constraints --- Enforceability 
 Foreign ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enforceability 
dimension1 
Yes 31 3.1613 1.55127 .27862 
No 56 3.0179 1.18308 .15810 
 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Enforceability Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.819 .031 .484 85 .630 .14343 .29657 -.44622 .73309 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
.448 49.623 .656 .14343 .32035 -.50012 .78699 
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Graph 7.23 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Enforceability 
 
 
7.3.5.3 Summery of the judicial constraints  
Among these six judicial constraints in the WBES, the foreign firms are more constrained by all 
six factors of judicial constraints in China (table 7.30.1), and the author rejects the hypothesis 
3a. The different judicial constraints faced by foreign firms may be connected with the sector, 
size, corruption, location and firm age. Domestic firms are more familiar with the inefficient 
judicial system. Additionally, there is a tradition that the domestic firms try to avoid to use the 
judicial system to deal with the problems, while the foreign firms usually choose judicial system 
due to their original customs. As Reinstein (2005: 6) noted, “Mediation or conciliation has been 
utilized in China to resolve civil disputes for over two thousand years. China’s widespread 
preference for avoidance of the courts has led to its high utilization of arbitration. As a result, 
China has some of the biggest and most widely utilized arbitration bodies in the world. The 
Chinese preference to use extra-legal means is largely due to three factors: Confucian 
philosophy, an underdeveloped court system, and the influence of communism.” Therefore, the 
domestic firms may engage more in some informal ways to resolve disputes outside courts 
rather than facing the costs and the uncertainty associated with the decisions of the judicial 
system. The domestic firms which have to resort to courts for disputes settlements would be 
more or less comfortable with the decisions of the courts and the efficiency of the legal 
procedures. This could be due to the possibility that the domestic firms have more access to 
social network that allows them to guarantee the courts decisions and resolve disputes in less 
costly manner. This is a common situation in an environment where informal networks are used 
(Akimova and Schwodiauer, 2003), regarding to a better access to the local network that 
enjoyed by these firms. 
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Table 7.30.1 Summery of difference in the judicial constraints 
Judicial constraints H5a: The foreign firms are less constrained by legal constraints than domestic firms. 
Fair and impartial Rejected 
honest Rejected  
quick Rejected  
affordable Rejected 
consistent Rejected 
enforceability Rejected 
7.3.6 Summary of the foreign firms and domestic firms 
This section examines the relations between the constraining factors and whether these 
constraints affect the business of foreign firms and domestic firms differently. Based on the 
results of Levene’s test and Error bar, there are some proportional discrepancies in the 
perceptions regarding to the business constraints. The results also indicate the disparities in the 
perception to the constraints are connected with the factor of foreign ownership as well as the 
business environment in China. The foreign firms are less constrained by “custom regulations” 
than domestic firms. In the category of finance constraints, the foreign firms are less constrained 
by “high interest rate”. When facing the corruptions, the foreign firms’ perception to the 
constraints related to “the corruption of bank officials” is lower. The results also give an 
indication on the potential comparative advantage that the domestic firms have over the foreign 
firms in matters related to “labour regulation” and “foreign exchange regulations” in general as 
well as their ability to avoid “access to foreign bank”. In the area of competition constraints, the 
domestic firms are less constrained than the foreign firms by “paying no duties” and “foreign 
prices”. Moreover, among the judicial constraints, the domestic firms are less constrained than 
the foreign firms. These results also reflect the potential advantage that the domestic firms have 
compared to the foreign firms when accessing the domestic network. This access is part of the 
accumulative social capital that the domestic firms have been undertaken along their existence 
in the Chinese business environment. The social network allows them to pool resources, share 
information, generate trust, and secure their predictable behaviour and assuring the outcome of 
some decision makers (Adler and Kwon, 2002).  The domestic firms have already been part of 
this network or at least more involved in this network more than the foreign firms in China.  
 
Among the constraints in the WBES, the Levene’s test shows that there are three factors that are 
significant at 95% because of the foreign ownership factor, which includes financing as a 
general constraint, enforceability as judicial constraint, and access to foreign bank as a finance 
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constraint. Based on the NIEs, these three constraints all belong to the formal institutions. The 
constraints of informal institutions are all insignificant at 95%. Moreover, the large variance 
shows that the group of foreign firms and domestic firms is not homogenous. This would 
indicate that not all foreign firms perceive the obstacles in the same way. Some of them may 
value the constraints as much as the domestic firms. This would indicate that some foreign firms 
can have similar access to the network of Chinese business environment as the domestic firms. 
Thus, the variation within the groups raises the question about whether the other factors, i.e. the 
firm size and the private ownership, also play a role in the firm’s ability to be involved in the 
network and to take the advantage of this network. This question will be investigated in the 
following sections.    
7.4 Private firm and non-private firm category 
This section investigates differences between the perceptions of private firms and non private 
firms about the same constraining factors, such as finance constraints, competition constraints, 
judicial constraints, corruption constraints, rules and regulations constraints. The Levene’s test 
compares the homogeneity of the variances between private firms and non private firms, the two 
types of firms seem to differentiate in their perceptions regarding to the same constraint (table 
7.31, table 7.32, table 7.33, table 7.34, table 7.35 and table 7.36). Because of the difference 
related to private ownership, “financing” is the only one significant general constraint, and 
“Paperwork” is the unique significant constraining factor among the specific constraints.  
 
Table 7.31 Levene’s test of the general constraints (private) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
General constraint Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Financing  7.091 1 99 .009 
Infrastructure  .256 1 99 .614 
Political instability .814 1 98 .369 
Inflation  .354 1 97 .553 
Exchange rate 1.705 1 90 .195 
Street crime .471 1 97 .494 
Organised crime .248 1 95 .619 
Taxes and regulations .331 1 99 .566 
Corruption as a general constraint .003 1 94 .957 
Functioning of the judiciary .005 1 92 .944 
Anticompetitive practices .666 1 96 .417 
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Table 7.32 Levene’s test of the competition constraints (private) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Competition constraint Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Avoid taxes .542 1 78 .464 
No duties .377 1 89 .541 
Foreign price 1.039 1 85 .311 
Domestic price .008 1 94 .927 
Violation of patents .039 1 93 .843 
Collude for credit .121 1 91 .729 
Receive subsidies .710 1 95 .401 
 
 
Table 7.33 Levene’s test of the judicial constraints (private) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Judicial constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Fair & impartial 2.313 1 91 .132 
Honest 1.062 1 89 .306 
Quick  .002 1 89 .968 
Affordable  .032 1 83 .858 
Consistent  .128 1 86 .722 
Enforceability .194 1 85 .661 
 
 
Table 7.34 Levene’s test of the finance constraints (private) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Finance constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Collateral  .221 1 97 .639 
Paperwork  4.700 1 98 .033 
High interest rates 2.033 1 97 .157 
Special connections .853 1 92 .358 
Lack money to lend .678 1 98 .412 
Access to foreign banks .187 1 68 .667 
Access to non bank equity .276 1 84 .601 
Export finance .221 1 73 .639 
Lease finance .497 1 87 .483 
Credit  1.904 1 97 .171 
Long term loan 1.325 1 94 .253 
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Table 7.35 Levene’s test of the rules and regulation constraints (private) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Rules and regulation 
constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Business regulations .008 1 99 .929 
Customs regulations .689 1 74 .409 
Labour regulations .329 1 98 .567 
Foreign exchange regulations 2.029 1 80 .158 
Environmental regulations .378 1 94 .540 
Fire regulations .714 1 95 .400 
High taxes 1.108 1 92 .295 
Tax administration regulations 1.772 1 98 .186 
 
Table 7.36 Levene’s test of the corruption constraints (private) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Corruption constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Corruption as a general constraint .003 1 94 .957 
Corruption of bank officials .030 1 91 .863 
7.4.1 Financing as a general constraint 
Similar to the foreign firms, the private firms also consider financing as the top one constraining 
factor as a general constraint (table 6.4). In addition, for the private firms, financing is the only 
one factor that is significant at 95% among the general constraints (table 7.31).  The private 
firms are less constrained by “financing” than the non-private firms, and the variation of private 
firms is bigger than that of the non-private firms suggesting that the replies of non-private firms 
when facing the general constraint of “financing” are more various than the private firms (table 
7.37.1 and graph 7.24). 
Table 7.37.1 Levene’s test of general constraints --- financing 
 Private ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Financing  
 
Yes 77 3.2727 1.11964 .12759 
No 24 3.5833 .77553 .15830 
 
 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed
) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
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Financin
g 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
7.091 .00
9 
-1.266 99 .209 -.31061 .24542 -
.79758 
.17637 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-1.528 55.50
2 
.132 -.31061 .20332 -
.71799 
.09678 
Graph 7.24 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
financing 
 
In addition to the private ownership difference, the author examines the other characters of the 
firms involved in the WBES (table 7.37.2). Among these firms, nearly 2/3 of private firms are 
without foreign ownership, and almost half is small firms. Recalling the information discussed 
in the sections of foreign ownership and size categories in Chapter 3, there are obvious 
difficulties of small firms or related to the foreign ownership factor. As shown in Chapter 3, the 
domestic private firms face a number of difficulties in accessing financing (Li et al., 2009), and 
the lending policies of government actually favour the SOEs and against the private firms (Bai 
et al., 2006). The small firms also face tougher obstacles in obtaining finance (Beck et al., 2005; 
Schiffer and Weder, 2001; Zhou et al., 2002). Therefore, the factor of small firm size without 
foreign ownership is the one important factor to explain why financing is significant in the 
group of private and non-private firms  
Table 7.37.2 Frequencies of private firms in the WBES 
 Frequency Percent 
 Foreign 
ownership 
 Yes 29 37.7 
 No 48 62.3 
Total 77 100.0 
Size Small 37 48.1 
Medium  24 31.2 
Large 16 20.8 
Total 77 100.0 
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7.4.2 Finance constraint: paper work 
Paper work is another significant financing factor at 95%, and the private firms are less 
constrained than the non-private firms (table 7.37.3). The responses from the non-private firms 
are more inconsistent than private firms (graph 7.25). There appears another question that why 
this significant issue related to the private firms is not significant to the foreign ownership 
category. The answer is in reforming efforts conducted by the Chinese government (in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4). In other words, the favourite policies for foreign firms in financing are the 
fundamental issues causing the difference. On the contrary, the constraining factor of paper 
work is the main disadvantage for private firms in China.  
Table 7.37.3 Levene’s test of finance constraints --- paper work 
 Private ownership N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Paper 
work 
 
Yes 76 1.9211 .90573 .10389 
No 24 2.2917 1.12208 .22904 
 
 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df 
Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Differenc
e 
Std. 
Error 
Differenc
e 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pape
r 
work 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
4.700 .033 -
1.647 
98 .103 -.37061 .22499 -
.81710 
.07587 
Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
  
-
1.474 
33.010 .150 -.37061 .25151 -
.88230 
.14107 
Graph 7.25 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
paper work 
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7.4.3 Summery of the category of private and non-private firms 
7.4.3.1 Competition constraints 
Displayed the graphs (7.25.1, 7.25.2, 7.25.3, 7.25.4, 7.25.5, 7.25.6), private firms are more 
constrained by “reception of subsidies” and “paying no duties”, and are less constrained by 
“collude for credit”, “violation of patent”, “foreign price” and “domestic price” (table 7.38.1). 
As a whole, the author thus the author rejects the hypothesis 1b.  
Graph 7.25.1 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Collude for credit 
 
Graph 7.25.2 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Reception of subsidies 
 
Graph 7.25.3 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Violation of patent 
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Graph 7.25.4 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Paying no duties 
 
 
Graph 7.25.5 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Foreign price 
 
 
Graph 7.25.6 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Domestic price 
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Table 7.38.1 Summery of difference in the competition constraints 
Competition 
constraints 
H1b: The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business 
competition than the non private firms. 
Collusion for credit Rejected  
Reception of subsidies Accepted 
Violation of patent Rejected 
Paying no duties Accepted  
Foreign prices Rejected  
Domestic prices Rejected  
7.4.3.2 Finance constraints 
According to the table 7.38.2 and graphs 7.24, 7.25, 7.25.7, 7.25.8 and 7.25.9, similar to the 
situation when facing the competition constraints, private firms are more constrained by the 
financial factors of “inadequate credit/financial information on customers” and “access to 
foreign banks”, and are more constrained by the other three financial factors, including 
“financing” as a general constraint, “high interest rate” and “paper work”. Thus, as shown in 
Table 7.37.3, the hypothesis 2b is rejected overall.  
Table 7.38.2 Summery of difference in the finance constraints 
Finance constraints H2b: The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of 
finance than the non private firms.  
Finance as a general constraint Rejected 
Inadequate credit/financial 
information on customers 
Accepted 
High interest rate Rejected 
Access to foreign banks Accepted 
Paper work Rejected 
Graph 7.25.7 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Inadequate credit/financial information on customers 
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Graph 7.25.8 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
High interest rate 
 
Graph 7.25.9 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Access to foreign banks 
 
7.4.3.3 The constraints of rules and regulations  
According to the graphs (7.25.10, 7.25.11, 7.25.12, 7.25.13 and 7.25.14), private firms are more 
constrained by “custom regulation”, “high tax”, and “tax administration regulation”. On the 
contrary, private firms are less constrained by “labour regulation” and “foreign exchange 
regulation” (table 7.38.3). As a result, the hypothesis 3b is rejected as a whole. 
Table 7.38.3 Summery of difference in the rules and regulation constraints 
Rules and regulation constraints H3b: The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business 
rules and regulations than non private firms.  
Labour regulation Rejected 
Foreign exchange regulation Rejected 
Custom regulation  Accepted  
High taxes Accepted 
Tax administration regulation Accepted 
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Graph 7.25.10 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Labour regulation 
 
 
Graph 7.25.11 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Foreign exchange regulation 
 
 
Graph 7.25.12 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Custom regulation 
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Graph 7.25.13 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
High tax 
 
 
Graph 7.25.14 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Tax administration regulation 
 
7.4.3.4 The constraints of corruption 
Based on two graphs (7.25.15 and 7.25.16), private firms are more constrained by corruption 
than the non private firms in China (table 7.38.4). Consequently, the hypothesis 4b is accepted.  
Graph 7.25.15 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Corruption as a general constraint 
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Graph 7.25.16 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Corruption of bank officials 
 
 
Table 7.38.4 Summery of difference in the corruption constraints 
Corruption constraints H4b: The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of 
corruption than the non private firms.  
Corruption as a general constraint Accepted 
Corruption of bank officials Accepted 
 
7.4.3.5 The legal constraints 
As displayed graphs (7.25.17, 7.25.18, 7.25.19, 7.25.20, 7.25.21, and 7.25.22), the private firms 
are more constrained than the non-private firms by the judicial constraining factors in China 
(table 7.38.5). The author therefore accepts Hypothesis 5b. 
 
Table 7.38.5 Summery of difference in the judicial constraints 
Judicial constraints H5b: The private firms are more constrained by legal constraints than the 
non private firms.  
Fair and impartial 
Accepted  
Honest 
Accepted  
Quick 
Accepted  
Affordable 
Accepted  
Consistent 
Accepted  
Enforceability 
Accepted  
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Graph 7.25.17 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Fair and impartial 
 
Graph 7.25.18 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Honest 
 
Graph 7.25.19 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Quick 
 
 192 
Graph 7.25.20 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Affordable 
 
Graph 7.25.21 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Consistent 
 
Graph 7.25.22 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Enforceability 
 
7.5 Firm group of small, medium and large size 
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The factor of firm size can influence the firms’ business operation, and the difference of firm 
size can partly determine the way of organisational responses when facing the constraining 
factors (Beck, et al, 2002; Schiffer and Weder, 2001). In practice, firm size plays an important 
role on the organisational ability to better access given institutional framework or to avoid the 
existing business constraints (Bertucci and Alberti, 2003). On one side, a large firm in China 
that is usually a SOE, have more advantages in facing business constraints as this firm have 
more power to influence its business environment, including the behaviours of government, the 
judicial system, the banking system, the operation of law and regulations. On the other side, the 
small and medium size firms are good at avoiding the control of the Chinese government and its 
agents within the Communist system, because these firms do not have to depend on supports 
from banking system and government. This section is to discuss the results of testing hypotheses 
to explain how the firm size factor responding to the constraints. In other words, it is important 
to investigate whether the large firms are the least constrained by the institutional obstacles 
compared to the medium and small firms. 
Table 7.39 Levene’s test of the general constraints (size) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
General constraint Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Financing  1.184 2 98 .310 
Infrastructure  .980 2 98 .379 
Political instability .736 2 97 .482 
Inflation  .384 2 96 .682 
Exchange rate .505 2 89 .605 
Street crime .581 2 96 .561 
Organised crime 1.894 2 94 .156 
Taxes and regulations .235 2 98 .791 
Corruption as a general constraint .409 2 93 .666 
Functioning of the judiciary .154 2 91 .858 
Anticompetitive practices 2.488 2 95 .088 
Table 7.40 Levene’s test of the competition constraints (size) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Competition constraint Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Avoid taxes .607 2 77 .547 
No duties 3.273 2 88 .043 
Foreign price 2.207 2 84 .116 
Domestic price .741 2 93 .479 
Violation of patents 1.023 2 92 .364 
Collude for credit 3.007 2 90 .054 
Receive subsidies .422 2 94 .657 
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Table 7.41 Levene’s test of the judicial constraints (size) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Judicial constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Fair & impartial .092 2 90 .913 
Honest 1.376 2 88 .258 
Quick  .229 2 88 .795 
Affordable  .999 2 82 .373 
Consistent  .705 2 85 .497 
Enforceability .906 2 84 .408 
 
Table 7.42 Levene’s test of finance constraints (size) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Finance constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Collateral  .026 2 96 .974 
Paperwork  .781 2 97 .461 
High interest rates .269 2 96 .765 
Special connections .961 2 91 .387 
Lack money to lend .918 2 97 .403 
Access to foreign banks 2.552 2 67 .085 
Access to non bank equity 10.773 2 83 .000 
Export finance 1.794 2 72 .174 
Lease finance 2.155 2 86 .122 
Credit  .425 2 96 .655 
Long term loan 7.096 2 93 .001 
 
 Table 7.43 Levene’s test of the rules and regulation constraints (size) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Rules and regulation 
constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Business regulations .598 2 98 .552 
Customs regulations 1.423 2 73 .248 
Labour regulations .612 2 97 .545 
Foreign exchange regulations .151 2 79 .860 
Environmental regulations .355 2 93 .702 
Fire regulations .653 2 94 .523 
High taxes .930 2 91 .398 
Tax administration regulations .584 2 97 .559 
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Table 7.44 Levene’s test of the corruption constraints (size) 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
Corruption constraints Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Corruption as a general constraint .409 2 93 .666 
Corruption of bank officials 1.577 2 90 .212 
According to the general constraints in the WBES, no difference is significant at 95% level. 
Among the competition constraints, the constraining factor “no duties” is the only significant 
one. The financing constraints of “access to non-bank equity” and “long term loan” are both 
significant. In the category of rules and regulations, the corruption constraints and judicial 
constraints, the author again fails to find any significance caused by the firm size factor. There 
are five different trends: 
 Some constraints are positively related to the size factor. In other words, the bigger the 
firms are, the larger the constraints are. The constraints belonging to this trend include 
“no duties” (graph 7.26), “foreign price”, “access to foreign bank”, and “lease finance”. 
The table 7.45 can partly explain that. More than 80% of small firms are private firms, 
and they can largely use all approaches to get the right to live in the competition without 
considering anything else too much, even if the ways are legal or illegal.  
 Some constraints are negatively related to the firms’ size. That is, the smaller the firms 
are, the larger the severity of these constraints. Small firms suffer more than medium-
sized firms, which in turn suffer more than large firms do because the small firms have 
fewer opportunities to exploit their informal arrangements in order to overcome some 
constraints. This put the small firms in a less advantageous position than the medium and 
the large firms with regard to these constraints. This pattern is more obvious if the 
medium and large size firms can use their connections and receive some business 
advantages because they are closer to the administration or government officials, such as 
when facing the constraint of “customs regulations”. As a result, medium and large firms 
are less constrained by these factors. Summarised in table 7.47, more than half of large 
size firms in the WBES are private firms and domestic firms, and they cannot receive the 
same business advantages as the foreign firms and the non private firms (SOEs). The 
large firms appear to be the least constrained because their contributions in tax revenue 
and employment can influence the rules of the game in China.   
 The medium firms are the most constrained. Table 7.46 summarises most of the medium 
size firms in the WBES are the private firms without foreign ownership, and they do not 
have advantage like foreign firms and non private firms (SOEs). These firms are also not 
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enough small to reduce the severity of the constraints or to avoid the regulations and 
administration either. In addition, the medium size firms are not enough big to influence 
the operation of regulations and government intervenes.  Consequently, the medium size 
firms have to deal with the formal sector and face any related constraints more than the 
other two size categories.  
 The medium firms are the least constrained, including “collude for credit”, “court-
honest”, “corruption of bank officials”, “access to non bank equity” (graph 7.27), and 
“export finance”.  
 The last trend is the large size firms are the most constrained, while both small and 
medium size firms are less constrained, such as the finance constraint named the long 
term loan (graph 7.28). 
Graph 7.26 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
No duties 
  
 
Graph 7.27 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Access to non bank equity 
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Graph 7.28 The error bar showing the standard error and mean differences--- 
Long term loans 
 
Table 7.45 Frequencies of the small size firms  
 Frequency Percent 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes  14 31.1 
No 31 68.9 
Total 45 100.0 
Private 
ownership 
No 8 17.8 
Yes 37 82.2 
Total 45 100.0 
 
Table 7.46 Frequencies of the medium size firms 
 Frequency Percent 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes 10 33.3 
No 20 66.7 
Total 30 100.0 
Private 
ownership 
No 6 20.0 
Yes 24 80.0 
Total 30 100.0 
 
Table 7.47 Frequencies of the big size firms 
 Frequency Percent 
Foreign 
ownership 
Yes 11 42.3 
No 15 57.7 
Total 26 100.0 
Private 
ownership 
No 10 38.5 
Yes 16 61.5 
Total 26 100.0 
Based on the five trends about the relations between firm size factor and the business 
constraints, the hypothesis 6a and hypothesis 6b is rejected (table 7.48). 
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Table 7.48 Summary of the firm size factor 
H6a: The business constraints faced by the firms are positively related to the factor of firm 
size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of formal institutional constraints than 
medium firms that in turn have fewer problems than small firms have. 
Rejected  
H6b: The business constraints faced by the firms are negatively related to the factor of firm 
size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of informal institutional constraints 
than medium firms that in turn have fewer problems than small firms have. 
Rejected  
7.6 Summary and discussion of chapter 
This chapter tested the insider-outsider hypotheses in the firm categories related to foreign 
ownership and private ownership. The author also examines the hypotheses related to the factor 
of firm size. The different group of firms exhibit discrepancies according to their perceptions of 
business constraints. Evidently, this chapter confirms that the different categories are distinct 
from one another under both formal and informal institutional constraints. This distinction also 
confirms that the firms differ in their business operation due to the nature of the firms 
themselves and the nature of the business environment in China. This confirms the opinion that 
some firms can be categorised as insiders and outsiders in the Chinese business environment, 
and the constraints on the insiders and outsiders are also dissimilar.  
 
Three factors are significant because of foreign ownership, including “financing” as a general 
constraint, “access to foreign bank” in finance constraints, and “enforceability” in judicial 
constraints. Connected with private ownership, only “financing” as a general constraint and 
“paper work” in finance constraints are significant at 95%. Related to the firm size factor, three 
different factors are significant at 95%, named “no duties” in competition constraints, “access to 
non bank equity” and “long-term loan” in finances constraints. One implication is that, under 
the categories of foreign ownership and private ownership, the firms are both 95% significantly 
different when facing “financing” as a general constraint. Base on table 7.37.2, the author 
believes the reason is the character of private firms as the large proportion of private firms in 
China is also in the small firm category without foreign ownership.  
 
Moreover, this chapter discusses why the foreign firms are less constrained than domestic firms 
and why they display high heterogeneity in their group. The determinant is the nature of those 
firms, i.e. the worldwide network and overseas financial abilities of the foreign firms that help 
them ease some financial constraints. This chapter also highlights the importance of special 
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treatment towards the foreign firms to operate their business in China. Moreover, this chapter 
shows that the firms with different sizes have different response to the constraining factors, and 
the size factor can play an important role in determining the business performance. However, 
table 7.45, table 7.46 and table 7.47 display the nature behind the firm size factor are 
complicated. The findings related to this chapter only include the hypotheses related to the size 
of the firms, the private ownership, and the foreign ownership. It is still possible that there are a 
number of other factors that are able to have an effect.  
 
The investigation of hypothesise is displayed in table 7.49. Moreover, the constraints for the 
different types of ownership and firm size would also be connected with both the formal and 
informal institutions to affect the firms’ business performance. Based on the constraining factors 
that are statistically significant at 95% upon Levene’s test, the author is to explore how the 
institutional factors the business performance in Chapter 8. 
Table 7.49 Hypothesis investigation 
  
H1a The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of business competition 
than the domestic firms. 
Rejected 
H1b The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business competition 
than the non private firms.  
Rejected 
H2a The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of finance than the 
domestic firms. 
Rejected 
H2b The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of finance than the non 
private firms.  
Rejected 
H3a The foreign firms are less constrained by the constraints of business rules and 
regulations than the domestic firms. 
Rejected 
H3b The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of business rules and 
regulations than the non private firms.  
Rejected 
H4a The foreign firms are more constrained by the constraints of corruption than the 
domestic firms. 
Rejected 
H4b The private firms are more constrained by the constraints of corruption than the 
non private firms.  
Accepted 
H5a The foreign firms are less constrained by legal constraints than the domestic firms. Rejected 
H5b The private firms are more constrained by legal constraints than the non private 
firms. 
Accepted 
H6a The business constraints faced by the firms are positively related to the factor of 
firm size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of formal institutional 
constraints than medium firms that in turn have fewer problems than small firms 
have. 
Rejected 
H6b The business constraints faced by the firms are negatively related to the factor of 
firm size. That is, large firms face fewer problems in terms of informal institutional 
constraints than medium firms that in turn have fewer problems than small firms 
have. 
Rejected 
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Chapter 8 Research finding: Using regression analysis to 
explore business performance in China 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter intends to test the constraining factors in regards to the different perceptions of the 
WBES in relation to the business constraints from the viewpoint of foreign and domestic firms, 
and private and non-private firms. The categories overlap each other and consequently the 
results associated with each classification could be affected by the characteristics of the 
remaining categories. This is common across many studies when testing differences between 
different categories (Hellman, et al, 2000; Batra, et al, 2003). It is difficult to construct pure 
homogenous groups and compare between them. This research conceptual framework postulates 
the existence of institutional factors that forms the institutional constraints in the business 
environment of China. 
 
This chapter studies the effects of the constraining factors on the business performance, to 
provide an assessment whereby the firms’ performance is constrained by the institutions. The 
model might consist of the informal constraints (Angeletos and Kollintzas, 2000; Clark and Xu, 
2002; Hellman et al., 2000; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Wei, 1997). Also, the model can include 
research variables that are associated with formal institutions (Beck and Levine, 2003; Mauro, 
1995). Beck et al., (2000) note that the underdeveloped financial and legal systems constrain the 
firms’ ability to fund investment projects and weakens business performance.  They also argue 
that quality of financial and legal systems is strongly related to the local business circumstances. 
Based on the findings in Chapter 7, the author considers that the quality of financial system and 
legal systems are closely connected with the level of business constraints. This connection 
implies that these institutions are contingent on the level and the quality of the factors that 
constrain the business operation. This chapter endeavours to explore these questions about how 
the institutions influence the business performance, to demonstrate an approach of the 
institutional changes to improve business performance (Mantzavinos, et al, 2004). 
8.1.1 Regression model and statistical technique 
The statistical tools used are logistic regression and categorical regression, which involve 
categorical variables with different level of scale, such as nominal data, ordinal data, and 
numerical data. Categorical variables serve to separate groups of cases, and the technique 
estimates separate sets of parameters for each group. In particular, this technique is not 
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dependent on the assumption of normality of the variables.  Logistic regression and categorical 
regression are therefore appropriate for the assessment of the variables in this study, which are 
categorised on different scales (ordinal scale for dependent variable, size and institutional 
constraints, ordinal scale for sector, and numeric scale for age of the firms). Running regressions 
requires usually testing for multicollinearity, which is a common problem in regression 
procedures. This problem can generate erroneous coefficient estimates and hence leads to 
misleading conclusions about the potential effect of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. A common method to identify the potential presence of this problem is to run a 
correlation matrix amongst the independent variables in the equations to see whether there is 
high and significant correlation between the independent variables. It is therefore important to 
run a correlation matrix between the independent variables in the analysis. 
  
8.1.2 Research data and variables 
In Chapter 5, the author has already compared a number of available data sources and found that 
the WBES is appropriate for this research. Additionally, after discussing the advantages and 
shortcomings of research variables, the author has demonstrated that the sales and investment of 
the firms in China is more convinced than that of profit in this study. Based on the conceptual 
framework in Chapter 3, the author represents two models to measure the business performance 
affected by institutional constraints, in terms of sales and investment changes over the previous 
three years as well as their expected changes over the next three years. Moreover, as discussed 
in Chapter 5, to investigate the effect of institutions on business performance, the dependent 
variables are the business performance of the firms, in terms of sales and investment, and the 
independent variables include the industrial sector of the firm, firm size, firm age, and the 
institutional constraints. The equations are: 
Performance (previous sales growth) =+1sector+2size+3age+β4 institutional variables+ 
Performance (previous investment growth) =+’1sector+’2size+’3age+β’4institutional variables + 
Future Performance (sale growth) =+1sector+2size+3age+4 institutional variables + 
Future Performance (investment growth) =+’1sector+’2size+’3age+’4 institutional variables + 
     
There are different firm groups displayed in Chapter 3. The author has chosen the domestic 
firms (firms without foreign ownership) and the foreign firms (FIEs) to investigate the business 
constraints on the FDI inflows. Moreover, the author will examine the difference in business 
performance of private firms (firms without government ownership) and non private firms 
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(firms having government ownership), to determine the influences caused by the institutional 
constraints, especially on domestic private business in China. Both the formal institutional and 
informal constraints are considered, which consists of financing, legal system, business 
competition, rules and regulations, and corruption.  
 
In the group of foreign firms and domestic firms, at the level of 95%, financing is the only 
one significant variable as general constraints (table 7.1). Among those specific business 
constraints, there are two significant institutional constraints based on the WBES (table 7.2, 
table 7.3, table 7.4, table 7.5 and table 7.6). One variable under the name of “finance-access to 
foreign bank” is selected. It is also judged on four-point scale; no obstacle, minor obstacle, 
moderate, and major obstacle. The second variable is under Chinese legal system, named 
“courts-enforceablility”. In the group of private firms and non-private firms, at the 95% 
level, financing is again the only one significant variable as a general constraint. Among the 
specific business constraints, finance-paper work is the only one significant at 95%. Previous 
sales and investment change as well as future sales and future investment are reported in the 
WBES, in the context of nominal scale as the dependent variables. Sector, size and age variables 
are chosen as control variables because of their potential role in determining the performance of 
firms (Hellman et al., 2002; Batra et al., 2003). The investigation in Chapter 7 has presented the 
constraints of the informal institutions do not significantly influence the business 
performances at 95%, in the group of foreign / domestic firm, in the group of private / non-
private firm, and in the firm group of different sizes. 
  
8.2 Influences of the institutional constraints on the business performance in China 
8.2.1 The group of foreign firms and domestic firms 
8.2.1.1 General constraints  
Having been displayed in Chapter 7, according to the foreign firms and domestic firms, among 
the general constraints, finance is the unique one that is significantly at 95% related to the 
foreign ownership factor (table 7.1). In addition, finance also significantly influence the 
category of private firms and non-private firms (table 7.31). However, no general constraints 
significantly influence the business performance related to the firm size factor (table 7.39). The 
following equations are estimated: 
Previous sales =+1sector+2size+3age +β4 finance+ 
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Future sales =+1sector+2size+3age +4 finance + 
Previous investment =+’1sector+’2size+’3age +β’4 finance + 
Future investment =+’ 1sector+’ 2size+’ 3age +’ 4 finance + 
 
The results of logistic regression of sales and investment changes are shown in Table 8.1, Table 
8.2, Table 8.3 and Table 8.4 (sales or investment change=1, no change of sales or 
investment=2). As a one-tail test, in the previous three years, only the factor of firm age is 
positively significant to influence the change of sales, and the constraining factors are 
insignificant to influence the change of investment and of sales. Table 8.1 shows that in the 
previous three years, the model is statistically significant as the p-value of step 1 is 0.032 that is 
less than 5%, and the overall percentages of correct prediction by the model is 85.9%. In table 
8.3, the overall percent of investment change in the previous three years that are correctly 
predicted by the model is 55.4%, and the model is not significant as the p-value that is 0.445 
which is more than 5%. According to table 8.2 and table 8.4, in the future three years, all factors 
are insignificant to influence the change of investment and of sales, while only firm age is 
positively significant to affect the change to investment. In addition, the overall percentage of 
prediction by logistics regression is 90.9% for sales, and the model is not statistically significant 
as p-value that is 0.561 which is more than 5%. The overall percentage of prediction of 
investment change is 68.5%, and the model is not statically significant as p-value 14.4% which 
is less more than 5%. 
Table 8.1: Effect on sales change of the previous three years  
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 10.563 4 .032 
Block 10.563 4 .032 
Model 10.563 4 .032 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 71.258a .108 .184 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00014 Percentage 
 204 
 1.00 2.00 Correct 
Step 1 Sales 1.00 76 1 98.7 
2.00 12 3 20.0 
Overall Percentage   85.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector -.094 .348 .073 1 .787 .910 
Size .144 .441 .106 1 .744 1.155 
Age .050 .020 6.117 1 .013 1.052 
Finance  -.354 .294 1.448 1 .229 .702 
Constant -1.320 1.726 .585 1 .444 .267 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Finance. 
 
Table 8.2: Effect on sales change of the future three years  
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 2.983 4 .561 
Block 2.983 4 .561 
Model 2.983 4 .561 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 50.633a .033 .073 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00015 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Sales  1.00 80 0 100.0 
2.00 8 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   90.9 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector .011 .433 .001 1 .980 1.011 
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Size -.160 .532 .090 1 .764 .852 
Age -.042 .051 .666 1 .414 .959 
Finance  -.361 .326 1.222 1 .269 .697 
Constant -.530 1.903 .077 1 .781 .589 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Finance. 
 
Table 8.3: Effect on investment change of the previous three years  
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 3.724 4 .445 
Block 3.724 4 .445 
Model 3.724 4 .445 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 123.642a .040 .053 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00016 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Investment  1.00 21 23 47.7 
2.00 18 30 62.5 
Overall Percentage   55.4 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector .211 .246 .730 1 .393 1.234 
Size .172 .310 .306 1 .580 1.187 
Age .021 .018 1.371 1 .242 1.022 
Finance  .133 .221 .363 1 .547 1.142 
Constant -1.370 1.264 1.174 1 .279 .254 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Finance. 
 
 
 
 206 
Table 8.4: Effect on investment change of the future three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 6.859 4 .144 
Block 6.859 4 .144 
Model 6.859 4 .144 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 115.158a .074 .099 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00017 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Investment  1.00 43 7 86.0 
2.00 21 18 46.2 
Overall Percentage   68.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector .197 .254 .597 1 .440 1.217 
Size -.482 .321 2.259 1 .133 .617 
Age .041 .019 4.565 1 .033 1.042 
Finance  -.188 .224 .704 1 .401 .828 
Constant .364 1.259 .084 1 .772 1.439 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Finance. 
 
All the independent variables are same in the equation of categorical regression, and the 
dependent variables change to the growth of the sales and the investment. Shown in table 8.5, 
table 8.6, table 8.7, and table 8.8, size and finance are both negatively significant to influence 
the sale growth in the previous three years, and sector is significant to influence the sales growth 
in the future three years. However, finance is not significant to influence the sale growth in the 
future three years. Moreover, no factors are significant to influence the investment in the 
 207 
previous years or in the future three years, and sector is again significant to have an effect on 
investment in the future three years. 
Table 8.5: Effect on sales growth of the previous three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .179 .116 2.356 .104 
Size -.326 .140 5.382 .007 
Age .285 .262 1.183 .281 
Finance  -.405 .149 7.392 .001 
R square:    .229 
 
Table 8.6: Effect on sales growth of the future three years  
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .259 .123 4.427 .016 
Size -.203 .214 .902 .346 
Age -.193 .229 .710 .403 
Finance  .155 .187 .688 .506 
R square:    .127 
 
Table 8.7: Effect on investment growth of the previous three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .252 .143 3.119 .058 
Size -.223 .191 1.373 .250 
Age -.149 .383 .151 .700 
Finance  -.224 .193 1.343 .275 
R square:    .222 
 
Table 8.8: Effect on investment growth of the future three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .464 .179 6.696 .004 
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Size -.198 .254 .608 .442 
Age -.287 .295 .951 .337 
Finance  .207 .294 .497 .487 
R square:   .400 
 
8.2.1.2 Specific constraints  
Investigated in Chapter 7, among the specific constraints in the WBES, there are only two 
variables that are named “court-enforceability” and “finance-access to foreign bank”, are 
significantly related to the foreign ownership factor which affects business performance. The 
following correlation matrix of the two equations above displays the following results. Table 8.9 
shows that the independent variables, do not correlate highly or significantly with each other at 
95%. It would be primarily safe to run the regressions, as there is no general problem of 
multicollinearity. The following equations are estimated: 
Previous sales =+1sector+2size+3 Age +β4 enforceability +5 access to foreign bank + 
Future sales =+1sector+2size+3 Age +4 enforceability +5 access to foreign bank + 
Previous investment =+’1sector+’2size+’3 Age +β’4 enforceability +’5 access to foreign bank + 
Future investment =+’ 1sector+’ 2size+’ 3 Age +’ 4 enforceability +’5 access to foreign bank + 
Table 8.9: Correlation Matrix between the independent variables for foreign 
ownership 
Correlations 
 Enforceability Access to foreign banks 
Enforceability Pearson Correlation 1 .004 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .977 
Access to 
foreign banks 
Pearson Correlation .004 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .977  
 
The results of logistic regression analysis are shown in the table 8.10, table 8.11, table 8.12 and 
table 8.13 (sales/investment change=1, no change of sale/investment=2). They are still one-tail 
tests. In the previous three years, firm age is again positively significant to influence the change 
of sales at 95%, and no constraining factor is significant to influence either the change of sales 
or of investment. In the previous three years, the overall percent of logistic regression prediction 
is 84.5% for sales change, and the model is not statistically significant as p-value (0.22) is more 
than 5%. In the same period, the overall percentage of model in correct prediction is 60.3% for 
investment changes, and the model is not significant as p-value (.635) is more than 5%. In the 
future three years, “enforceability” is negatively significant affecting the change of sales at 95%. 
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The model to predict the sale change in the future three years is not significant as p-value (.142) 
is more than 5%. For the future investment, the model is not significant as p-value (.177) is 
more than 5%. In the prediction of future investment, the factor of firm size has significantly 
negative effects, and the factor of “finance-access to foreign bank” has significantly positive 
influence at 95%. Moreover, the overall percentages of logistics regression are 92.7% for sales 
and 68.5% for investment respectively. 
Table 8.10: Effect on sales change of the previous three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 7.010 5 .220 
Block 7.010 5 .220 
Model 7.010 5 .220 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 46.315a .114 .189 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00014 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Sales  1.00 47 1 97.9 
2.00 8 2 20.0 
Overall Percentage   84.5 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector -.100 .438 .052 1 .820 .905 
Size .243 .546 .198 1 .657 1.275 
Age .044 .025 3.181 1 .075 1.045 
Enforceability -.309 .309 1.000 1 .317 .734 
Access to 
foreign bank 
.190 .411 .215 1 .643 1.210 
Constant -1.935 1.931 1.003 1 .317 .144 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Enforceability, Access to foreign bank. 
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Table 8.11: Effect on sales change of the future three years  
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 8.263 5 .142 
Block 8.263 5 .142 
Model 8.263 5 .142 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 20.407a .139 .343 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00015 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Sales  1.00 51 0 100.0 
2.00 4 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   92.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector -.372 .720 .266 1 .606 .689 
Size -.324 .738 .193 1 .660 .723 
Age -.040 .080 .253 1 .615 .961 
Enforceability -1.740 .911 3.650 1 .056 .175 
Access to 
foreign bank 
-.573 .965 .352 1 .553 .564 
Constant 3.774 3.681 1.051 1 .305 43.556 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Enforceability, Access to foreign bank. 
 
Table 8.12: Effect on investment change of the previous three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 3.423 5 .635 
Block 3.423 5 .635 
Model 3.423 5 .635 
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Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 76.982a .057 .076 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00016 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Investment 1.00 21 8 72.4 
2.00 15 14 48.3 
Overall Percentage   60.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector .076 .313 .059 1 .808 1.079 
Size -.030 .393 .006 1 .939 .970 
Age .038 .026 2.153 1 .142 1.038 
Enforceability .102 .204 .248 1 .618 1.107 
Access to 
foreign bank 
.137 .319 .186 1 .667 1.147 
Constant -1.054 1.339 .620 1 .431 .348 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Enforceability, Access to foreign bank. 
 
Table 8.13: Effect on investment change of the future three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 7.646 5 .177 
Block 7.646 5 .177 
Model 7.646 5 .177 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 69.701a .128 .170 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
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Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00017 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Investment  1.00 20 10 66.7 
2.00 12 14 53.8 
Overall Percentage   60.7 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector -.007 .330 .000 1 .982 .993 
Size -.743 .425 3.057 1 .080 .476 
Age .031 .024 1.700 1 .192 1.032 
Enforceability -.090 .210 .183 1 .669 .914 
Access to 
foreign bank 
.809 .363 4.955 1 .026 2.246 
Constant -.096 1.401 .005 1 .946 .909 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Enforceability, Access to foreign bank. 
 
The categorical regression model includes the same independent variables used in logistic 
regression, the dependent variables change to the growth of sales or investment. The results of 
categorical regression are displayed in table 8.14, table 8.15, table 8.16, and table 8.17. No 
factors are significantly to influence the sale growth or investment growth, either in previous or 
in future three years at 95%.  
 
Table 8.14: Effect on sales growth of the previous three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .187 .167 1.264 .295 
Size -.390 .258 2.279 .140 
Age .386 .395 .954 .335 
Enforceability .177 .258 .472 .497 
Access to 
foreign bank 
.048 .278 .030 .864 
R square:    .239 
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Table 8.15: Effect on sales growth of the future three years  
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
df F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. 
Error 
Sector .273 .173 2 2.485 .097 
Size -.152 .222 2 .471 .628 
Age .230 .244 1 .889 .352 
Enforceability .024 .241 1 .010 .921 
Access to 
foreign bank 
-.192 .316 2 .372 .692 
R square:    .195 
 
Table 8.16: Effect on investment growth of the previous three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .347 .190 3.338 .057 
Size -.443 .437 1.028 .323 
Age .387 .556 .485 .495 
Enforceability -.393 .377 1.088 .357 
Access to 
foreign bank 
.386 .456 .718 .501 
R square:    .491 
Table 8.17: Effect on investment growth of the future three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .135 .205 .432 .658 
Size -.571 .335 2.907 .088 
Age .166 .330 .252 .623 
Enforceability .335 .439 .583 .571 
Access to 
foreign bank 
.044 .319 .019 .981 
R square:    .344 
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8.2.1.3 Summery of the foreign firms and the domestic firms 
Based on the results of logistic regression, among the general constraints, finance is not 
statistically significant to influence the sales or the investment, either in the previous three 
years or the future three years. The analysis of categorical regression demonstrates that finance 
is only significant to influence the sale in the previous years. For the specific constraints, 
when using logistic regression analysis, in the previous three years, no constraining factor is 
significant to influence either the change of sales or of investment. In the future three years, 
“enforceability” is significant to affect the change of sales, and the factor of “finance-
access to foreign bank” is significant to influence the investment. The results of categorical 
regression show no factors that are significant to influence the sale growth or investment 
growth, either in previous or in future three years.  
 
8.2.2 The group of private firms and non-private firms  
Based on the finding in Chapter 7, “finance” is only one general constraint whose effects are 
statically significant related to the factor of private ownership (the table 7.31 and table 7.34). 
Among the specific constraints of the WBES, “finance-paper work” is the only significant 
constraining factor. The equation including the variable of finance as a general constraint 
has been investigated already in the section 8.2.1. To study the variable of paper work, the 
following equations are estimated: 
Previous sales =+1sector+2size+3Age +β4 paper work+ 
Future sales =+1sector+2size+3 Age +4 paper work + 
Previous investment =+’1sector+’2size+’3 Age +β’4 paper work + 
Future investment =+’ 1sector+’ 2size+’ 3 Age +’ 4 paper work + 
 
The results of logistic regression of sales and investment changes are shown in table 8.18, table 
8.19, table 8.20, and 8.21. To predict the business performance in the previous three years, the 
logistic model of sale change is not statistically significant as the p-value (.053) is more than 
5%. In this model, the factor of age is significant at the 95% critical value, and the overall 
percent of correct prediction by this model is 86.8%. To predict the investment change in the 
previous three years, the overall percent of correct prediction is 59.3%. The logistic model is not 
significant as p-value (.323) is more than 5%, and no variables are statically significant. In the 
examination of sale change in the future three years, p-value (.335) is more than 5% implies the 
logistic regression model is not significant. In this model, the variable of paper work is 
 215 
significant at 95% critical value as one tail test, and the overall percent of correct prediction is 
90.8%. In the same period, the p-value of (.178) is more than 5% means the model of logistic 
regression of investment change is not significant at 95% critical value, and this model turns 
into significant at 75% critical value. Again, the variable of age is significant at 95% critical 
value, and the overall percent of correct prediction is 60.2% for investment change in the future 
three years. 
 
Table 8.18: Effect on sales growth of the previous three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 9.344 4 .053 
Block 9.344 4 .053 
Model 9.344 4 .053 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 72.120a .098 .165 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00014 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Sales  1.00 76 0 100.0 
2.00 12 3 20.0 
Overall Percentage   86.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector -.034 .345 .010 1 .921 .966 
Size .257 .424 .368 1 .544 1.293 
Age .044 .019 5.229 1 .022 1.045 
Paper work .176 .308 .326 1 .568 1.193 
Constant -3.080 1.463 4.433 1 .035 .046 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Paper work. 
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Table 8.19: Effect on sales growth of the future three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 4.562 4 .335 
Block 4.562 4 .335 
Model 4.562 4 .335 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 48.863a .051 .111 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00015 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Sales  1.00 79 0 100.0 
2.00 8 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   90.8 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector -.005 .440 .000 1 .991 .995 
Size -.043 .522 .007 1 .934 .958 
Age -.052 .049 1.160 1 .282 .949 
Paper work -.762 .517 2.176 1 .140 .467 
Constant -.398 1.739 .052 1 .819 .672 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Paper work. 
 
Table 8.20: Effect on investment growth of the previous three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 4.670 4 .323 
Block 4.670 4 .323 
Model 4.670 4 .323 
 
Model Summary 
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Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 121.384a .050 .067 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00016 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
Step 1 Investment  1.00 25 19 56.8 
2.00 18 29 61.7 
Overall Percentage   59.3 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector .237 .250 .903 1 .342 1.268 
Size .171 .302 .323 1 .570 1.187 
Age .024 .018 1.723 1 .189 1.024 
Paper work -.193 .225 .735 1 .391 .825 
Constant -.647 .988 .430 1 .512 .523 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Paper work. 
 
Table 8.21: Effect on investment growth of the future three years 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 6.303 4 .178 
Block 6.303 4 .178 
Model 6.303 4 .178 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 114.552a .069 .093 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
 
Classification Tablea 
 Observed Predicted 
 VAR00017 Percentage 
Correct  1.00 2.00 
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Step 1 Investment  1.00 37 12 75.5 
2.00 23 16 41.0 
Overall Percentage   60.2 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1a Sector .174 .257 .461 1 .497 1.190 
Size -.450 .311 2.097 1 .148 .638 
Age .037 .018 3.995 1 .046 1.037 
Paper work -.115 .232 .244 1 .621 .892 
Constant .021 1.022 .000 1 .984 1.021 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sector, Size, Age, Paper work. 
 
The dependent variables of categorical regression model again change accordingly to the growth 
of sale and investment, and the independent variables are still same. The results of categorical 
regression are displayed in table 8.22, table 8.23, table 8.24, and table 8.24. In the sale growth 
analysis of the previous three years, no variables are statistically significant at 95%. Only the 
variable of sector is significant to affect the investment growth of previous three years at the 
critical value of 95%. Again at the critical value of 95%, no variables are significant in the 
categorical regression of sale growth in future three years, and sector is significant in the 
categorical regression of investment growth.  
Table 8.22: Effect on sales growth of the previous three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .135 .102 1.768 .180 
Size -.214 .153 1.959 .150 
Age -.075 .295 .065 .799 
Paper work -.333 .234 2.021 .161 
R square:    .176 
 
Table 8.23: Effect on sales growth of the future three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
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Sector .131 .123 1.139 .327 
Size -.268 .173 2.397 .100 
Age .086 .207 .173 .679 
Paper work .306 .344 .792 .503 
R square:    .166 
 
Table 8.24: Effect on investment growth of the previous three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .343 .149 5.320 .010 
Size -.178 .224 .631 .433 
Age -.059 .393 .023 .881 
Paper work .219 .280 .611 .440 
R square:    .205 
 
Table 8.25: Effect on investment growth of the future three years 
Coefficients 
 
Standardized Coefficients 
F Sig. Beta 
Bootstrap (1000) 
Estimate of Std. Error 
Sector .322 .170 3.584 .042 
Size -.334 .194 2.950 .069 
Age -.260 .290 .802 .378 
Paper work -.337 .381 .784 .467 
R square:    .436 
 
To sum up, the investigation of the general constraints is the same as the one of foreign and 
domestic firms. To study the specific constraints, in the logistic regression analysis, the variable 
of paper work is significant to affect the changes of sales in the future three years. According to 
the results of categorical regression analysis, the institutional factor named “paper work” is not 
significant to influence either the sales or investment, either in the previous three years or in the 
future three years. 
8.3 Finding of logistic regression analysis and categorical regression analysis 
As the foreign firms are invested by the overseas private owners, they belong to private firms in 
this research. The author hence does not only explore the constraints significant related to the 
factor of foreign ownership, but examines the significant constraints connected with the private 
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ownership factor. According to the finding in Chapter 7, at 95% in the group of foreign 
firms and domestic firms, finance is statistically significant among general constraints, and 
there are two statistically significant constraints named “court-enforceability” and 
“finance-access to foreign bank” among the specific constraints. In the group of private and 
non-private firms, finance is again significant, and only one constraining factor of 
“finance-paper work” that is statistically significant. Among the significant constraints, 
finance is the standout significant factor to both firm groups.  
 
In the logistic regression analysis, the model including the variable “finance” is only 
statistically significant for the sale change in the previous three years at 95%. However, in 
all four models, the constraining factor of “finance” is not statistically significant influence 
the change of sales and of investment. However, the factor of firm age is statistically 
significant to affect both the change of sale in previous three years and the investment change in 
the future three years. In the categorical regression analysis, finance is significant to 
influence the sale growth in the previous three years, and its effect is negative. In the other 
three models, finance is not significant any more. In addition, the influences of finance on 
business performance are negative in the previous three years and positive in the future three 
years. The variable of sector is significant in the investigation of future performance. 
 
In the logistic regression analysis of “court-enforceability” and “finance-access to foreign 
bank”, the four models are not significant at 95%. “Court-enforceability” is statistically 
significant to the change of sale in future three years, and “finance-access to foreign bank” 
is statistical significant to affect the investment change in the future three years. In addition, 
firm age is significant to influence the sale change in previous three years, and the factor of firm 
size is significant to affect the investment change in the future three years. However, there are 
no significant factors in the categorical regression analysis.  
 
Moreover, under the logistic regression analysis, this variable of “finance-paper work” is 
not significant in all four models at the critical value of 95%, and the variable of firm age is 
significant to change the sale in previous the investment in future. In the categorical regression 
analysis, this factor is not significant to influence the sale growth and investment growth at 
the given critical value of 95%. 
8.4 Summary of regression analysis 
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The author chooses logistic regression and categorical regression to investigate the relations 
between the constraints and the firms’ business performance, in terms of the change of sales and 
investment/the growth of sales and investment. The investigation covers the previous three years 
and the future three years. The analysis displays that the constraining factors might not be 
statistically significant to influence the business performance, although the same constraints are 
statistically significant related to some characters of these firms, such as foreign ownership and 
private ownership. Even if these constraints are significant, their significant influences are not 
constant. That is, the significant relations are either in previous three years or in future three 
years, either in sale growth or in investment growth.  
 
However, one question arises about why the significant relations cannot keep constant. More 
importantly, along with the question related to the finding of Chapter 7, why the informal 
institutions are not statistically significant to influence business performance. These two 
questions can be summarised as to why the influences of institutions on business performance 
are limited and how to realise the limitation or problems in the application of NIEs theory in 
China. In Chapter 9, the author aims to answer these questions by re-examining the main 
findings of Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8.  
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Chapter 9 Research discussion 
9.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to thoroughly review and discuss the findings of Chapter 6, Chapter 7, 
and Chapter 8, based on the results of descriptive analysis, the Levene’s test and Error bar, and 
of the regression analysis (logistics regression and categorical regression analysis). In the 
beginning, the author will discuss the findings of these three chapters separately to explain the 
analysis results. As the second step, the scholar tries to bring the findings together and re-
examine the connections amongst these findings. Moreover, along with the theoretical 
foundation of the NIEs and the actual business environment in China, the findings will be 
further investigated to find the direct and indirect reasons behind the apparent evidences. In the 
end, the author links the research findings and the application of NIE theory to try to examine 
the policies about how to improve business performance in China. 
9.2 The reviews of research finding 
9.2.1 Descriptive analysis finding 
According to the WBES data, there are 34.7% of firms that are foreign firms, and 76.2% of 
them are private firms in this research (Table 6.1). 67 firms (66.3% of total) regard financing as 
the major obstacle among the general constraints (table 6.2), and 80.2% of all firms regard 
financing as the problematic constraint (table 6.3 and figure 6.1). Moreover, this problematic 
financing constraint is still valid for firms with and without foreign ownership, for both private 
firms and non-private firms (table 6.4). The dissimilarity amongst these firms is the only 
different level of financing constraint that they face.  
 
Corruption is the most obvious constraint belonging to the informal institutions. In fact, 
upon the WBES, there are only two corruption factors surveyed in China--- corruption as a 
general constraint and the corruption of bank officials. The issue of corruption is a pressing 
concern for China, as it is ranked the 4th problematic constraint for all firms, the 7th for foreign 
firms, the 4th for domestic firms, and the 5th for private and non-private firms (table 6.4). The 
corruption of bank officials is one which is selected as a problematic constraint by 32.3% of all 
firms (table 6.8). It is evident that foreign firms, non-private firms and private firms are less 
constrained by this factor, while the domestic firms are more constrained by the corruption of 
bank officials. When turning to the formal institutions, among the specific finance factors 
(table 6.6), credit information is the largest limitation for all firms. Although non-private firms 
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view paper work and high interest rates as their largest constraints. In the judicial functioning 
category (table 6.9), “court-affordable” is the number one constraint for all firms and for foreign 
firms. For domestic firms, the court-fair and impartial factor is the most important constraint. 
The private firms consider the court-enforceability as the most problematic one, while the non-
private firms select the court-consistent constraint instead. Among the rules and regulations 
constraints, all firms view high tax as the number one obstacle, regardless of firm size (table 
6.7). In Table 6.5, non-private firms view “avoiding tax” as the most serious competition 
constraint, while others regard “domestic price” as the most serious. 
 
Subject to the limitation of the WBES data on the informal institutions, the comparison can be 
only applied on the formal institutions in China. The four kinds of firms investigated in this 
research all view “high tax” as the number one problem of rules and regulations. The majority 
consider “credit information” as the most difficult constraint under the category of financial 
constraints, apart from the non-private firms. Similarly, most view “domestic price” as the most 
leading competition constraint, whereas non-private firms view “avoiding tax” as the largest 
competition constraint. Their views on judicial functioning constraints are very contrasting. In 
fact, all firms have the same opinion about the obstruction of their business. The results of 
descriptive analysis can only show the similarities and differences of the apparent responses of 
the business constraints in China. Nevertheless, these analysis results cannot explain why the 
responses are similar or different, as this would require an in-depth analysis.    
 
9.2.2 Research findings of Levene’s test and error bar 
Given the similarities and differences of the firms’ responses as a percentage, it is important to 
discover whether the reaction can be linked to the fundamental characters of the firms, in terms 
of foreign ownership, of private ownership, and size of the firm. The Levene’s test and Error bar 
are the two appropriate statistical tools to answer this question. 
 
In the category of foreign firms and domestic firms, “financing” is the only general constraint 
that is statistically significant at 95%. “Court-enforceability” and “financing-access to foreign 
bank” are the two specific significant factors related to the foreign ownership factor. As all 
other constraints are not statistically significant, the similarities and differences of their 
responses to other business constraints should not be linked to the factor of foreign ownership. 
In addition, the domestic firms are more constrained than the foreign firms by financing as 
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a general constraint. For the specific constraints, the domestic firms are less constrained by 
“financing-access to foreign bank” and “court-enforceability” than the foreign firms. On 
the informal institutions side, no constraints are significant either. The foreign firms are 
less constrained than the domestic firms, both by “corruption” as a general constraint and 
“corruption of bank officials” as a specific constraint. Particularly, corruption is not 
described as a problematic constraint by the majority of the firms, and it is not significantly 
related to the foreign ownership factor. This result confirms the findings of descriptive 
analysis that corruption is not as serious as the existing literatures discussed in Chapter 3 about 
the business environment in China.  
 
In the category of the private firms and non-private firms, “financing” is again the unique 
statistically significant general constraint that is related to the private ownership. The 
private firms are less constrained by “financing” than the non-private firms. “Financing-
paper work” is the only one significant specific constraint that is connected with their 
ownership difference, and the private firms are again less constrained than the non-private 
firms by this factor.  
 
9.2.3 Research findings of regression analysis 
After having found the significant constraints, the author chooses the logistic regression and 
categorical regression to investigate the influences of these constraining factors on the business 
performance. The variables consist of “financing” as a general constraint, “finance-access to 
foreign bank” (AFB) and “court-enforceability” (CE) as the specific constraints for 
foreign/domestic firms, and “finance-paper work” (PW) for private/non-private firms. As no 
informal institutions are statistically significant to the ownership factor (which includes foreign 
ownership and private ownership), only the business constraints belonging to the formal 
institutions are investigated in the regression analysis.  
 
Based on the logistic regression analysis including “financing”, the model is statistically 
significant to the sale change in previous three years at 95%, and the variable of firm age is 
significant at 95% and the variable of financing is significant only at 75%. The model including 
AFB and CE is significant at 75% to the sale change in the previous three years. In this model, 
firm age and CE are significant at 75%. The investment model of the future three years is 
significant at 75%. In this model, the variables of firm size, firm age, and “financing” are also 
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significant at 75%. To study the sale change of the future three years, the model including AFB 
and CE is significant at 75% and CE is significant at 95%. The same model is significant to the 
investment change in the future three years at 75%, and the variables of AFB and firm size are 
significant at 95%. Given the critical value of 75%, the model including the PW is significant 
both to the sale change in previous three years and to the investment change in the future three 
years. In this model, firm age is the unique significant variable at 75%. 
 
The author also applies the categorical regression to investigate the relationship between the 
same dependent and independent variables. The model displays that “financing” is significant 
at 95% to negatively influence the sale growth in previous three years. In this model, the 
variable of firm size is also significant and has a negative effect. The variable of firm sector is 
significantly related to the future growth of sale and investment. In the model containing AFB 
and CE, neither AFE nor CE is significant to influence the sale growth and investment growth in 
China. Through the investigation of the model including the variable of PW, at the critical value 
of 95%, the factor of firm sector is significant to affect both the sale growth and the investment 
growth in the future three years. At the critical value of 75%, the factor of firm size becomes 
significant to influence the sales growth in the past and in future, and also in investment growth 
in future. More importantly, PW is also significant and negative to control the growth in 
sales in the previous three years. 
 
To sum up, investigating the results of two types of regression models at 95%, only the model 
including “financing” is significant. As a general constraint in this model, “financing” 
negatively influences the sales in pervious three years. The relation between the other 
institutional constraints and the business performance is not significant, either because the 
model is not significant or because the variable is not significant. If we change the critical value 
to 75%, ACF and CE are not significant to affect the business performance. Again compared to 
the 75% critical value, the model having PW is significant to investigate the sale growth in the 
previous three years, and in this model the constraint of PW is statistically significant to 
negatively change the growth of sales. Moreover, the factors of sector, firm size, and firm age 
are also able to influence the firms’ business performance. 
9.3 Research findings and the influences of institutions on business performance 
In addition to the theoretical constraints (such as labour, land, capital, and technology), the 
economic reform in China comprises the restructuring efforts in its economy and society. This 
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reforming process is started by the external factor of FDI inflows in the beginning, and then 
sustained and accelerated by an internal factor of ownership change towards a gradual 
privatisation. Understood by the NIEs scholars, the business growth in China might be largely 
considered as the result of transition or moving away from its existing Marxist institutional 
system. After testing a number of hypotheses, the author tries to discover the relations between 
the institutions and the firms’ business performance.  
9.3.1 The business constraints and institutions in China 
As a whole, the investigation shows that the institutions might have an effect on the business 
performance in China. The constraints can be allocated in several categories, which are 
financing, infrastructure, political instability, inflation, exchange rate, organised crime, 
corruption, tax and regulation. All firms surveyed by the WBES mentioned how they are 
constrained by these factors. In other words, the descriptive research findings confirm that the 
institutions, acting as “the rules of the game” (North, 1995: 8), shape the exchange activities and 
human organisation. North (1990) noted that the institutions can be acting as the rules of the 
game differently from one society to the others, and the differences result from the actual 
environment, i.e. objective endowment and subjective situation. In a transit and developing 
economy like China, both formal rules and informal institutions influence the business 
performance. Thus, the institutions can be considered as the basis of business studies as they 
determine the business operation and also contribute to a sustainable development. 
 
In terms of reforming FDI policies and regulations, the business constraints can affect the 
business performance from various angles. Moreover, the institutional elements are 
complementary and substitute between each other, depending on the nature and character of 
economic growth (Aoki, 2001; Bruton et al., 2001). It can also be understood differently that, 
the institutions have their effects on the incentives and activities of the individuals, through the 
three categories of institutions which are cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements 
(Scott, 1995). The institutions can therefore influence the business competition and business 
extension of the existing firms. Furthermore, the institutional factors are able to encourage or 
prevent the potential foreign and domestic investors from their investment behaviour and other 
business activities connected at present and in future.    
9.3.2 The business constraints and the characteristics of the firms in China 
There are four kinds of firms investigated in this research, including firms with foreign 
ownership, firms without foreign ownership, private firms and non-private firms. Therefore, to 
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explore the influences of institutions on business performance in China, it is necessary to 
investigate the relations between the institutions and the characteristics of these firms.  
 
Among the formal institutions, “financing”, “financing-access to foreign bank”, and “court-
enforceability” are three significant variables that are related to the factor of with/without 
foreign ownership. “Financing” and “financing-paper work” are the two significant factors that 
are connected with the different character of private firms/non-private firms. Among the general 
business constraints, “financing” is the only significant one both to the category of foreign 
invested firms/domestic firms, and to the category of private firms/non-private firms. Among 
the specific constraints, the factors named “financing-access to foreign bank” and “court-
enforceability” are significantly related to the factor of foreign ownership, and “financing-
paper” is significantly connected with private ownership. In addition, none of these specific 
factors is significant to both categories. Theoretically, the informal institutions are also the 
important, such as values, norms, beliefs, and culture, and as well as the enforcement 
characteristics of both formal and informal institutions (North, 1991). In theory, the influences 
of both formal and informal institutions direct and shape the motivations and decisions of the 
individual actors (Clague, 1997). However, through the examination of the WBES data, there in 
no informal institution that is statistically significant to the business performance in China, 
either as a general constraint or as a specific constraint, either in previous or in future. 
 
When considering the significant constraint, the domestic firms look to be more constrained by 
financing as a general constraint. For the significant specific constraints, foreign firms could be 
more constrained by “financing-access to foreign bank” and by “court- enforceability” than 
domestic firms. It might also suggest that private firms are less constrained by “financing” than 
non-private firms, and less constrained by “financing-paper work”. For the constraints that are 
not statistically significant to the factors of foreign investment or private investment, it seems 
that there is no common tendency about the investment character and the level of business 
constraints. That is to say, foreign firms might be more constrained by some obstacles and less 
constrained by other factors than domestic firms. Similarly, it looks that the private firms are 
more constrained by some factors, and the non-private firms are more constrained by the others. 
 
Recalling the literatures in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the FDI oriented reforms are conducted by 
central government and regional government, and both the policies and the specific regulations 
are all designed to provide some advantages for FDI inflows. However, the implementation of 
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the most reforms did not entirely succeed in affecting the business performance. In other words, 
there is something else that is able to influence the application of these policies and regulations, 
and those issues cause the bias in the operational mechanism of the policies and regulations. 
9.3.3 The business constraints and the evaluation of the institutional reforms in 
China 
9.3.3.1 The general evaluation of the reforms 
Table 9.1 The economic performance in China------FDI and GDP 
 FDI 
Annual 
growth 
GDP 
Annual 
growth 
GDP per 
capita 
Annual 
growth 
Unit 
US$ 100M 
(current 
price) 
% 
US$ Billion 
(current 
price) 
% 
US$ (current 
price) 
% 
1985 19.56  305.26  288.39  
1986 22.44 14.72 295.48 -3.20 274.84 -4.70 
1987 23.14 3.12 321.39 8.77 294.05 6.99 
1988 31.94 38.03 401.07 24.79 361.24 22.85 
1989 33.93 6.23 449.10 11.98 398.48 10.31 
1990 34.87 2.77 387.77 -13.66 339.16 -14.89 
1991 43.66 25.21 406.09 4.72 350.61 3.38 
1992 110.08 152.13 483.05 18.95 412.26 17.58 
1993 275.15 149.95 613.23 26.95 517.42 25.51 
1994 337.67 22.72 559.23 -8.81 466.61 -9.82 
1995 375.21 11.12 727.95 30.17 601.01 28.80 
1996 417.26 11.21 856.01 17.59 699.41 16.37 
1997 452.57 8.46 952.65 11.29 770.59 10.18 
1998 454.63 0.46 1019.48 7.02 817.14 6.04 
1999 403.19 -11.31 1083.28 6.26 861.21 5.39 
2000 407.15 0.98 1198.48 10.63 945.60 9.80 
2001 468.78 15.14 1324.81 10.54 1038.03 9.77 
2002 527.43 12.51 1453.84 9.74 1131.81 9.03 
2003 535.05 1.44 1640.96 12.87 1269.83 12.19 
2004 606.30 13.32 1931.65 17.71 1486.02 17.03 
2005 603.25 -0.50 2256.92 16.84 1726.05 16.15 
2006 630.21 4.47 2712.92 20.20 2063.87 19.57 
2007 747.68 18.64 3494.24 28.80 2644.56 28.14 
2008 923.95 23.58 4519.95 29.35 3403.53 28.70 
2009 900.33 -2.56 4990.53 10.41 3739.62 9.87 
2010 1057.35 17.44 5930.39 18.83 4422.66 18.26 
2011 1160.11 9.72 7321.99 23.47 5434.36 22.88 
Source: FDI---Chinese statistical year book; GDP and GDP per capita---World Economic Outlook. 
 
 
 229 
Table 9.2 The economic performance in China------Investment 
 
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT 
IN FIXED 
ASSETS 
Annual 
growth 
TOTAL INVESTMENT IN 
FIXED ASSETS BY Private 
Ownership 
Annual 
growth 
Investment 
share of 
private 
ownership 
Unit 
100 Million 
(Yuan) 
% 100 Million (Yuan) % % 
1994 17042.94  4631.12  27.17 
1995 20019.26 17.46 5771.59 24.63 28.83 
1996 22913.55 14.46 7084.05 22.74 30.92 
1997 24941.11 8.85 7832.83 10.57 31.41 
1998 28406.17 13.89 8725.68 11.40 30.72 
1999 29854.71 5.10 9423.95 8.00 31.57 
2000 32917.73 10.26 11472.23 21.73 34.85 
2001 37213.49 13.05 14186.27 23.66 38.12 
2002 43499.91 16.89 18436.94 29.96 42.38 
2003 55566.61 27.74 28751.39 55.94 51.74 
2004 70477.40 26.83 34763.50 20.91 49.33 
2005 88773.60 25.96 51080.60 46.94 57.54 
2006 109998.20 23.91 71006.00 39.01 64.55 
2007 137323.90 24.84 93980.15 32.36 68.44 
2008 172828.40 25.85 117826.23 25.37 68.18 
2009 224598.77 29.95 146423.31 24.27 65.19 
2010 251683.77 12.06 158325.37 8.13 62.91 
2011 311485.13 23.76 218745.24 38.16 70.23 
Source: Chinese statistical year book 
 
Graph 9.1 The economic performance during the regional and global crises 
 
 
To build a more liberal business environment, Chinese government starts its continuous 
institutional reforms through an international mechanism. As the problems of institutions are in 
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the areas of finance, law, corruption, the judicial system, rules and regulations, etc., the related 
reforms obviously have positive effects on the business operation of both the FIEs and the 
domestic firms. For example, the FDI in China increased from $ 19.56 million in 1985 to $ 
747.68 million in 2007 (Table 9.1). From 1985 to 1991, the overall growth of the FDI inflows is 
more than doubled. In 1992 and 1993, the FDI inflows keep increasing at speed of about 150% 
per year. From 1994 to now, the growth of FDI inflows is stable except for the negative 
influences caused by Southeast Asian financial crisis. Globally, China’s economic performance 
was outstanding during the East Asian financial crisis (1998) and the current global (2008) 
crises (Graph 9.1) (Lin, 2011). 
 
According to the literatures in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the Chinese government actually started 
its elementary reforms in 1991 although the reform was apparently started in beginning of the 
1980s.  From 1991 to 1993, the reforms are also connected with the WTO negotiation, along 
with the most fundamental revolution by legitimately recognising the domestic private 
ownership in the first time after 1949. As one landmark of legal reorganisation in China, as the 
first time, the private investment data appeared in Chinese statistical year book in 1994. 
Increasingly competitive sectors, such as distribution, were opened to private enterprise and 
foreign capital. Overall, the Chinese economic reform has generated rapid economic growth 
over two decades and the country has moved from a centrally planned economy towards a 
market economy (Hu, 2005). Consequently, China has little by little abandoned its Maoist 
control in economy and society, and the reforms officially and legitimately followed the 
Western standard (Oi, 1992). The private investment grew faster than the total investment since 
1994 (table 9.2). When considering the issue of time lag, the continuous growth of private 
investment since 1994 seems to provide evidence that the reforms lead the overwhelming 
development of private sector. The investment share of private investment increases from 
27.17% in 1994 to 66.35% in 2007. As private investment depends on its profits or prediction, 
the faster growth of private investment has verified that the private investment is more efficient 
than government’s investment in this same business environment (Serven and Solimano, 1992).   
 
9.3.3.2 The constraint of business competition and the institutional reform  
In the category of business competition constraints of the WBES, it suggests that no factor is 
significant to influence the business performance either of foreign firms or of private firms at 
95%. As the variables in the regression models are based on the analysis of Levene’s test and 
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Error Bar, it is possible that the firms are similarly constrained by the competition factors. It is 
also likely that, although they are differently constrained by the business competition reasons, 
the different constraint levels they face are not significantly related to the ownership difference. 
Thus, it is still important to review the situation of these competition obstacles explored in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. In table 6.5 of Chapter 6, all firms choose “domestic producers 
unfairly sell below my prices” (DP) and “violation of patent by the competitors” (VP) as 
their top two business competition constraints. DP is also the top constraint for the FIEs and 
private firms. As it is usually impossible for domestic private producers to use DP in 
competition because DP also reduces their own profits, all firms who choose DP as their first 
concern in competition demonstrate that there should be other competitors using the DP. 
Interestingly, “receiving subsidies” (RS) is not significant either. When recalling the conclusion 
about the national banking system credit funds for the SOEs and the relation between 
government and the SOEs, it is easy to answer these questions and to understand why financing 
is statistically significant in affecting business performance in China.  
 
As the subsidies from government are against the WTO accession agreement, “all forms of 
export subsidies inconsistent with WTO rules, including grants and tax breaks linked to export 
performance, were eliminated” (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 2004: 8). Chinese government has to 
make use of the national banking system controlled by government to potentially and indirectly 
maintain the SOEs in competition (Martin, 2012; Linton, 2006), instead of using the 
government subsidies. Positively speaking, the governmental behaviours in China are changed 
due to the international mechanism. On the negative side, the Chinese government has found 
that in order to achieve its own objectives, the new approach makes it unavoidable in breaking 
its own promise, which is to treat domestic and foreign enterprises equally. Similarly, the 
constraint of DP largely results from the same reason. All in all, financing support toward the 
SOEs is the reason behind the concerns of DP although DP is not significant. In addition, the 
function of financing support has taken the place of the other constraints, such as DP and RS, 
and financing issues also make the constraint of RS become less important. 
Table 9.3 Violations of patents cases finished in the court of China 
Year 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Number 
of cases 
3823 2777 1662 1508 4009 5041 5411 8332 13393 14056 21026 
Source: Chinese statistical year book 
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The patent violations have been regarded as an important part of business risks in China (Haley, 
2003), and they also determine the core competencies of firms (Wang et al., 2004). The area of 
IPR protection of Chinese law was seen as critical to the prospects for the long-range economic 
development, as “rampant piracy of intellectual property in China has undermined foreign 
confidence in the Chinese market’s ability to absorb foreign technology and copyrighted 
material without cannibalizing it” (Spierer, 2006). Moreover, Lee and Mansfield (1996) 
reported that China’s weak IP protection has negatively influenced the US direct investment in 
China. In table 9.3, the number of VP cases finished by courts increased by about four times 
from 2001 to 2007, and this number grew very slowly before 2001. However, GDP growth and 
FDI inflows are similar in the two periods (table 9.1). This rapid increase in VP cases after 2001 
again proves Chinese efforts along with its agreement of the WTO accession. The relative stable 
and small number before 1996 shows the vacuum of patent protection due to the law blankness. 
Along with the efforts to establish the mechanism to protect patents and other intellectual 
property rights, the social common reorganisation of patent protection has also been gradually 
set up in China. In other words, the reforms of formal institutions of patent protection 
successfully change the informal institutions related in China. With the social awareness of 
intellectual property right protection, everyone in China can use this legal weapon to protect 
their benefits of patents. That is another reason about the large increase in number of these 
cases. However, “while China has many laws to protect intellectual property… enforcement of 
such laws has been problematic as the court system is still in the process of reform, and relevant 
administrative bureaus have problems delegating authority” (Li, 2002: 650). In particular, 
Guvenli and Sanyal (2003) found that according to senior managers of American-owned firms 
in China, none of them found China’s legal systems efficient and few found it fair when dealing 
with the problems of patent violations. 
 
9.3.3.3 The constraints of finance and the evaluation of the institutional reforms 
The research findings might exhibit that both the FIEs and private firms are the most 
problematically constrained by financing. Accordingly, there is a difference between the reform 
of institutions in finance and their effects in practice. In table 9.4, the credit share for local 
private owners is always less than 1%, and the credit share for foreign investment has been 
decreasing since 2001. According to the data in this table, the largest share of national banking 
system credit funds flows to non-private firms, such as the SOEs. For both the FIEs and private 
firms, it is evident that the financial support from the Chinese national banking system is far less 
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than the sufficient or even the necessary level when we compare the credit share for private 
firms to the investment share of private owners (Lin and Zhang, 2009). Furthermore, compared 
to the fast increasing investment of the foreign and domestic private owners, financing that acts 
as a constraining factor prevents both from fair competition with the SOEs in China. Without 
sufficient financing, they have to depend on their own approaches to seek funds with the 
additional costs and risks. Moreover, the growth of credit funds from national banking system is 
closely connected with the WTO negotiation. When China entered the WTO in 2001, the 
national treatment is a major commitment on trade-related activities (Rumbaugh and Blancher, 
2004). At the same time, the financial benefits for the FIEs are in reality terminated by Chinese 
national banking system, and the government began to treat the FIEs and the domestic owned 
firms equally in terms of financial supports. Moreover, the US government made the first 
complaint against China in the WTO in 2004 as the US government alleged that China provided 
preferential treatment “for domestic semiconductor producers and that the preferences violated 
China’s national treatment obligations” (Hufbauer et al., 2006: 55). 
 
Table 9.4 The economic performance in China------National banking system credit funds 
 
Total 
NATIONAL 
BANKING 
SYSTEM 
CREDIT 
FUNDS 
Annual 
growth 
NATIONAL 
BANKING 
SYSTEM 
CREDIT 
FUNDS for 
local private 
ownership 
Annual 
growth 
Credit 
share 
NATIONAL 
BANKING 
SYSTEM 
CREDIT 
FUNDS for 
FDI 
Annual 
growth 
Credit 
share 
unit 
100 Million 
(Yuan) 
% 
100 Million 
(Yuan) 
% % 
100 Million 
(Yuan) 
% % 
1994 49558.40  155.90  0.31 792.30  1.60 
1995 64221.70 29.59 196.20 25.85 0.31 999.10 26.10 1.56 
1996 79033.70 23.06 279.80 42.61 0.35 1346.30 34.75 1.70 
1997 95008.10 20.21 386.70 38.21 0.41 1891.00 40.46 1.99 
1998 110420.50 16.22 471.60 21.96 0.43 2487.50 31.54 2.25 
1999 123230.60 11.60 579.10 22.79 0.47 2985.80 20.03 2.42 
2000 135483.70 9.94 654.60 13.04 0.48 3049.80 2.14 2.25 
2001 154876.10 14.31 918.00 40.24 0.59 3263.50 7.01 2.11 
2002 184024.50 18.82 1058.80 15.34 0.58 2697.40 -17.35 1.47 
2003 225313.30 22.44 1461.60 38.04 0.65 2569.40 -4.75 1.14 
2004 262740.00 16.61 2081.60 42.42 0.79 2198.40 -14.44 0.84 
2005 302042.80 14.96 2180.80 4.77 0.72 1975.30 -10.15 0.65 
2006 365230.10 20.92 2667.60 22.32 0.73 1833.70 -7.17 0.50 
2007 454267.80 24.38 3507.70 31.49 0.77 2069.10 12.84 0.46 
Source: Chinese statistical year book (Note: The national banking system credit funds statistical data for local 
private ownership was not available after 2007) 
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There might be still some obvious shortcomings among the specific financing constraints, 
despite the inefficient national banking system in China. For the FIEs, it looks that the constraint 
of “financing-access to foreign bank” is also statistically significant to influence the 
investment change in the future three years. If considering the constraint of finance as general 
and the specific constraint of financing-access to foreign bank together, the institutions in 
China could not only limit the financial supports to the FIEs through its national banking 
system, but also prevent them from getting overseas funding. Similarly, it suggests that the 
private firms are both constrained by the factor of finance and by that of financing-paper 
work, and they have to face more problems in getting domestic funds, in the context of 
“bureaucratic sabotage” (Brecht, 1937) in the national banking system. Actually, it is impossible 
for the private firms in China to access to funds abroad because the rules and regulations will 
block such attempts. Evidently, the institutions are not effective enough to sustain the growth of 
private capital in China.  
 
The author might conclude, although the reforms of financing institutions announced by 
Chinese government have contributed to the growth of FDI inflows and domestic private 
investment, the financing reforming is not towards a marketing oriented economy and still less 
than an essential level to maintain a sustainable growth of the private sector. As Linton (2006: 
9) mentioned, “the FIEs have limited access to capital in China. Most FIEs depend on parent 
company financing and the reinvestment of profits earned locally. It is very difficult, however, 
for smaller FIEs to obtain funds without ties to local bank managers or loan officers”. As the 
most reliable source of local funding, foreign banks can however raise only limited amounts of 
capital (EIU 2006). On the contrary, after joining the WTO, the financing reform is indeed to 
encourage the growth of SOEs and to control the expansion of non-state ownership in China, in 
order to protect the socialist economy ultimately (Hassard et al., 2007; Xie et al., 2012). 
 
9.3.3.4 The constraint of rules and regulations and the evaluation of institutional 
reform  
Djankov et al. (2006) demonstrate the countries with better regulations grow faster by using 
objective measures of business regulations. However, the analysis of Levene’s test and Error bar 
may display all variables in the category of rules and regulations constraints are insignificant at 
95%. Among these rules and regulations variables, custom regulation constraint (CR), labour 
regulation constraint (LR) and foreign exchange constraint (FER) become significant to the 
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difference of foreign ownership, compared to the 75% critical value. There could be a relatively 
close connection between the responses on these three constraints and the foreign ownership 
factor. It also suggests that the foreign firms are more constrained by LR and FER and less 
constrained by CR than the domestic firms. At the 75%, it also seems that FER and tax 
administration regulation (TAR) are two significant factors towards the difference in private 
ownership. Private firms look to be more constrained by TAX and less constrained by FER. To 
sum up, it might demonstrate the constraint of foreign exchange regulation is significant to the 
ownership difference in China. 
 
The descriptive analysis might display no firms choose the factor of rules and regulations as 
their top constraint (Chapter 6: table 6.4). Given the special arrangement in rules and regulations 
to attract FDI inflows, the FIEs that might be still more constrained by FER could imply that the 
FER reform is still not sufficient and effective. Linton (2006) noted the restrictive foreign 
exchange control system further complicates FIEs access to capital as China employs these 
complex regulations to maintain currency transactions that are generally open on the current 
account but closed on the capital account. Base on a survey conducted by the Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers, financial and tax issues, and particularly the regulation of capital and earnings, as one 
of the greatest challenge of investing in China. They also cite difficulties in obtaining loans and 
banking services that are inadequate to meet demand (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2004: 6-7). The 
latter complaints are also similar to the problems faced by domestic firms (Tam, 2005). “Off-
shore sources of finance often are critical to FIEs; foreign exchange controls and a complicated 
regulatory environment substantially undercut their access to capital” (Linton, 2006: 9). 
 
The situation of CR displays the reform related is already efficient for FDI implementation. For 
the LR constraint, it is possible that the applicable practices of LR turn out to be business 
obstacles for the FIEs. However, as some FDI enters China to enjoy the regulating blankness in 
business operation (Wang and Meng, 2004; Dean et al., 2009), the ongoing reform in setting up 
a system of regulations will clearly prevent some FIEs from operating their business in China. 
Similarly, the business obstacles of TAX and FER also indicate the success of reforming foreign 
exchange policies and the failure in the reforms in the institutions connected with TAX. 
 
Du (2009) notes that China’s experience demonstrates that administrative governance may have 
been instrumental in the absence of adequate market-supporting legal institutions. Together with 
the reforms in laws and courts, the legislation reform additionally leads to the changes of rules 
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and regulations in China. Among them, on the domestic aspect, the Interim Provisions on 
Guiding FDI is the most important one to “classify four categories for FDI----encouraged, 
permitted, restricted, and prohibited. The regulations aim to encourage greater geographic 
dispersion of FDI inflows to China, and promote FDI inflows into targeted sectors and 
industries. In broad terms, projects are encouraged and permitted in designated industries that 
introduce new and advanced technologies, expand exports capacity, raise product quality, and 
use local resources in the central and western regions. Restricted and prohibited are projected in 
designated sectors that make use of existing technologies, compete with domestic production or 
state monopolies, make extensive use of scare resources, or are deemed to be a danger to 
national safety and the environment” (Tseng an Zebregs, 2002: 12-13). 
 
Table 9.5 The number of bilateral investment treaties concluded as of 1 January 1997 
Total Developed countries Developing countries Central and 
eastern 
European 
countries 
Western 
Europe 
United 
states 
Japan Other developed 
countries 
Within 
region 
Outside 
region 
80 16  1 3 21 18 21 
Source: Chinese statistical year book 
 
On the international side, both multilateral and bilateral agreements support further domestic 
reforms of rules and regulations. Among them, the WTO agreement introduces the multilateral 
mechanism to China. “China has made substantial commitment though the international 
mechanism in trade and investment liberalisation as a part of the WTO accession agreement. 
The general commitments include non-discriminatory treatment of foreign and domestic 
enterprises, adherence to WTO rules on intellectual property rights, and elimination of various 
requirements on FDI, including foreign exchange and trade balancing, technology transfer, local 
content, and export performance. Sector commitments involve significant expansion of market 
access, particularly in the services sector. These involve eliminating geographic and other 
restrictions in key sectors and increasing foreign ownership limits in telecommunications, life 
insurance, distribution and retailing, securities, and giving full national treatment to foreign 
banks” (Tseng an Zebregs, 2002: 12-13). Additionally, the bilateral agreement also directs the 
reforms of rules and regulations. Before China entered the WTO, the bilateral negotiation 
mainly refers the bilateral investment treaty (table 9.5). Gradually, the free trade agreement 
becomes the new target, such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area. As a result, the 
international cooperation helps to maintain the reforming policies and reduce redistributive 
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intervention in China and to benefit the investment of foreign owners and domestic private 
owners (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). 
 
9.3.3.5 The business constraint of corruption and the evaluation of institutional reform  
Recalling the investigation in Chapter 7, it looks that the foreign firms are less constrained by 
corruption, and the private firms are more constrained instead. Moreover, it suggests that the 
corruption constraints are not significant towards the factor of different firm ownership. The 
ownership type is thus not the central reason which causes the difference, as a general constraint 
or as a specific constraint. As an important business constraint of the informal institution, does 
the insignificance of corruption variables mean that corruption is no longer serious in China? As 
the regression section of this research only studies the variables that are significant in Levene’s 
test, it is necessary to re-explore the corruption from an altered angle. 
Table 9.6 The Control of Corruption data of China 
Year 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
% Rank 43.90 45.85 50.73 33.66 43.41 34.63 31.71 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% Rank 37.07 33.50 35.44 34.93 32.38 35.07 39.23 
Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, the World Bank. 
 
In 2001, Chinese courts at all levels investigated over 36,000 cases of corruption with the value 
of more than 4.1 billion Yuan. From 1994 to 2001, the number of people charged by corruption 
grew at an average annual rate of 12.5% (Chinese Statistical Year Book). The World Bank point 
out that the corruption in China becomes more serious between 1996 and 2007 (table 9.6). Allen 
et al. (2005) also verifies that China’s corruption is the worst among the seven developing 
countries. In fact, the corruption in China does not become better, and the firms face more 
corruption constraints than before.  
 
Table 9.7 Corruption in Asia Pacific Region 
RANK REGIONAL 
RANK 
COUNTRY / TERRITORY CPI 2010 SCORE 
1 1 New Zealand 9.3 
1 1 Singapore 9.3 
8 3 Australia 8.7 
13 4 Hong Kong 8.4 
17 5 Japan 7.8 
33 6 Taiwan 5.8 
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36 7 Bhutan 5.7 
38 8 Brunei 5.5 
39 9 Korea (South) 5.4 
46 10 Macau 5.0 
56 11 Malaysia 4.4 
62 12 Samoa 4.1 
73 13 Vanuatu 3.6 
78 14 China 3.5 
78 14 Thailand 3.5 
87 16 India 3.3 
91 17 Kiribati 3.2 
91 17 Sri Lanka 3.2 
101 19 Tonga 3.0 
110 20 Indonesia 2.8 
110 20 Solomon Islands 2.8 
116 22 Mongolia 2.7 
116 22 Vietnam 2.7 
127 24 Timor-Leste 2.5 
134 25 Bangladesh 2.4 
134 25 Philippines 2.4 
143 27 Maldives 2.3 
143 27 Pakistan 2.3 
146 29 Nepal 2.2 
154 30 Cambodia 2.1 
154 30 Laos 2.1 
154 30 Papua New Guinea 2.1 
176 33 Afghanistan 1.4 
176 33 Myanmar 1.4 
Source: Transparency International 
 
Common logic states that a foreign investor should be unwilling to invest in a country with a 
high level of corruption as there would be an increase in transaction costs due to bureaucratic 
barriers and the likelihood of possible fraud of the investment (Javorcik and Wei, 2009; Campos 
et al., 1999; Habib and Zurawicki, 2002). Based on an analysis of quantitative measures of the 
business environment, the study of Fries et al. (2002) shows business obstacles that added costs 
and constraints on business, especially such as corruption. However, although corruption is 
generally accepted as one of the main business obstacles in China, we do not find a significant 
difference between the two categories at 95% when corruption is as a general constraint. Why 
do the foreign firms and the domestic firms have similar responses? More importantly, does 
corruption practically affect the business performance in China? To answer these questions, we 
have to compare the corruption in China to that of other countries, by using the corruption 
perceptions index (CPI). Defined by Transparency International, the CPI is based on a scale 
from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). China is ranked in the 14th in the region of Asia 
Pacific, and ranked in the 78th in the CPI 2010 score globally (table 9.7). According to the 
World Bank Corporate Corruption/Ethics Indices, China is ranked the 52nd in the category of 
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corporate illegal corruption index component, and also ranked the 21st in the category of 
corporate legal corruption index component. In other words, when the corruption is regarded as 
a business constraint, the business environment in China is not noticeably worse than the other 
main developing countries in the Asia Pacific region and around the world. On the contrary, an 
outstandingly economic growth, an extending market size and the enormous business 
opportunities in China should be able to eliminate the negative influences caused by corruptions 
in business operation. 
 
According to the NIE, the relation between the formal and informal institutions is substitute 
between each other. Due to the availability of the WBES data in China, there are only two 
corruption variables examined. Without more corruption variables, the connection between 
them is helpful in this research. The World Bank views good governance and anti-corruption as 
important to its poverty alleviation mission. According to the Global Competitiveness Report 
2004/2005, traditionally, national governance and corruption challenges have been seen as: i) 
particularly daunting in the poorer countries, with the richer world viewed as exemplary; ii) 
anchored within a legalistic framework and focused on formal institutions, iii) a challenge 
within public sectors, and, iv) divorced from global governance or security issues---seen as 
separate fields. The World Bank constructs a new set of Corporate Corruption and Ethics 
Indices , encompassing forms of (legal) corruption not subject to measurement in conventional 
(illegal) corruption indicators. It is found that manifestations of “legal corruption” may be more 
prevalent than illegal forms, such as outright bribery, and particularly so in richer countries. 
Further, corruption in particular is a key determinant of a country's global competitiveness. 
Although the variable of legal corruption is unavailable, the regression analysis including the 
significant variable of court-enforceability can not only describe the corruption in the area of 
legislation, but also partly explain the influences on the business performance caused by the 
corruption in the other areas, such as the corruption in business competition, and the corruption 
in rules and regulations.  
 
Kaufmann et al. (2000) conducted an empirical analysis of governance and corruption, and they 
particularly pay attention to “state capture” as the propensity of firms shape the underlying 
“rules of the game”. In this study, as the unique significant general constraint, the importance of 
financing can explain the influence of bank officials’ corruption. Because of the decision-
making role under the communist system, “explicit corruption represents the expansion of these 
privileges through the illegal efforts of such individuals in their official capacity. Due to their 
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control of state-owned resources, party officials can often extort bribes from those in need of 
their services. … … In China, the best methods for detecting corruption are studying rent-
seeking behaviour as well as corrupt activities and data either stated or implied by the 
government. The main types of corruption in China are tax evasion; rent-seeking behaviour; 
involvement in the underground economy, where the management of the goods is legal, but the 
income is illegal; involvement in the underground economy, where the management of the 
goods is illegal; and the abuse of public investment and expenditures” (Tao, 2003: 9-10). 
 
9.3.3.6 The constraint of judicial constraints and the evaluation of institutional reform 
The descriptive analysis in Section 6.4.6 of Chapter 6 indicates that the firms’ responses on the 
judicial constraints are totally different from one to another as those firms select the diverse 
factors as the most problematic business obstacle. They seem to be constrained by all judicial 
constraints at a relatively high level. Upon the Levene’s test and Error bar, it shows that court-
enforceability (CE) is the unique significant factor related to the difference of with/without 
foreign ownership at 95%. At the 75% level, it suggests that court-fair and impartial (CFI) 
become significant to the category of private and non-private firms, and court-affordable (CA) 
and court-consistent (CC) become statistically significant in the case of foreign owned firms and 
domestic invested firms. More importantly, it seems that CE is statistically significant to lead to 
the sale change in the previous three years and in the future three years at the 75% critical level. 
Table 9.8 Civil cases finished in the court of China 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Number 
of cases 
3093995 3277572 3375069 3519244 3412259 3459025 4420123 4410236 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number 
of cases 
4432727 4380095 4385732 4724440 5412591 5800144 6090622 6614049 
Source: Chinese statistical year book 
 
Buscaglia and Domingo (1996) stated that the adoption of market reforms have created 
additional demands for court services. In addition, as an increase in GDP implies an increase in 
the number of transactions that can result in a potential possibility for conflict, “the number of 
transactions per individual as proxied by the level of real per capita GDP positively influences 
the amount of litigation per capita” (Clemenz and Gugler, 2000: 215). Consequently, there 
should be a positive relation between these two factors given the same or similar judicial cost. 
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Based on the WBES, the FIEs are more constrained by all judicial obstacles than the domestic 
firms, and private firms are more constrained than non-private firms. Thus the FDI favourite 
policies and the reforms connected in Chinese judicial system have partly failed to achieve their 
objectives although China has been successful to absorb a large amount of FDI. The 
unsuccessful reform of judicial system can also be verified by the data in the table 9.8. In this 
table, the number of civil cases finished in court rapidly grows before China enters the WTO in 
2001, and decreases afterward. Although the finished civil cases cannot represent everything of 
the judicial reform, the decreasing tendency is still inconsistent with the macro economic data in 
table 9.1. The relation between the fast economic growth and the decreasing number of civil 
cases can be explained by the fact that the judicial cost is increasing or the judicial system is not 
as efficient and effective as it should be. Accordingly, the reform in the judicial system is 
outstanding alongside the Chinese WTO negotiation before 2001. However, the efforts 
afterward are not as successful.  
Table 9.9 The Rule of Law data of China 
Year 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 
% Rank 36.36 38.76 35.89 39.23 40.19 38.76 37.80 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% Rank 37.32 41.15 45.19 45.50 45.50 43.66 38.86 
Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, the World Bank. 
 
The investigation about unsuccessful judicial reform in China can also be found by a World 
Bank project---the Worldwide Governance Indicators, in percentile rank terms from 0 (lowest) 
to 100 (highest) among all countries worldwide (Kaufmann et al., 2010). In this project, the 
Chinese data of Rule of Law can exhibit its reforming judicial system, by “capturing perceptions 
of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2010: 4). In table 9.9, from 1994 to 
2007, the Rule of Law data declines from 48.57 to 44.9. In every six years, the tendency is 
decreasing except from 1998 to 2004. Based on a survey, the managers of US multinational 
companies considers the Chinese legal system as inefficient and unfair in terms of legal 
protections of product piracy and patent violations (Guvenli and Sanyal, 2003). Similarly, Allen 
et al. (2005) examined Chinese legal system and compared them to the average measures of 49 
countries’ study conducted by La Porta et al. (1998). Allen et al. (2005) also suggest that the 
majority of the 49 countries have a better creditor and shareholder protection than China and the 
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progress of China’s legal system is not ahead of the other major emerging economies, though 
China has adopted various protection measures into the law. 
 
To have an effective law enforcement system, in theory, a country must have an independent 
and efficient judicial system with a sufficient supply of qualified legal professionals. “Increasing 
delays, backlogs and the uncertainty associated with expected court outcomes have diminished 
the quality of justice. The judiciary is faced with several obstacles, including a dysfunctional 
administration of justice, lack of transparency, and a perception of corruption” (Buscaglia, 1998: 
582). The Ministry of Justice of China have stated there are 110,000 lawyers and 9,000 law 
firms by 2002. Compared with data in table 9.6, lawyers represent only 2% of all clients in civil 
cases. Moreover, “only one-fifth of all lawyers in China have law degrees, and even a lower 
fraction of judges have formally studied law at a university or college. Needless to say, it will be 
a long time before China has a strong legal labour force” (Allen et al., 2005: 67). Another fact 
connected with the ineffective judicial reform is many new laws are not effectively enforced in 
China. The primary reason is the unavoidable conflict of interest between practicing law in the 
“fair play” business operation and keeping the monopoly power of the single ruling party, 
especially in cases in which government ownership and its officials are involved (Wilson, 
2003). Wilson (2003: 1008) also noted that “China’s legal system has progressed rapidly from 
ruin to reform. It still fails, however, to provide the basic legal rules upon which market 
economies rely. A stable, predictable legal system is imperative for successful investment. 
Without it, assessing and allocating risk is impossible”. Blodgett et al. (2009: 231) concluded 
that in the transition from its command-and-control economy toward the creation of a socialist 
market economy, “China must continue to reform its legal system, especially emphasizing the 
need for the existence of a judiciary free from Communist Party influence”. 
9.3.4 The relation between the formal and informal institutions in China 
According to the findings in Chapter 8, there are four statistically significant variables that 
influence the business performance, including “financing” as a general constraint, and the 
specific constraints named “financing-access to foreign bank”, “financing-paper work”, and 
“court-enforceability”. According to the NIE theories, they all belong to the formal institutions, 
and the variables of the informal institutions in China are not statistically significant to affect the 
business performance of the firms at the critical value of 95%, As this finding apparently does 
not support the NIE theories that both formal and informal institutions influences the business 
performance, it is therefore essential to investigate the relations between the corruption factors 
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and the significant variables included in the regression analysis of this research, in order to 
clarify application of the NIE in China.  
 
Scholars argue that the corruption problems are from the basic cultural characters in China as 
Chinese have a long tradition of placing personal connections above the law, due to its cultural 
background. Therefore, “China’s corruption problems can never be avoided no matter what 
political, economic, or social changes are brought about in the future”. However, “there is 
nothing to suggest that there are characteristics within Chinese culture that encourages 
corruption as opposed to Western cultures…….After a period of time when the new social norm 
gradually takes root, the political-legal environment can change people’s perceptions and 
behaviour”… … therefore, “the true cause of China’s recent corruption problems is due to the 
lack of separation between business and government, a weak judicial system and minimal 
economic transparency” (Tao, 2003: 7-8). Fundamentally, the reason is the overwhelming 
power of the Chinese Communist Party in both the political and economic affairs.  
 
The legal system should be an instrument of the ruling government to preserve social order. 
“The most basic form of judicial independence, decisional independence, refers to the ability of 
judges to decide cases independently in accordance with law and without (undue, inappropriate, 
or illegal) interference from other parties or entities… … Courts must not only be strong enough 
to resist pressure from outside forces in deciding cases; they must also have the authority and 
power to ensure that their judgments are enforced and that other political actors comply with 
their orders” (Peerenboom,2008: 3). However, in a socialist state, the party always makes use of 
influence in ideology, policy, and personnel matters, and the communist party even sometimes 
is involved in deciding the outcome of particular cases (Peerenboom, 2002). As a result, judicial 
decisions are practically often arbitrary and do not necessarily follow the sentencing guidelines 
set out in the Chinese constitution or the criminal and civil codes. In the Chinese communist 
system, it is impossible to prevent the executive and legislative powers from interfering in 
judicial matters. Due to a lack of trust in the fairness and supposed impartiality of the judicial 
system, actors who engage in corruption can seek protection from the legal system, and all 
actors within a marketplace of China think not in terms of long-term benefits, but in terms of 
short-term gains. Therefore, the author confirms the findings that the judicial constraints and the 
corruption can be substitute to each other (Choi and Thum, 2005), as “weaker legal systems and 
unstable conditions for economic activity increase corruption” (Buehn and Schneider, 2006: 24). 
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Related to the business constraints in the financing area, bank fraud has cost Chinese banks 
more than US$2.8 billion annually since 2000 (Zhou, 2006). The view of the Ministry of Public 
Security of China – the country’s top police authority, is that bank corruption is obviously 
increasing and expected to worsen with the rapid economic development (Wu, 2008). 
Considering local interests, personal profits and/or political achievement and promotion, local 
government and party officials would interfere in the criminal justice system regarding 
investigation of bank fraud and corruption cases. Furthermore, according to law, procuratorates 
are independent agencies which have considerable powers of investigation and prosecution 
regarding public corruption. In reality, however, since almost all senior government officials are 
party members, the fact that criminals are protected by “connection networks” and “protective 
umbrellas” makes the problem of corruption a more structural and cultural one (Cheng and Ma, 
2009). Thus, the complaints related to corruption in the banking system of China can also easily 
lead to the connection with the specific financing constraints, and it is obvious that, as the 
important parts of shadow economy, the constraint of corruption of bank officials and the 
financing constraints can also replace each other (Buehn and Schneider, 2006). 
 
Corruption is a non-transparent activity that an investor pays a bribe to an official to seek 
benefits, such as the unfair court judgement and the funding supports from Chinese banking 
system. Due to the illegal nature of corruption, it will create an atmosphere of uncertainty for 
investment. Acting as an additional tax on FDI, corruption may create incentives for investors to 
move away from under the control of government regulations. Subsequently, corruption reduces 
a firm’s competitive advantage with less protection and the probability to fairly settle the 
disputes between foreign and local firms in the courts. In China, the financing obstacles lead to 
the constraint of corruption of bank officials, and the corruption in judicial systems results in the 
constraints related to the courts. However, as the investigation of corruption is a very political 
sensitive area in China, a personal exploration can be regarded as the illegal behaviour and 
the individuals involved in the survey might be sentenced to jail unless the survey is approved 
by the government. Moreover, as this permission means the Chinese governmental 
involvement in the whole survey process, this survey would not be independent any more 
once the government is also able to access the survey dataset. Thus, although the WBES is 
officially granted in China, it is reasonably to believe that the persons surveyed logically choose 
the other business constraints closely related to the corruption factors to describe the corruption, 
instead of answering the political sensitive questions directly. To sum up, subject to the 
availability of corruption data officially approved, the interaction between the formal and 
 245 
informal institutions mainly is a substitute relation between them. As a consequence, the study 
of the informal institutions in China can be substituted by the analysis of the formal institutions.    
9.3.5 The business constraints and the three main elements of NIE 
The evaluation of business constraints implies the different aspects of business operation in 
China, i. e. a rapid economic growth, macro policies to attract the FDI inflows, business 
regulations to apply these policies, financial supports connected with the reforms, legal and 
administrative reforms to protect the benefits of investment, anti-corruption and anti-unfair 
competition efforts to correct the bias in the competition. Besides the improvement in the 
Chinese business environment, there exist some obvious shortcomings of the institutions, such 
as the obstacles for private investment and their business operation. Based on the individual 
evaluation between the business constraints and the institutions, it is also important to apply the 
theoretical foundation - the NIE - to evaluate the application of Chinese reforming policies and 
the business constraints as a whole. The three core elements of the NIE, which are transaction 
cost, PA theory, and the property right, are all closely connected with the reforming procedure 
in China. The efforts to change the formal and informal institutions work together and lead to 
the extraordinary achievement-a better business performance and rapid economic growth. 
 
China faced problems to develop its economy in the beginning and afterward, i.e. the shortage 
of capital, skilled labour, resource as the normal constraints for every nation (Smith, 1776). 
However, even if China acquires these essential resources for its economic growth, as a transit 
economy, China has to overcome more obstacles connected with its existing system under the 
control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Lin, 2009). Therefore, it is urgent to abandon 
its Marxist institutions to build a marketing oriented economy. However, the core reason of 
economic reform is to keep the political power of the CCP, and the reforming or changing 
process should be gradually improved to avoid the social crisis happening in the other countries, 
instead of a “shock” treatment. It requires the changes or reforms that can only be externally 
started in the beginning and then sustained internally. Also, the reform needs to be monitored 
and directed by the international mechanism to get rid of the Communist effects in the domestic 
financial, legal, and administrative areas (Behr, 2007; Hutchens, 2003; Chen, 2010). 
 
To achieve a sustainable growth, China has to create a business system based on marketing 
competition that disappeared once China was controlled by the CCP in 1949. It is thus essential 
for the Chinese reform designers to combine the individual benefits and their contributions 
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altogether to encourage the individual incentives of actively making profits and innovation. 
When considering the objective of building this necessary basis, a number of new governmental 
policies should be issued and their effectiveness and influences depend on the application of PA 
theory. Under the mechanism following PA theory, the principal’s resources are able direct the 
agent’ behaviours by satisfying the objectives and interests of the agent. On the other side, as 
the trust between them is essential in a long-standing principal-agent relation, the principal has 
to find a proper approach to monitor the agent’s performances when minimising or avoiding the 
additional costs in the evaluation and judgement of the principal. Clearly, a marketing oriented 
system with the design of contract included is an appropriate arrangement to assure the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the PA relation. 
 
The private property right is centrally located in business growth. The NIE agree that good 
institutions must secure property rights, enabling people to keep the returns on their investment, 
make contracts, and resolve disputes. The security of property rights can boot the investment in 
human capital and in physical capital. It is thus necessary that the individuals are able to gain 
benefits from the production and exchange, and to take the risks of losses in marketing 
transaction.  Admitting to private ownership can assure the individual’s ability to have profits or 
losses in competition as there is no ability to make any contracts or agreements compulsory to 
individuals. Given this ability under their own control, the individual can have its inner 
motivation to pursue its own benefits. At a macro level, the PA relation can have an effect on 
the expectation of the individuals and in turn to influence their behaviours. 
 
However, private property rights and market based economies are both entirely against the 
principles of the Marxist. Under the control of the CCP, any behaviour related to them was 
regarded as illegal before the 1980s. It is impossible to create market competition and private 
ownership internally in China. In fact, the underdeveloped economy was also a threat to the 
CCP and it might lose the control of China. Thus, the private ownership can only be introduced 
from overseas and the FDI is the best option to start the reform. In additions to the fact that the 
FDI itself can solve the problems of capital shortage, the introduction of FDI also transported 
the private property right in China. More importantly, the CCP government has to protect 
private ownership because the government has signed the multilateral and bilateral agreements 
of investment protection. To avoid the possibility of economic crisis caused by a U-turn reform, 
China set up a dual legal system and economic system to deal with the FIEs and domestic 
invested firms respectively. The dual system consists of legislation, finance, marketing 
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administration, anti-corruption, rules and regulations. When the economic growth target is 
successfully achieved, the advantages of private property rights can be realised and recognised 
by public. Gradually, the acceptance of private ownership results in the intangible changes in 
China. With the changes in economy and society, the official and public recognition of domestic 
private ownership will help accelerate the in depth business growth. Therefore, even in Post-
WTO China, the political economy of reforms suggests that “although evolutionary trends point 
towards convergence in the long term, the dual systems of foreign investment regulation are 
likely to persist, at least to some degree, in the foreseeable short term” (Huang, 2009: 187). 
 
After smoothing the conflict between the Communist principles in Chinese authorities and the 
development objective of building a marked based economy with private ownership, the tasks 
should concentrate on the efforts to reducing the transaction costs in China. As the transactions 
are connected with costs that might result in the uncertainty, a large amount of transaction costs 
can even cause market failures (North, 1993; Williamson, 1985). As “transaction costs are those 
costs involved in measuring what is being exchanged and in enforcing agreements” and 
“competition plays a critical role in reducing enforcement costs” (North, 1993: 160), the priority 
for developing countries is to reduce the transacting costs in order to attain an efficient market 
operation to develop the business subsequently. 
 
According to the United States Trade Representative (2011: 2-3), “following China’s accession 
to the WTO, Chinese leaders took many impressive steps to implement a set of sweeping 
commitments. China reduced tariffs, eliminated non-tariff barriers that denied national treatment 
and market access for goods and services imported from other WTO members, and made legal 
improvements in intellectual property protections and in transparency. These steps 
unquestionably deepened China’s integration into the international trading system, 
strengthening both China’s rule of law and the economic reforms that China had begun in 1978. 
……Despite this progress, the overall picture currently presented by China’s WTO membership 
remains complex, given a troubling trend in China toward intensified state intervention in the 
Chinese economy …… Increasingly, trade frictions with China can be traced to China’s pursuit 
of industrial policies that rely on trade-distorting government actions to promote or protect 
China’s state-owned enterprises and domestic industries. In fact, in recent years, China seems to 
be embracing state capitalism more strongly, rather than continuing to move toward the 
economic reform goals that originally drove its pursuit of WTO membership. ……some 
Chinese government policies and practices raised increasing concerns that China had not yet 
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fully embraced the key WTO principles of market access, non-discrimination and transparency. 
……the prevalence of interventionist policies and practices, coupled with the large role of state-
owned enterprises in China’s economy, continued to generate significant concerns ……. Major 
issues included China’s indigenous innovation policies, serious problems with intellectual 
property rights enforcement, and China’s slow movement toward accession to the WTO 
Government Procurement Agreement, as well as continued market access barriers and 
discrimination against foreign enterprises in numerous sectors of China’s economy”. 
 
NIE scholars consider the institutions are made up of the formal and informal institutions. 
Differed from the Western economies, the author tries to allocate the transaction costs in 
China into three different categories that contain both types. The transaction costs in the 
first category are connected with the activities of transaction in business operation and 
market competition (Coast, 1960; Johanson and Vahlne, 1990; Liu, 1995; Standifird and 
Marshall, 2000). Similar to those in the other countries based on a market based economy, this 
kind of transaction costs can be reduced to a minimum level, but it will never disappear in 
reality. However, in the beginning of economic reform, this kind of transaction costs are fairly 
high as there is no real market and competition in China. The reforms related to these 
transaction costs should be linked to the attempts to study and introduce the experiences of the 
other countries having an advanced marketing operation. Therefore, the application of this kind 
of reforms is mainly dependent on the multilateral and bilateral negotiation on one side, and the 
introduction of a matured institutional system to maintain marketing operation on the other side.  
 
After the reform started, there are actually two other kinds of institutions belonging to the 
second category, which are the existing institutions based on the CCP’s principles and the 
institutions being set up coming from the Capitalist side (Bremmer, 2010; Guthrie, 2001; Jones, 
1994; Li et al., 2000; White et al., 1996) . The dual system in the reforms is inevitable to avoid 
any possible chaos and confusions caused by the conflicting institutions in one country. The 
transaction costs emerge and they are the conflicts between the issues related to the dual systems 
in China. The aim of protecting the principles of Marxist and encouraging market competition 
causes an inevitable problem for the CCP as the Marxist aims to eliminate the Capitalist. With 
this dilemma, no policies and the applications related are entirely able to reach the original aims 
of economic growth and development.  
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As a result, the implementation of reforms in China comprises differences at various aspects. In 
the beginning, the most apparent one is the geographical difference when FDI can only be 
operated in specific cities and areas. The block caused by regional differences brings out the 
supply and demand problems in business operation. On the supply side, the FIEs cannot acquire 
the materials needed for production, while it is impossible to extend their market on the demand 
side. The most important dissimilarity is the different legal and administrative protection due to 
the ownership difference. Those FDI favoured arrangements create an unfair competition for the 
domestic firms as only the FIEs are entitled in having the special advantages. To gain the 
business benefits, the fake FDI inflow appears as the origin funding of FDI is actually China’s 
overseas investment. In other words, it is Chinese funding that invests overseas and then flows 
back to China to be qualified for FDI favoured advantages (Salidjanova, 2011). That is why the 
unequal management created by the government also raises the costs in transaction and 
competition. The transaction costs in this category can be also reduced to a minimum level and 
to be ultimately removed once the dual system disappears in China.  
 
After removing these two differences, the transaction costs belonging to the third category 
are the most problematic, which is the treatment differentiation in practice (Birner and 
Wittmer, 2004; Huang, 2011; Luo, 2002; Park and Luo, 2001). This distinction is because of 
different ownership although the firms should be treated equally according to the official 
documents of the WTO accession. For example, the financial funding from national banking 
system favours the SOEs, while both private firms and the FIEs cannot have the equal 
assistance. Upon the Chinese official documents, it is impossible to find the reasons connected 
with the problems in this category. However, the costs indeed exist in the business operation of 
foreign investment and domestic private investors. This kind of transaction costs can thus be 
allocated to the formal and informal institutions. Since the Chinese economy and society was 
under the control of the CCP for more than 60 years, the principles of Marxist have already been 
rooted into the social minds in this country. Though the reform took place more than thirty years 
ago, the foreign ownership and domestic private ownership appeared only in some specific 
regions for the 1980s and they have been lawfully recognised for about only 15 years. 
Understandably, nobody was willing to take the risks to support the growth of private sector as 
the private ownership was illegal for about half a century in China. Even if it seems that the 
private ownership is officially recognised and legally protected now, the character of Chinese 
government and the fact that the CCP completely controls the country determine the attitudes of 
government and the agencies related. Instead of an ultimate objective of the adoption of private 
 250 
ownership as a path to achieve the economic growth,  the development of private ownership 
must not be beyond the control and the accepting range of the CCP. The CCP has to avoid any 
threats on the SOEs coming from the development of private sector, by trying to control its 
expansion. Therefore, the bottom line is the CCP will never lose the benefits connected with its 
supreme power and authority in China. Due to the conflict between private ownership and the 
CCP, the transaction costs in the third category can be gradually reduced along with the 
continuous reforming efforts. However, it will never be abolished unless a 100% market 
oriented economy is set up and China gives up the Marxism entirely. 
 
9.3.6 Summary 
The author discusses the research findings of the previous three chapters. After reviewing the 
findings individually, the author examines the connection between the business constrains and 
the characteristics of the firms to study the influences of reforming the institutions in China. 
Based on the investigation of Chinese efforts in reducing business constraints respectively, 
including financing, business competition, corruption, legislation, rules and regulation, the 
author finds the principal explanation that might lead to the economic achievement in China - 
private ownership. All the reforms seem to be connected with this core element to change the 
institutions in China, and the institutions linked to private ownership may be also the reason of 
transaction cost increasing or decreasing. To sum up, the private ownership could be a key to 
reducing the transaction costs to achieve the efficiency of economic operation, while it might 
also become the difficulty that makes the transaction costs larger and preventing business 
growth in China. 
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Chapter 10 Conclusion  
 
10.1 Research conclusion  
In this thesis, the author has chosen the NIEs as the theoretical foundation to investigate the role 
of the business constraints in determining the firms’ business performance in China. The 
findings show that institutional factors are as important as economic factors in regards to 
influencing business performance. The formal institutions include the financial constraints, 
competition constraints, legal constraints, rules and regulations constraints. Subject to the 
availability and limitation of research data, the informal institutions consider corruption, both as 
the general and specific constraint. 
 
Based on the WBES data, this thesis examined the differences of the institutional constraints on 
the business performance, in terms of sales and investment. The author examined the existence 
of disparities among the firm categories with different ownership, consisting of 
foreign/domestic firms, and private/non-private firms. The author also assessed the disparities 
according to the firms with different size to see the role of firm size in determining the business 
performance, and the disparities that are closely connected with the nature of the Chinese 
business environment. In the context of the reforming outcomes and efforts in China, the author 
investigates both the effects of the general/specific constraints on the firms’ sales and 
investment, to reveal the practical effects of the reforms.  
 
Chapter 6 assesses the importance of the institutional and non-institutional constraints for the 
business in China, as well as assessing the importance of these constraints across different firm 
categories (firms with and without foreign ownership, private and the non private firms, and 
firms with different sizes). The results show that the firms are concerned with the institutional 
factors, such as corruption, tax and regulation, and financing. This chapter displays that the 
informal institutions such as corruption and the formal institutions such as tax regulation and 
legal system are of the same importance to the business operation of the different firm 
categories in China.  
 
Upon the results of the Levene’s test and the Error bar in Chapter 7, the proportional 
discrepancies between firm categories exhibit their different abilities when facing the 
constraints. The overall results also indicate that the disparities in the perception to the 
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constraints can be associated with the nature of the firms as well as the character of business 
environment. There are three factors that are significant at 95% directly because of the factor of 
foreign ownership, including financing as a general constraint, court enforceability as judicial 
constraint, and access to foreign bank as a finance constraint. The three constraints belong to the 
formal institutions, and no informal institutional constraint is significant. Moreover, when 
facing specific business constraints, the large variance displayed by the group of the foreign 
firms shows that the group is not homogenous. This would indicate that not all foreign firms 
perceive the business obstacles in the same way, as the other characters of these firms also play 
a role to deal with the business constraints, such as the factors of firm size and private 
ownership. In the category of the private/non private firms, two business constraints are 
statistically significant at 95%. These are financing as the general constraint and paper work as 
the specific financing constraint. Moreover, the private firms are less constrained by these two 
significant factors than the non private firms. For all other constraints, the private firm group 
and the non private firm group again show the larger variance. The way in which the responses 
are not homogenous demonstrates that there should be other factors that have an influence on 
the business operation. The author also notes the reforming efforts for the FIEs and the practical 
advantages of the large size SOEs are the elemental issues causing these differences. 
 
In Chapter 8, the author does not only explore the business constraints statistically significant 
related to foreign ownership factor, but also examine the constraints significant in the private 
firm category. The regression analysis is based on the statistically significant variables in 
Chapter 7, as a general constraint, finance is the only one factor that is statistically significant to 
the both two categories. Among the individual business constraints, “court-enforceability” and 
“finance-access to foreign bank” are significantly related to the category of firms with and 
without foreign ownership, and “finance-paper work” is significant to the difference between 
private and non private firms. In the logistic regression analysis, the variable “finance” is not 
statistically significant to influence the change of business performance. In the categorical 
regression analysis, finance is only significant in influencing the sale growth in the previous 
three years, and its effect is negative. In the logistic regression analysis of “enforceability” and 
“access to foreign bank”, the four models are insignificant. The variable “enforceability” is 
statistically significant to the change of sales in future three years, and the factor named “access 
to foreign bank” is statistically significant in leading the investment change in the future three 
years. In the categorical regression analysis, they are not significant to influence the business 
performance. In the logistic regression analysis, the variable of paper work is not significant in 
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all four models at the critical value of 95%. Compared to the critical value of 75%, the variable 
of paper work is statistically significant to affect the sale change in future three years. In the 
categorical regression analysis, this factor is not significant to influence the sale growth and 
investment growth at the given critical value of 95%. However, compared to the 75%, the 
variable of paper work is significant and negatively influences the sales growth in previous three 
years.  
 
According to the analysis and discussion, the author concludes that the business constraints 
might not be statistically significant to influence the business performance, although the same 
constraints are statistically significant in relation to the different firm categories studied. Even if 
these constraints are significant, their influences are not consistent and continuous. In other 
words, the significant relations only exist either in previous three years or in future three years, 
either in sales growth or in investment growth. In addition, there are other factors that are 
significant which influence business performance although their influences are also inconsistent 
and discontinuous, such as firm age, sector, and firm size.  
 
The author also notes that the influences of the institutional constraints reported by the 
hypotheses vary in different occasions according to the type of the firms studied, i.e. the 
foreign/domestic firms, the private/non private firms, small, medium and large firms. Therefore, 
these specific characters of the firms can determine the ability of these firms to access the 
information and business network. Consequently, the insider and outsider proposal is supported 
by this research. However, these significant relations between the institutions and the business 
performance cannot be kept consistent and continuous, and the informal institutions do not 
significantly influence the business performance in China. In short, the influences of institutions 
on the business performance are limited in China, in terms of sales and investment. These 
results imply that the comparison should look for other key factors rather than the firms’ 
inherent nature. 
 
At a macro level, the author emphasises the importance of taking into consideration the structure 
and characteristics of the Chinese economy in order to make a comprehensive conclusion about 
the capacity of the firms dealing with the institutional constraints in China, which includes 
existing Marxist influences and on-going reforms. Indeed, the SOEs enjoy the various 
advantages provided by the Communist government. On the contrary, for both the firms with 
foreign ownership and the private firms, the traditional aspects of and the present information 
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about the Chinese business environment report a number of disadvantages in competition. 
Seemingly, the reforms announced by China are meant to contribute to the growth of FDI 
inflows and domestic private investment. However, a lot of reforming efforts still stay on paper, 
instead of having an effect in practice. As a result, reform is still far less than an essential level 
to maintain a continuous growth for the foreign and the private firms. Instead, the reform has 
encouraged the business operations of a large inefficient sector of SOEs and has limited the 
expansion of the firms with non-state ownership, aiming to ultimately protect the socialist 
economy in China.  
 
The author also concludes that, among the institutional constraints, the business performances of 
both the foreign firms and the private firms are most constrained by financing. In the financing 
reforms, there is an obvious conflict between these reforms as announced and their practical 
influences, and the largest share of national banking system credit funds flows to non-private 
firms in China, such as the SOEs. For the foreign and the private firms, the financial support 
from the national banks is limited and far less than their demand. Consequently, as the top 
constraint, financing prevents their business performance. Among the specific financing 
constraints, the institutions limit the supports to the foreign firms. The private firms also have to 
face more problems in getting domestic funds, and their efforts to access the funds abroad are 
blocked because of the existing institutional constraints in China.  
 
Among business competition constraints, no factor is significant to influence the business 
performance of the foreign or private firms. For the constraint of DP, the behaviours of Chinese 
government and the financing support related toward the SOEs are the reasons behind the 
insignificant concerns of DP. In other words, because of the WTO accession agreement signed 
by China, the function of financing has taken the place of the other constraints, such as DP and 
RS, and financing issues also make the constraint of RS become less important in China. In term 
of VP, there are reforming efforts to establish the mechanism to protect patents and other 
intellectual property rights, and the social common reorganisation of patent protection has also 
been gradually set up in China. In other words, the reforms of formal institutions of patent 
protection successfully change the informal institutions related in China.  
 
Although every firm is constrained by the judicial constraints, the foreign firms are more 
constrained than the domestic firms, and private firms are more judicially constrained than non-
private firms. Thus, the FDI favourite policies and the judicial reforms connected in China are 
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partly failed to achieve their original objectives of setting up an efficient and effective judicial 
system for business operation. During the reforming time, the reform in the judicial system is 
successful before 2001 and is unsuccessful afterward. Without an independent and efficient 
judicial system, the obvious reason of the ineffective judicial reform is that many laws are not 
effectively enforced in Communist China. Basically, there are the unavoidable conflicts of the 
interest between enforcing the judicial independence and keeping the monopoly power of the 
Communist Party in the judicial system, particularly when facing the involvement of the SOEs 
in the judicial cases. 
 
On the domestic side, the legislation reform leads to the changes of rules and regulations in 
China. On the international side, the WTO agreement brings the multilateral mechanism to 
China, and the bilateral agreements also support the institutional reforms in rules and 
regulations, including the bilateral investment treaty and the free trade agreement. The 
international cooperation removes the business obstacles and directs the reforms of rules and 
regulations, to build a favourite business environment. Thus, no firms choose the factor of rules 
and regulations as their top business constraint. However, the fact that the constraint of foreign 
exchange regulation is significant to the ownership difference indicates the success of reforming 
in Chinese foreign exchange policies. 
 
The foreign firms are less constrained by corruption, and the private firms are more constrained. 
Moreover, the corruption constraints are not significant to the difference of firm ownership, 
either as a general constraint or as a specific constraint. The ownership is thus not the central 
issue connected with the constraints of corruption. As the informal institutions, the corruption 
becomes more serious in China and the firms are more constrained than before. Compared with 
the other developing countries, the corruption is not obviously worse in China. In addition, a 
growing market size and more business opportunities along with a rapid economic growth in 
China should be able to compensate the negative effects caused by corruptions. More 
importantly, the formal and informal institutions substitute each other; some significant 
variables can indicate the corruption closely associated with the other constraints in financing, 
in legislation, in business competition, and in rules and regulations. 
 
The author also concludes that the firm’s characters can also partly explain these differences. 
For example, the firms with different sizes have different response to the institutional 
constraints, and the firm size can play an important role in shaping the business operation. 
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Although no general constraint is significant at 95%, three specific constraints are significantly 
related to the firm size factor, including the competition constraint of no duties, the financing 
constraints of access to non-bank equity and long term loan. The role of firm size is thus 
complex when facing business constraints and the general trends of this role are various too.  
 
The author notes that, the results also indicate the potential advantage that the domestic firms 
have over the foreign firms due to the familiarity of domestic business environment. With 
regard to accessing the domestic network, the potential advantage is connected with the access 
to the network as part of the accumulative social capital that the domestic firms have been 
undertaken all along their existence in the Chinese business environment. The social network 
allows them pooling resources, sharing information, the generation of trust among the members 
and securing the predictable behaviours and assuring the outcome of some decision makers. On 
the other side, as the reforms were originally and officially conducted by government to attract 
the FDI inflows, the foreign firms also have their comparative advantages in financing, 
legislation, court, competition, corruption, and rules and regulations.  
 
In addition, the author highlights that the large variance displayed by the group of the foreign 
firms indicates that this group is not homogenous, because not all foreign firms perceive the 
business obstacles in the same way and some foreign owners can have similar access to the 
network of Chinese business environment as the domestic firms. For instance, the capacity of 
the domestic partner in the joint venture is able to allow the foreign firms to access the domestic 
market network and reduce the transaction costs associated with market entry. Moreover, this 
author finds the factor of firm age is not as important as the other factors in affecting the 
business performance, such as the sector and the firm size. In other words, once entering the 
market, all the firms that have been investigated in this thesis can soon access to local network 
and be very quickly familiar with the Chinese business environment.   
 
The author finds that the impact of corruption is apparently limited in affecting the business 
performance in China. The author assesses the importance of the interaction between the formal 
institutions and the informal institutions on the firms’ business performance. That is, the direct 
effect of both types of institutional constraints on the business performance is on one hand, and 
the interaction between the formal institutional and informal institutional constraints is on the 
other hand. In other words, the substitute relation between the informal institutions and the 
formal institutions contributes and explains why the informal institutional constraints are not 
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statistically significant to influence the business performance. The interaction implied that the 
firms should be aware of the situations when and whether the use of informal rules damage or 
are replaced by formal rules in transaction and exchanges. The findings also demonstrated that 
the corruption through the formal institutions negatively influences the business performance in 
previous and in future. As a result, it is necessary for the firms operating in China develop 
higher awareness about the potential influences caused by the informal institutional constraints 
on the business operation and business performance, especially such as corruption.  
 
The author furthermore indicates that all these activities are undertaken by Chinese government 
who should continue its reforming efforts to provide a more efficient business environment for 
transaction and exchange. As there is a serious conflict between the Communist principles and 
the marketing orient reforms, the government should introduce the civic participation in the 
process of increasing the level of freedom in economy and in society. Amongst the reforming 
policies, strengthening quality and effectiveness of rules of law and finance system should 
constitute one of the top priorities to improve the business performance, and the efforts to 
remove the root of causing corruption should also be undertaken. This involves developing 
strong and effective courts to strengthen social to reduce the transaction costs for exchanges. 
The reforms and the establishment should be associated with development of transparency in 
transaction operations, not only within the state apparatus and bureaucracy but also among 
public, private and civil society. All of these can focus on and alter the costs imposed by bad 
laws, poor enforcement, corruption, administrative discretion, and monopoly practices.  
 
As a result, because of the problems of transparency and accountability in China, more efforts 
have to be arranged on developing an efficient mechanism to promote transparency across the 
transactions and exchanges. As the United States Trade Representative (2011: 3) notes, 
“essential work for China includes the need to reduce market access barriers, uniformly follow 
the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and transparency, fully embrace the rule of 
law, and fully institutionalize market mechanisms. Completing this work is critical to realizing 
the tremendous potential presented by China’s WTO membership, including the breadth and 
depth of trade and investment”. Correspondingly, there are several priority issues to build a 
more efficient institutional system in China, including intellectual property rights, industrial 
policies, trading rights and distribution services, agriculture, services, and transparency. The 
tasks ahead comprise not only a framework of laws and regulations, but also an effective 
enforcement of the laws and regulations in the Chinese business environment. 
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To create trust and reduce transactions costs, China should additionally focus on developing the 
positive aspects of the informal institutions, by improving and strengthening the cooperative 
behaviour based on trust derived from the existing social network, to improve the enforcement 
and effectiveness of the formal rules. Moreover, the public-private partnership is helpful to 
promote the existing informal mechanisms to ease the constraints associated with formal rules. 
Admitting the importance of the interaction between the formal and informal institutions, the 
reforming policies must stress on improving the adaptive efficiency of the informal rules after a 
change in the formal rules.   
10.2 Limitation and difficulties in undertaking the research 
In this thesis, the author has discussed several sensitive issues in a Communist country in order 
to identify and disclose the characteristics of the Chinese institutional framework. These issues 
consist of the nature of informal constraints that intervene in the Chinese economy and society 
in general, and in the business environment in particular. These are sensitive issues which 
contravene Communist Principles, whereby the investigation or data collection into such 
subjects may result in breaking the laws controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, it is 
expectable for the researcher to face practical obstacles due to the risk in the investigation of 
these informal institutions. The issue of corruption can be highlighted as one such difficult 
subject. In this regard, the examination of these topics in China does not only require confidence 
and trust, but the researcher must also be aware of the legal implications and punishments 
sanctioned by the Communist government. To overcome these problems, the author would have 
had to set up personal networks in order to gain access to the firms. This would have required an 
extensive amount of time and a considerable amount of financial resources. Time and financial 
resources were two major constraints faced in this research. As a result, despite the potential 
methodological problems associated with such methods, the author has to depend on the 
existing data of the WBES, which has been approved by the Chinese government. According to 
the responses received in China, it is obvious that managers were not comfortable dealing with 
the issues of corruption and other informal institutions.  
 
In the comparison with other data sources, (Chapter 5: section 5.3.1), especially with the ES, the 
WBES has several advantages to be chosen in this research.  
1. According to the official explanation of ES methodology, the firms with 100% 
government/state ownership are not eligible to participate in ES. However, in this 
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research, a number of hypotheses concentrate on the difference of the business 
constraints on the firms with or without government/state ownership. Without full state 
owned firms, the dataset itself is not sufficient for research exploration. By using the 
WBES, it becomes possible to provide a convinced investigation about the institutional 
constraints on the business performances of the private firms (without government 
ownership) and non-private firms (with government ownership). 
2. The WBES “primarily collected perception data regarding constraints and some 
information on firm performance” (Aterido et al., 2009: 7). Perception is very important 
to investigate the institutions, especially in regards to institutional changes. This type of 
perception data is not widely available in the ES. This thesis’s theoretical foundation is 
NIEs, and it is necessary to have a collection of perception data to clarify the 
relationship between formal and informal institutions and their connections. The WBES 
can mostly fulfil this request. 
3. The ES concentrates on the firms’ business performance data for the use of accountants 
when filling in financial statements such as business income, expenses, and profits. It is 
thus not appropriate for this study because a firm’s profit might be influenced by the 
fluctuation of transfer prices, especially for firms with foreign ownership in a developing 
country. The WBES data includes both sales and investment data that can reflect the 
business operation at the firm level. 
4. The ES covers a similar area as that of the WBES, and can be regarded as a simplified 
format of the WBES. The ES covers eight aspects of the business environment. This list 
includes infrastructure; access to finance; labour market; corruption & regulatory 
burden; court & crime; innovation & technology, and trade. The WBES carries 
information regarding to questions about nine areas: financing; infrastructure; policy 
instability; inflation; exchange rate; street crime; organised crime; taxes & regulation, 
and corruption. Compared with the ES, the WBES places an emphasis on questions 
about institutional constraints on the firms’ performance, and questions related to the 
specific institutional constraint are also covered. 
5. The WBES explores the following areas that are important in this thesis: “To provide 
feedback from enterprises on the state of the private sector; to measure the quality of 
governance and public services including the extent of corruption; to provide better 
information on constraints to private sector growth, from the enterprise perspective; to 
sensitize client governments to the importance of listening to firms and using this 
information to critically assess policies; to establish the basis for internationally 
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comparable indicators which can track changes in the business environment over time, 
thus allowing an assessment of the impact of market oriented reforms on private 
enterprises; to stimulate systematic public-private dialogue on business perceptions and 
the agenda for reform” (Batra et al., 2003: 3). 
6. The WBES instrument is broad in its coverage and includes information on business 
environment attributes and firm level attributes including information on firm size; years 
of operation; sales; debt and growth performance; ownership nature and source of 
finance. There are also evaluations on issues such as corruption and governance; the 
regulatory regime; economic policy predictability; the nature of competition; public 
service delivery and government bureaucracy; the judicial system; banking system; 
financing and general constraints to business operation.  
7. The WBES is the first survey that China agreed to take part in. Based on face-to-face 
interviews with managers and owners, the WBES is designed to generate comparative 
measurements in such areas as corruption, judiciary, lobbying, and the quality of the 
business environment, which can then be related to specific firm characteristics and firm 
performance. Response rates were generally high, with the exception of responses to 
questions on bribery. It uses a consistent methodology and parallel parameters. 
8. The cost of conducting such a survey is beyond the ability of the author. The problems 
are linked mostly to the nature of this research and to some of the questions it raises, 
particularly with regard to politically related questions for the Chinese Communist Party 
such as the corruption of government officials and the evaluation of governmental 
behaviours. More seriously, it is likely for a researcher to face some offences in 
attempting to collect corruption data in China. The human, financial and political 
resources of the World Bank are difficult to match as the WBES provides panoply of 
different firms that embody different characteristics that are crucial to test the 
hypotheses of this research. 
 
Using the WBES as the main source of research data in this thesis has several shortcomings. 
The limitations originally exist in the procedure of data collection and limit the data analysis and 
research discussion afterwards. The author has recognised the fact that some categories under 
the investigation have a low proportion of observations. This is another limitation of this study. 
Consequently, the findings of this research should be treated with caution due to the following 
limitations.  
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1. The first limitation is connected with the subjective issues in the whole research 
procedure, both in choosing research data and in the data analysis practice. The author 
has to compare the advantages and disadvantages among the available data source and 
then make a decision about which one is the most appropriate. Using SPSS to analyse 
data allows for several statistical tests which are available for the author to make 
judgements. Essentially, it is the researcher who selects the research data source, chooses 
a business model to carry out mathematical calculation, and then selects the appropriate 
statistical tests to make a conclusion. The process of statistical investigation and research 
conclusion are therefore totally subject to the person doing this research. 
2. The second limitation is because the WBES questionnaire data collection itself has 
the following shortcomings.  
2.1. The WBES only contacts the managers or owners, excluding persons who are also 
connected with the business operation of FIEs from different aspects. This includes 
the government officials involved in the FDI policies’ design or people taking part in 
FDI implementation. There are possibilities that such persons could also provide 
some important information.  
2.2. The WBES includes some survey questions about the performance in the previous 
three years. Other indicators in subjective areas might no longer be available either 
for memory lapse or as the particular information is only available at that time. Even 
if such data could be obtained, people might misclassify previous events and 
records, or recall details incorrectly. Additionally, it can also be said that recent 
experiences and events may bias recollection of earlier experiences, making 
inferences about trends or causation somewhat circular (Dex, 1991). Consequently, 
the information provided by select individuals might bring extra bias and negatively 
influence the quality of research.  
2.3. It is not easy for everyone to clarify those influences accurately, but the managers 
involved in the survey must be capable of summarising the business operation. They 
should be able to understand the survey questions correctly, and to express their 
ideas and minds clearly. During the procedure of the WBES data collection, 
translation is necessary. This involves translating questions into Chinese and 
translating subsequent responses into English. In this respect, it is often difficult or 
seemingly impossible to choose the most accurate vocabularies in the translation. 
This means that the translation process connected with data collection is dependent 
on the person who conducts the survey. 
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3. The third limitation is linked to the shortcoming of the WBES data investigation.  
3.1. Compared with the numerous numbers of enterprises in China, the sample size is so 
small that the results of data analysis and research conclusion could be debated. 
However, subject to the availability of survey data, especially in relation to the topic 
of corruption which remains a politically sensitive area in China, the WBES is still 
the best option to conduct this institutional research. 
3.2. The second problem is connected with the missing values. It is possible that some 
firms only answer some survey questions and did not provide answers to other 
questions. It could be argued that as the data for all survey questions might be 
incomplete, there could be debate in how best to apply the survey result and the 
subsequent analysis based on the survey to every firm involved the WBES. As the 
firms surveyed in the WBES did not answer the full survey questions, the questions 
they did not answer make the analysing result less convinced. It is not possible for 
these firms who did not answer particular questions to provide any further 
information to the WBES questions. As the research investigation can only depend 
on existing survey data, it is possible that the potential answers provided by these 
firms may demonstrate a different result of data analysis. It can be posed that 
potentially, the research conclusion should be treated with caution.  
3.3. The third problem relates to the consistency of the sampling size itself. In this thesis, 
the sampling size is not consistent throughout the whole research as the number of 
firms providing their survey answers are varied. The author has to address again that 
the inconsistent sampling size reduces the results of the data analysis and research 
conclusion. As a result, it is difficult for the scholar to apply the result of data 
analysis to every firm involved in the WBES. Accordingly, it is further difficult for 
the researcher to apply the research result to all firms in China. Thus it would be 
additionally problematic to make a convinced conclusion based on the research 
discussion. However, the inconsistent sample size does not mean that the opinions of 
the firms taking part in the WBES are worthless. The researcher can still analyse the 
mainstream of responses according to certain survey questions and then to 
demonstrate it to the business environment in China. 
 
To sum up, subject to availability, the WBES is the most appropriate data set for research. As a 
well-accepted database, the WBES could contribute to the research to investigating the business 
constraints on the firms’ performance in China. Choosing the WBES data, this study consists of 
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three different categories of firms which were all important to answer some research 
hypotheses, i.e. the firms with and without foreign ownership; private firms and non-private 
firms and the firms with different sizes and in different sectors. It would have been impossible 
for an individual researcher with limited resources to gather such comprehensive details and 
information on such politically and organisationally sensitive issues that would match the 
WBES. Moreover, the discussion of the WBES’s shortcomings points out the direction of 
further studies in future. Larger samples and the availability of panel surveys would have 
increased the ability to draw country specific inference and track changes over time. Moreover, 
because perceptions are only imperfectly related to underlying physical and cost conditions, it 
would have been valuable in surveys to complement perceptual data with greater use of 
quantitative questions that evaluate constraints as much as possible, supporting cross-country 
comparisons and providing a check on perceptual responses. 
10.3. Research implication 
This study provides a suggested research agenda with a range of opportunities. This research 
makes an effort to set the ground for further studies on the interaction between the formal and 
informal institutions to understand their influences on the business performances. This research 
also provides some issues and calls for further investigation about the importance of institutional 
framework in China.  
 
First, admitting the research limitation in the context of the availability of the survey data in 
China, a more widely based detailed empirical work is essential to cover the perception of 
different categories of the firms constrained by the institutions. In other words, a larger number 
of firms should be surveyed, including the firms with and without foreign ownership, private 
firms and non private firms, and the firms with different size. In addition, the questionnaire 
sample should also include the firms with other ownership types to see whether the mechanism 
of ownership difference affect the investors and managers to face the institutional constraints in 
the business transactions, such as the share of state ownership, with joint venture and without 
joint venture. If possible, future studies can also entail a sample of foreign firms with 
information on their operating duration in China, to investigate the competitive advantage 
between the first comers and the latecomers with regards to having more access to the 
information and networks of the local environment (Eden and Molot, 2002). 
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Second, the research reveals the firms’ business performance in terms of sales and investment is 
indeed constrained by the institutions. The influences on the business performance are 
complicated and determined by either the formal or the informal institutional constraints. This 
explanation implies that further research is required to understand how the dynamic of the 
interactive form of institutions affect the business performance. If a more detailed survey 
database is available, further research can be undertaken on the means and mechanisms between 
the business performance and the interaction of the formal and informal institutional constraints. 
Future investigation can also focus on the informal institutions about how they can act as 
substitutes and as complements to the formal institutions. This work will entail the investigation 
of the properties of the informal constraints that promote the enforcement characteristics of the 
formal rules. Therefore, further work should focus on the promotion of specific institutions to 
understand how to improve the adaptive efficiency of the informal institutional constraints when 
the formal institutions are altered. 
 
Upon a different philosophical foundation, future research can also choose a qualitative 
approach to investigate a more interactive process of how the firms’ business performance is 
constrained by the institutions. For example, further study can choose interviews within the 
business community to understand how the different individuals and agents actually reason and 
choose, individually and in collective settings. However, it needs to overcome the difficulties in 
collecting the data of the informal institutions, particularly about the corruption in China. 
Alternatively, a more empirical and accurate study can be based on both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to improve the understanding of social networks and their participants. This 
approach is very useful in understanding the change from one institutional setting to another and 
how the change can take place. This can also improve the understanding about how 
organisations interact with each other and how they use informal connections to gather 
information. In addition, this analysis is helpful in mapping the relationship between actors and 
organisations indicating the ways they are connected through various social familiarities, in the 
context of understanding the mechanisms that enter in the development of adaptive efficiency of 
informal rules after altering the formal institutions. Likewise, further studies can also be 
undertaken on the role of some institutions in explaining the behaviour of other economic agents 
constrained by some specific institutions. That is to say, it is possible to explore the relations 
between some economic agents and the particular institutional constraints. Obviously, it again 
addresses the importance and the value of conducting a more in depth business survey. More 
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essentially, this more detailed survey should be independently carried out and be out of the 
control of the Chinese Communist government. 
 
Four, this research suggests that the severity of the institutional constraints is significantly 
related to the size of the firms, and the influences of the firm size factor are very complicated in 
China. The future work can target the relation between the institutional constraints and the firm 
size factor to clarify the reasons resulting in the complex effects caused by the firm size. The 
researches between the institutions and firm size can also focus on each particular constraint to 
find about how they affect the firms of different sizes. These investigations can therefore be 
useful to reform the existing policies and to improve the behaviours of the government in China. 
 
Five, further studies can be undertaken at the different level. On one side, a cross-country 
investigation can focus the important aspects regionally or internationally to explain the national 
difference of the institutions and the business constraints. On the other side, an organisational 
study can concentrate on an individual business organisation to discover the organisational 
influences caused by the informal and formal institutions, in order to find out a more efficient 
business form and a more effective business reaction when facing the institutional constraints.   
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